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CHAPTER 12 
INTRODUCTION TO 1985-86 SURVEY, THE METHODS USED, AND 
THE DECLINE OF PRIVATE RENTING, 1979 TO 1985 
Introduction: Objectives of 1985-1986 Survey 
The publication of the 1981 census results confirmed the scale of the 
decline in private rented housing that had taken place since 1971 and 
which had been indicated by the results of the 1979-80 study of private 
renting in inner Sheffield. Table 12.1 shows that the intercensal decline 
had been very substantial, the number of households renting from private 
landlords in the whole of Sheffield falling 60 per cent, the fall being 
much greater among those renting unfurnished than furnished accommodation. 
By 1981 pri va te renting housed less than 10 per cent of the City's 
households, although in the inner city area, containing about half the 
City's households, it housed twice this proportion. 
The first survey of Sheffield's inner city private rented housing stock, 
households and landlords had confirmed that LHA policy did have an impact 
on private landlords' decisions, particularly in respect of getting modern 
amenities installed, of getting HMOs to meet model standards, and in 
influencing whether or not landlords continued to invest in HMOs. The 
research had also shown that changes in ownership had been an important 
factor in getting houses improved, as investors bought up property with 
sitting tenants, intending to sell for capital gain when they ultimately 
got vacant possession, meanwhile improving them with the aid of grants -
and being prepared to relet if a vacancy arose with five years of improve-
ment - so as not to repay the grant. It was also found that, whilst this 
speculative investment would assist with the installation of missing basic 
ameni ties in a proportion of the remainder of unimproved houses, many 
outstanding repairs did not seem to be done at the same time as amenities 
were put in and, and, moreover, that bigger improvement grants would be 
needed if all unimproved property was to be brought up to standard. 
As the previous chapters have indicated (and as Part 4 describes in much 
greater detail) the Housing Act, 1980 modified the improvement grant 
system in a number of ways which, on the Sheffield evidence, would 
assistant private landlords wanting to improve. For discretionary 
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Unfurnished 
1971 36,435* 
1981 12,660** 
Change (%) -65 
Source Census 1971 and 1981 
Furnished Total Percentage of 
6,410 
5,242 
-18 
Private Total Households 
Rented in Sheffield 
42,845 21.1 
17,902 8.8 
-18 
Notes * Includes Housing Associations in 1971 
** Includes renting with job and with business in 1981 (and in 
1971) 
Table 12.1 Households renting from private landlords in Sheffield 1971 
and 1981 
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improvement grants a new priority category for allowable costs and the 
rate of grant was established and this encompassed all dwellings without 
basic amenities and those in substantial and structural disrepair, not 
just those in HAAs. Thus all such dwellings got 75 per cent grants. 
Repairs grants were also extended beyond HAAs to embrace all dwellings 
built before 1919 in need of substantial and structural repair and payment 
of a grant became mandatory if LHAs served repairs enforcement notices. 
Between April 1982 and March 1984 the rate for repairs and intermediate 
grant was increased from 75 to 90 per cent. The proportion of a discre-
tionary grant which could be devoted to repairs of a substantial and 
structural nature was increased from 50 to 10 per cent (DoE, 1980) 
Between 1919 and 1985 there was a shift in LHA policy about private 
renting in Sheffield and there was also much greater formalisation of 
policy in its Housing Investment Programme strategy statements and in 
other policy documents. 
In using its, largely discretionary, powers about private renting it 
became Sheffield Council's policy to find the best way of improving the 
housing stock, consistent with its other priorities and available capital 
and staff resources (Sheffield City Council, 1983, 1985). It recognised 
that neither it, nor housing associations, had sufficient resources to 
acquire and improve private rented houses. Council policy was (and still 
is), therefore, to get landlords to improve to a 'reasonable' standard 
both by enforcement led action and agreed programming with owners, and to 
let on regulated tenancies at Fair Rents. 'While the private rented 
sector remains, strategic intervention is essential to control the rate of 
decline. If a secure, though inadequate home at a fair rent, with the 
basic amenities and properly maintained is the only foreseeable prospect 
for private rented tenants in the short term, local authority action must 
be directed to achieve these ends'. (Sheffield City Council 1983, 
Supplement 1). 
As far as houses (rather than houses in multiple occupation) are 
concerned, this action had been mainly directed in the past through the 
area improvement programme, but there were increasing attempts in the 
1980s to coordinate Council responsibilities about aid and advice to 
tenants on rents, agreements, security and harassment with its 
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responsibilities for grants and repairs enforcement. Until 1983, however, 
Council policies about standards and lettings were not always achieved, 
since standards were lower than in many other authorities and were not 
always consistently applied when officers used their discretion to be 
'flexible' about them - in the hope of securing some improvements instead 
of none. After 1983 it became Council policy to secure higher and more 
consistently applied standards when landlords improved and to 'target' its 
improvement programme to areas of greatest need. 
Improvement areas have been designated since the first GIA was declared in 
1972. By 1985 there were 18 GIAs and HAAs in existence. As Part 2 of this 
thesis explained, following a review of houses and areas provisionally 
scheduled for clearance, the first HAAs were declared in areas 'taken out' 
of the 'forward' clearance programme. By 1979 4 had been declared. Since 
then more declarations followed, but by 1985 the intention of declaring 
HAAs on an annual rolling programme basis had been thwarted by capital 
programme restrictions, though by 1985 a further 6 HAAs had been 
designated, including one which incorporated an 'enveloping' scheme (for 
enveloping, see Thomas, 1986). Sheffield had been deliberately cautious 
in its declarations, preferring to have 'live' only the number of HAAs it 
could deal with, given its capital and staff resources. Despite this 
limitation, Sheffield had been more active than many other authorities in 
contacting landlords, using compulsory powers and in also agreeing grant 
funding programmes with larger landlords. Until 1983 however it permitted 
one of the lowest standards, and did not always insist on rents being 
registered. By contrast it was vigorous in insisting on grant repayment 
for the breach of letting conditions on improvement grants (Martin, 1983). 
By 1985, policy was directed at the twin objectives of securing higher 
standards of amenity and repair and of securing tenants' rights in respect 
of rents and security, the latter involving not only aid and advice but 
ensuring, for example, that "'sham' licence agreements are challenged". 
(City of Sheffield 1983, Supplement 7). 
By 1985, therefore, there had not only been changes to the improvement 
grant system, but a general 'tightening up' and a greater coordination of 
LHA policy about private renting. By 1985, too, evidence had emerged that 
the findings of the original 1979-80 study in Sheffield were by no means 
unique. Postgraduate research under the author's supervision had been 
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carried out in 1982 about the policies of a sample of LHAs about their 
policies towards private renting (Martin, 1983). Interviews were also 
conducted with landlords of a sample of improved and unimproved properties 
in four LHAs with contras ting policies (Martin, 1985). This research 
showed that there had been an upturn in grant aided improvement by private 
landlords since 1980, that much of this was associated with what LHAs 
called a 'new breed' of landlords, many associated with the building 
trade, actively buying up property for capital gain. LHA policy about 
taking enforcement action was shown to be successful in getting long term 
landlords to improve. The pursuit of higher standards of repair and 
improvement was shown not to deter landlords, especially the so-called 
'new breed'. 
In view of the legislat1ve changes that had taken place (and alsothe 
policy changes within Sheffield and of the evidence from elsewhere that 
landlords were continuing to buy up sitting tenant property for improve-
ment, it was decided to undertake a follow up of the original 1979 panel 
of private rented housing, to monitor the changes that had taken place to 
the properties, tenants and their owners. The principal objective was to 
examine the changing pattern of investment, ownership and access to 
private renting between 1979 and 1985 and, in particular, to study the 
impact which ownership changes had on the improvement and repair of the 
stock and on the way it was managed and let, including the availability 
and terms of letting. The study was designed to find out how much of the 
stock had changed hands, whether it was being acquired by investors new to 
landlordism and, if so, whether these were landlords who were investing in 
improvement and prepared to relet, or were 'dealers' who were making short 
term speculative investments, buying tenanted property to sell with vacant 
possession when tenants moved out. More generally, it was designed to 
compare the policies and opinions of existing and new landlords about 
investment, improvement and management. 
This, and the succeeding two chapters, describe and discuss the findings 
ofa project on the changes that took place within Sheffield's private 
rented sector between 1979 and 1985. The trends were examined by repeat-
ing, in 1985/86, the linked sample survey of private rented properties; 
their tenants and landlords which was carried out in 1979/80. In 
combination these recall surveys provided data on the condition, occupancy 
410 
and ownership of a panel of private rented properties in both 1979 and 
1985. Most previous studies of changes in the private rented sector in 
England have relied on comparing the findings of a series of cross 
sectional studies. This project provided, therefore, a rare opportunity 
to undertaken a longitudinal study of a panel of private rented property 
and thus to examine the pattern of change over the six year period 
concerned. 
An earlier example of a recall survey of private rented housing is the 
1963 recall of a 1960 survey of private rented housing in Greater London, 
commissioned for the Milner Holland Committee on Housing in Greater 
London. The authors commended such follow up surveys in general (Gray and 
Todd, 1964). 
The chapters also look at the implications of these changes for future 
supply and at the lessons the changes have for future policy initiatives 
designed to sustain the private provision of rented housing, examining in 
particular rates of return on landlords' investment. One of the key 
findings of the research is that the continuing decline of private renting 
is accompanied by an active pattern of acquisition by speculative or 
'dealing' landlords, and a principle conc lus10n of the research is that 
the continuing gap between the sitting tenant and vacant possession value 
of properties not only encourages their sale by long standing landlords, 
but further hastens decline as 'dealing' landlords buy up tenanted 
property to sell as soon as possible for capital gain when they get vacant 
possession, a process in which the local authority plays an important 
mediating role. 
Survey Methods 
The methods are described in more detail in Appendix 3 and the 
questionnaires used will be found in Appendix 5. 
The previous 1979 and 1980 surveys were repeated. Although the 
questionnaires were enlarged in scope, they were designed to ensure that 
comparisons could be made on a wide range of issues, including house 
condition and rents. Thus the surveys included a repetition of the 1979 
external house condition survey, an interview with the 1985 occupants of 
411 
the 1979 sample of private rented houses, and subsequently with the 
landlords who owned in 1985 that part of the 1979 sector which was still 
pr1vate rented. 
Before briefly describing the methods and responses to these surveys three 
important qualifications about these recall surveys should be made. 
First, the addresses let as HMOs in 1979 (i.e. occupied by more than one 
household in 1979) were excluded from the follow up. They were not 
excluded because changes to them were uninteresting phenomena, but for the 
practical reason that those who funded the follow up study were already 
funding considerable research on HMOs and wished the author to concentrate 
on the changes that were taking place to singly occupied privately rented 
houses. However, since these latter houses included those let furnished 
to groups of unrelated adults living as a household, the survey did 
include some HMOs since they are covered by one of the IEHO's 
definit10ns, Category B HMOs: shared houses (See Chapter 2.3 of this 
volume and IEHO, 1985). 
Second, the follow up study traces only what happened to a sample of 
properties that were privately rented in 1979. It does not reveal whether 
any properties that were in other tenures, (or vacant), in 1979 had been 
transferred to private renting by 1985, nor does it identify any proper-
ties that were newly built for private renting. Conventional wisdom might 
suggest that these were unlikely to have happened - at least on any large 
scale, but conventional wisdom has not always proved a reliable guide to 
all private renting trends. It is important to stress that, whilst the 
1979 study was of a representative sample of all privately rented houses, 
the follow up survey is a study of what happened subsequently to this 
sample, i.e. it is a study of that panel, it is not (necessarily) a 
representative sample of private rented properties in 1985. 
The third - and related - point to stress is that this panel study is no 
freer of the problems that beset all such studies. In particular it 
should be stressed that there has been attrition in the sample. Proper-
ties that were vacant and particularly where no contact was made or where 
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contact was refused in 1979 did not get into the 1985 sample. To the 
extent that there has been cumulative non response (that is refusals and 
non-contacts also occurred in 1985), bias may have crept in. 
Excluding the properties let in 1979 as flats and bedsitters, a 100 per 
cent recall survey at all the 1,068 houses let to one single household in 
1979 was completed in June 1985 - with a response rate of 86 per cent, 
allowing for vacant and demolished properties. Interviews were held with 
the current households, including new owner occupiers and tenants, as well 
as any continuing tenants first interviewed in the earlier survey. As well 
as repeating the House Condition Survey done in 1979, the survey collected 
information about the property, household, tenancy and rents (or purchase 
price) enabling comparisons over the six years to be made on a wide range 
of housing, occupancy and tenancy heads. Since different proportions were 
taken as samples from each of the 1979 sample areas (such as HAAs), a 
weighted total is incorporated in the results to ensure that the samples 
are present in the total in their correct proportions. 
At the end of 1985, and in early 1986, an interview survey of the 305 
current landlords of the sample of 534 addresses still privately rented 
and with identified owners was carried out and, as in 1980, information 
was gathered about their specific policies for the sample addresses they 
owned, as well as their opinions and policies in general. It was not 
possible however to assemble information from landlords about all these 
addresses. Some simply owned far too many sample addresses for them to be 
expected to talk about all of them. Others had agents who responded to 
the interviews on their behalf, and some of these agents managed so many 
sample addresses that they could not be expected to talk about all of the 
sample properties of all of their clients. Landlords were therefore 
interviewed about a maximum of three sample addresses and agents completed 
short questionnaires for those they were unable to give full interviews 
about. In the end, a 75 per cent response from the 305 owners (or their 
agents) of the 534 addresses was achieved. Information on 273 of the 
sample addresses was obtained, inevitably biased towards furnished 
lettings and properties in the ownership of small landlords by the 
decision to restrict the collection of address-specific information to a 
maximum of three sample properties. To avoid reporting biased resul ts 
when the size of landlord is significant to the findings, some of the 
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results weight the sample according to the size of landlord so as to 
correct the underrepresentation of properties belonging to large 
landlords. 
Decline in private renting in inner Sheffield 1979 to 1985 
Although landlords said in 1979 they would relet 68 per cent of the houses 
let furnished if they became vacant 'tomorrow', they would relet only 32 
per cent of those let unfurnished. 
Table 12.1 and Figure 12.1 confirm that landlords carried out their plans 
to sell houses where vacancies occurred. Table 12.1 shows the proportion 
of houses which became vacant after 1979 and what happened to them in each 
sample area and for the sample as a whole. Since different proportions 
were taken as samples from each sample area, a weighted total is also 
shown to ensure that the sample areas are present in the total in their 
correct proportions. Figure 12.1 shows diagramatically the vacancies, 
sales and relets for this weighted total. 
The survey found, not only that 25 per cent of the 1979 stock belonged to 
owner occupiers in 1985, and 2 per cent either to the City Council or 
Housing Associations, but that 7 per cent of the stock had been demolished 
or was in non residential use by 1985. Altogether there had been a fall 
of 32 per cent by 1985 in the addresses in the panel which were privately 
rented. 
This fall was particularly steep in the case of houses let unfurnished in 
1979. Of the total of those still in residential use in 1985, 59 per 
cent were occupied by the same households who were tenants in 1979 and 
they were still privately rented. 4 per cent had been bought by the 1979 
household as sitting tenants, and 3 per cent belonged to Housing 
Associations or the Council. Over a third of the 1979 sample had become 
vacant at some time between the two surveys and had new occupants in 1985. 
Out of these vacancies, 59 per cent were sold to owner occupiers, 17 per 
cent were relet unfurnished and 24 per cent furnished. Sales to owner 
occupiers were at a lower rate in old HAAs, than elsewhere, reflecting 
letting conditions on improvement grants. The high rate at which 
unfurnished houses were relet furnished (with over half the unfurnished 
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relets being furnished) is significant because it is very much higher than 
would have been anticipated from the results of the 1980 landlord survey, 
when hardly any unfurnished properties had owners who said they would 
relet in this fashion. This change, as the next chapter confirms, is 
associated with changes in ownership. 
Almost all the stock let furnished in 1979 had new occupants by 1985 and 
the proportion sold to owner occupiers is, at 29 per cent, consistent with 
the intentions expressed by landlords in 1980. 
Figure 12.1 shows each of the ca tegor1es of sales and transfers from 
unfurnished to furnished lettings which have contributed to the 34 per 
cent fall in the number of houses let unfurnished and the slight increase 
in those let furnished. As a resul t of all the changes, the furnished 
sector's share of the total increased from 18 to 26 per cent. It is, of 
course, quite possible that the total stock had fallen less - and the 
furnished stock increased more - by virtue of acquisitions by landlords of 
empty property from outside private renting since 1979. In view of the 
result reported below: that some of the 'new' furnished property (but none 
of the relet unfurnished property) in the sample had been acquired vacant 
by new owners, this is more than mere conjecture as far as furnished 
lettings are concerned. 
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CHAPTER 13 
CHANGES TO PRIVATE RENTED HOUSES lID THEIR OWNERSHIP 1979 TO 1985 
Introduction 
Chapter 12 described the scale of the decline in private rented housing 
in the 1979 panel. This chapter examines some of the changes that occured 
to that part of the panel of addresses which were still privately rented 
in 1985. It examines tenants, landlords, improvements and repairs, 
letting agreements and rents. 
1979 to 1985: Old and New Tenants and Access to Private Renting 
Within the overall pattern of a falling supply of unfurnished houses and a 
stable supply of furnished ones, there were significant changes in the 
types of household occupying them, because the new tenants differed from 
those that they replaced. This was particularly noticeable in the case of 
houses that had been sold, where the new owners were predominantly young 
and in full time employment - the number of retired reflecting sitting 
tenant sales. The former tenants they replaced were mainly older and 
retired but also included student heads of houses formerly rented 
furnished. 
Figure 13.1 compares the economic activity status of the heads of 
household in 1979 and 1985 of the houses rented in 1979 and still rented 
in 1985. 68 per cent had 'continuing households', i.e. the houses did not 
have new tenants. Of the rest, 18 per cent were unfurnished houses relet 
unfurnished, 28 per cent were formerly unfurnished houses now relet 
furnished and 53 per cent were houses let furnished both in 1979 and 1985. 
Some of the houses were rented in 1985 to more than one household. To 
ease comparisons only the head of the first household has been compared 
with the 1979 head - though it can be noted that 75 per cent of all the 
other households were headed by students. 
As Figure 13.1 shows, there had been a fall in the proportion of all 
households heads who were economically active, from 48 to 39 per cent, 
and a rise in those who were unemployed and students. The proportion who 
were in work had fallen from 42 to 25 per cent, whilst amongst the 
economically active the unemployment rate had increased from 9 to 29 per 
cent, the latter being a figure commensurate with proportions in the areas 
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of greatest poverty in the inner city. The biggest change had in fact 
come from the increase in the proportion of heads who were unemployed or 
students, which had grown from 14 to 29 per cent, with the proportion who 
were students rising from 8 to 14 per cent. Indeed, students were 45 per 
cent of all heads in houses relet since 1979 and 62 per cent of all who 
moved to furnished houses. Such changes meant that private renting 
increasingly housed the young as well as the very old - 25 per cent were 
under 30 (21 per cent in 1979) and 28 per cent were over 70 (25 per cent 
in 1979). This is reflected in the low gross incomes of tenants, 34 per 
cent of heads having under £40 a week and only 20 per cent having £80 or 
more. 
Figure 13.1 also illustrates each of the components of this change. Not 
unexpectedly, continuing tenants are predominantly elderly. 68 per cent 
were over 60 years old, including 41 per cent who were over 70. Not 
surprisingly, only 36 per cent were economically active in 1985 as 
retirements had taken place over the intervening six years, whilst 
unemployment amongst the economically active had increased from 6 to 22 
per cent. 
Where unfurnished houses had been relet, the changes primarily reflected 
generational change as a group of younger, economically active tenants 
replaced the former older, retired tenants. Over half new heads had 
manual occupations replacing their predecessors' occupations almost 
exactly, with less than 1 in 5 of the new tenants doing non manual jobs. 
It is worth noting that over a quarter of the new tenants had children 
below school leaving age. The unemployment rate amongst the new tenants 
was 27 per cent. 
In the case of unfurnished houses which had been relet unfurnished the 
same pattern of generational change can be observed but this time a much 
younger group were the new tenants, 44 per cent being under 21 and 84 per 
cent under 30. Replacing the former active or retired manual workers were 
students, the unemployed and non manual workers, the unemployment rate 
amongst the new tenants being 39 per cent. There were fewer differences 
between the 1979 and 1985 tenants of furnished houses, but even here 
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students had increased their share to over two thirds of all household 
heads whilst only 1 in 10 of the new tenants were in employment, the 
unemployment rate amongst the economically active being 59 per cent. 
Indeed it should be noted that two thirds of all new lettings were to 
students and the unemployed while in furnished lettings alone they 
accounted for 78 per cent of tenants in 1985. Only 46 per cent of all new 
unfurnished and furnished let tings were to people who were economically 
active and of these 37 per cent were unemployed. Student tenants had 
increased in absolute numbers and the growth in the number of houses let 
to them more than compensated for the sale of furnished houses let to 
students in 1979. Results reported below show that landlords preferred to 
let to young single people, in general, and to students in particular 
because of their regular 'turnover'. The growth in unemployment reflected 
wider structural changes in the local economy and its particular impact on 
younger workers. Al though such tenants were 'marginalised ' in the 
economic sense, they retained housing purchasing power through the Housing 
Benefit system. It is possible to conjecture therefore that students (and 
perhaps also the unemployed) 'crowded out' those in work by their greater 
attractiveness to landlords in regularly moving and a rent paying capacity 
secured by student grants and Housing Benefit (at least at that time, 
al though there was no evidence from the survey of landlords that they 
preferred the unemployed to the employed). 
The overall decline in unfurnished accommodation thus provided fewer 
opportunities for those in manual jobs with partners and children to rent 
privately, but it is equally possible to conjecture that the decline in 
those in work who rented from private landlords reflected as much a 
falling off in demand, as access to owner occupation by young singles and 
partners in work increased. Indeed, it is worth noting that there were no 
differences in the socio economic distribution of the economically active 
who bought the formerly unfurnished houses that were sold between 1979 and 
1985 and those who rented the ones that were relet. Thus 69 per cent of 
the buyers (excluding sitting tenants purchasers) were in manual 
occupations, compared with 73 per cent of those who rented, including 23 
and 30 per cent respectively in semi and unskilled occupations. There 
were, however, important differences between unfurnished renters and 
buyers. The unemployment rate amongst buyers, at 9 per cent, was lower 
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and more of these households than renting households had two earners. 
Moreover, not only did buyers with manual jobs pay less on average for 
their houses (at £10,400 at 1985 prices) than those in non manual jobs 
(who paid £12,500), but all semi and unskilled workers paid less than 
£12,500. 
There was no evidence, moreover, to suggest that students and the 
unemployed found it any easier to find accommodation than other new 
tenants. Although 39 per cent of all household heads said they had 
experienced difficulties finding sui table places to rent (particularly 
women), this was no different from the proportion who experienced 
difficulties in the 1980/81 follow up. In addition, those in work actually 
experienced fewer difficulties than students and the unemployed - again 
repeating a finding of the 1980/81 follow up. While those in furnished 
and unfurnished accommodation were equally likely to have experienced 
problems, the former were more to do with landlords' preferences about 
types of tenant and the latter with the condition of what was on offer. 
Nonetheless, the problems posed by shortages in general and high prices in 
particular were shared by all seeking accommodation. In this context 
personal knowledge of the market and personal contacts with existing 
tenants become the key information channels in finding somewhere to live. 
Although half the new tenants had found their present accommoaation by 
personal contact they were, however, just as likely to say they had 
difficulties securing somewhere to live as those who had found it through 
the more formal channels of agency or advertisement. Thus the quantity 
and character of what is available was as important as the information 
channels used. The results also confirmed that those in the forms of 
accommodation subject to the least security have the least difficulty. 
Thus those with regulated tenancies experienced the greatest difficulty, 
those with tied accommodation and licences the least and those with 
protected shorthold tenancies were in between. Yet, despite these 
difficulties, few, only 29 per cent, would have preferred to have rented a 
Council house or flat when they last moved - and only a quarter were on 
the Council's waiting list in 1985. 
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Table 13.1 CHANGE IN LANDLORD NAME. 
BETWEEN 1979 & 1985 OF PRIVATE RENTED STOCK IN 1985 
LET UNFURNISHED IN 1979 
Not Relet Relet Total 
NEW LANDLORD? Relet Unfurnished Furnished 
1980/85 1980/85 1980/85 
% % % % 
Yes 13 8 62 17 
No * 87 92 38 82 
1----------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------
Total Stock ** 385 52 48 485 
(** Unweigh ted) 
-_._---- --_ .. - -
--- ----- ---------- - --------------- ----
~ote: *Includes all those cases where no name was given 1n 
either 1979 or 1985 and comparison was therefore not 
possible. 
LET FURNISHED IN 1979 
Total 
% 
11 
89 
r-----~-------------------------
87 
TOTAL 
% 
16 
84 I 
.... ---------------
572 
1979 to 1985: Old and New Landlords 
Within the pattern of an overall decline in unfurnished accommodation and 
a stable quantity of furnished accommodation, there had been changes in 
the ownership of the properties. This section looks at these changes, 
finds out whether the new owners were also new to landlordism and what 
reasons owners had for acquiring properties. 
Table 13.1 is taken from the results of the 1979 and 1985 surveys of 
tenants and is based on information about the names of landlords provided 
by tenants in the two surveys. It confirms that the changes in ownership 
which occurred in the 1970s continued into the 1980s. It shows that 16 
per cent of the addresses had a change of owner by 1985, with a greater 
turnover of ownership amongst properties let unfurnished in 1979 than let 
furnished in 1979. Indeed what is most noticeable is that two thirds of 
the unfurnished property that was relet furnished by 1985 had a change of 
owner. Changes were less in the case of property remaining unfurnished, 
al though rather less in the case of property that had been relet than 
property with continuing tenants. 
Table 13.2 is taken from the results of the 1985/86 landlord survey and it 
confirms the pattern shown in Table 13.1, revealing that 17 per cent of 
the sample had been acquired by its 1985 owners since 1979. Significantly 
27 per cent of furnished property had been acquired in this period 
compared with 13 per cent of unfurnished property. Although inheritance 
continued to play a role in the changing ownership of unfurnished prop-
erty, the majority of newly acquired property had been purchased. The 
results also confirmed that almost all unfurnished property changed hands 
with sitting tenants. By contrast, 60 per cent of furnished property was 
acquired with vacant possession before it was let, including 75 per cent 
of those changing hands in the 1980s. Three quarters of unfurnished and 
90 per cent of the furnished sample had owners who were neither companies 
nor trusts in their capacity as landlords. Addresses owned by these 
individual landlords were more likely to be owned by older women if let 
unfurnished and younger men if let furnished. A third of the sample had 
landlords connected with the building trade, and the more recent 
acquisitions in the 1970s and 1980s were more likely to have owners 
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TABLE If.2 DATE OF ACQUISITIOU AMJ PERCEUTAGE OF [JUF[JRNISHED 
AND FURNISHED HOUSES PURCHASED* 
Date Acquired 
Before 1970 
1970 - 1979 
1980 or later 
Total Houses 
Note: * Purchased: 
Unweighted Sample 
Let Ullfurni~hed Let Furnished 
Percent Percentage Percent Percentage 
of of 
Total Purchased Total Purchased 
7- 7-
55 53% 24 76% 
32 43% 49 837-
13 627- 27 1007-
182 517- 71 86% 
properties purchased and not 
inherited or received as a gift. 
Total Weighted Sample 
Let Unfurnished 
Percent Percent Percentage 
of of 
Total Total Purchased 
% 7-
46 53 55% 
37 34 42% 
17 l3 70% 
253 338 53% 
~ 
N 
0'-
TABLE 13.3 SIZE OF TOTAL RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES OWNED 
IN ENGLAND AND WALES 1985 BY THE LANDLORDS 
OWNING THE INNER SHEFFIELD SAMPLE 
Size of Unfurnished Houses Unfurnished Houses 
Total Owned by Individuals Owned by Companies 
Holding Acquired Acquired 
Before. 1970 1970s/80s All Before 1970 1970s/805 
i. % i. % % 
1 21 12 19 6 4 
2 - 5 26 23 24 19 4 
6 - 20 38 29 33 47 30 
21 - 100 7 37 23 21 9 
101 + 7 43 
Total 
Houses ~n 
Sample * 109 129 238 23 23 
Note: * Weighted Sample 
Unfurnished Houses All Unfurnished All Furnished Owned by Trusts Houses Houses Acquired Acquired All All All Before 1970 1970s/80s All 
% i. % i. % % 
4 9 20 11 16 42 
13 3 21 21 21 18 
39 51 41 30 36 30 
15 30 14 32 22 
26 6 2 6 4 10 
46 33 164 155 319 101 
connected with building than property acquired in the 1960s and earlier. 
One third of the property belonging to corporate bodies was owned by 
trusts, a half by property companies, and the rest by other companies. 
Whilst members of minority ethnic groups owned 10 per cent of the property 
in the hands of individual landlords, not only did they own twice this 
proportion of furnished property, they also owned a third of both the 
unfurnished and furnished properties acquired in the 1980s. They were 
more likely to be amongst the larger owners of unfurnished property and 
smaller owners of furnished property, indicating that the latter was based 
on the small sea Ie purchase of vacant properties for let ting to friends 
and relatives, whilst the former was based on the acquisition of 
investment property with sitting tenants. Altogether, they owned nearly 
half the property acquired by landlords who first set up in the 1980s. 
Table 13.3 (which is based on the weighted sample to ensure that sample 
properties are represented in their correct proportion in relation to the 
size of their owner) shows that the majority of the sample had small 
landlords, owning fewer than 6 properties throughout England and Wales, 
especially so for furnished properties where only 40 per cent have owners 
with 6 or more properties. There is evidence to show that the more recent 
acquisitions in the 1970s and 1980s had been made by the larger landlords 
- individuals, and, especially, property companies, owning 21 or more 
properties, whereas the properties in more long standing ownership tend to 
have smaller landlords. 
It can be seen, therefore, that, despite the overall reduction in supply, 
there had been a continuing change in ownership, with over half the stock 
changing hands in the fifteen years before 1985. Did this mean that these 
acquisitions were being made by new investors, by owners new to 
landlordism, or were they being made, instead, by more long established 
landlords adding to their portfolios? 
In fact Table 13.4 reveals that there were, indeed, new landlords in the 
field, because 18 per cent of the sample belonged to landlords who first 
came into the business in the 1980s, the respective proportions for 
unfurnished and furnished property being 15 and 24 per cent. Similarly 51 
per cent of all property belonged to landlords who first set up sometime 
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~ BECAME 
tl}LORD 
~ 
"'~re 1950 
l() 
- 1959 
i~ _ 1969 
'() 
- 1979 
~~ 
- 1985 
DATE OWNER FIRST BECAME A LANDLORD BY DATE 
LANDLORD ACQUIRED SAHPLE PROPERTY 
DATE SAHPLE PROPERTY 
ACQUIRED 
Before 1950 1960 1970 1980 
1950 to to to to 
1959 1969 1979 1985 
% 77 3 6 13 
% 85 5 5 5 
% 51 47 2 
% Q7 3 
% 100 
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Total 
31 
20 
45 
63 
36 
after 1969, including 42 and 67 per cent of unfurnished and furnished 
property respectively. What is particularly interesting is that very few 
properties have landlords who added to their portfolio after the period 
when they started up as landlords. Table 13.4 shows that, except for 
landlords who first set up in the 1960s, all other landlords acquired very 
little after the decade in which they were established. This pattern is 
repeated for both unfurnished and furnished properties. Thus almost none 
of the property which changed hands in the 1980s was acquired by someone 
who first because a landlord in the 1970s - or indeed in any other period. 
Landlords who set up in the 1970s, acquired almost nothing in the 1980s 
and those set up in the 1950s and earlier acquired very little of the 
existing sample afterwards. The exception to this pattern lies in the 
1960s, where landlords established during that decade continued to acquire 
into the 1970s, but virtually ceased to acquire in the 1980s. Nonetheless, 
despite this continued acquisition, 70 per cent of property acquired in 
the 1970s and almost all the 1980s acquisitions belonged to 'new' 
landlords established in each period. The evidence suggests, therefore, 
that the 1970s was a particularly attractive period for investment and 
that, although landlords who set up in that period no longer continued to 
acquire property, their places as new investors had been taken up by 
another set of 'new' landlords, making their own contribution to the 
process of ownership change that seems to accompany the long term pattern 
of decline. Each period seems, therefore, to produce 'new' landlords who 
acquire property over a strict ly limited period, ceasing buying property 
soon after becoming landlords. 
The new landlords who bought unfurnished property in the 1970s and 1980s 
were doing so primarily for capital gain. Two thirds of the purchases of 
unfurnished property in the 1970s and 1980s made by landlords who set up 
in that period were made as investments for capital growth alone, rather 
than for the rent income or anything else. Only 40 per cent of all 
investment purchases in the 1980s were made with the intention of contin-
ued letting, rather than of selling as soon as vacant possession was 
realised. Indeed, only 5 per cent of all unfurnished purchases in the 
1970s and 1980s were made for the rent income alone. The new landlords of 
the 1970s and 1980s bought unfurnished property which had sitting tenants 
with the deliberate intention of getting capital gain from selling with 
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vacant possession. They might, therefore, be better described as 
'property dealers' rather than as landlords with long term interests in 
residential letting. 
Although capital growth was a less important motive for those who bought 
unfurnished property before the 1970s which is still private rented today, 
this does not mean that property dealers were not also active in those 
earlier periods. It is just that those properties have now been sold and 
what was left in 1985 from the acquisitions of the earlier eras were the 
purchases of those who acquired them for a mixture of rent income and long 
term capital growth, and which were bought for continued letting rather 
than short term speculation. 
Not only were few unfurnished properties acquired for rent income, 
irrespecti ve of when they were bought, but, surprisingly, this was also 
the case for furnished properties where only 18 per cent were bought for 
their rent income alone, despite the much greater rent income, net of 
operating costs, that can be extracted from furnished lettings. Capital 
growth (combined with rent income) was also significant therefore as a 
reason for buying furnished lettings. 50 per cent were bought for these 
reasons, of which 17 per cent were bought for capital growth alone and 
33 per cent for both capital and rent, though principally for rent. The 
rest bought for a variety of miscellaneous reasons, including the purchase 
of houses as the original or intended home of the current landlord and 
his or her family. However, unlike unfurnished properties, most furnished 
ones were bought for continued letting rather than short term speculation 
and the s ta te of repair of these properties, allied with their rental 
income (see below), suggests that many of these properties have been 
'milked' by their landlords for the maximum net rental income that can be 
extracted in order for their rents to give them a competitive return on 
their investment. 
Capital growth had been an important motive therefore for ~ investment 
in private rented property, either for continued letting (the case for all 
furnished purchases and for unfurnished capital growth purchases of the 
1960s and earlier which were still let in 1985), or for ultimate sale with 
vacant possession (as in the unfurnished purchases of 1970s and 1980s). 
The economic circumstances of the 1970s would suggest that these were 
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t'~13LE 13. 5 HOW LANDLORD REGARDED PROPERTY IN 1979 AND 1985 
AS AN INVESTMENT FOR AS A IN SOME 
l~W LET ? RENT CAPITAL BOTH LIABILITY OTHER WAY N 
INCOME GROWTH 
1979 % 25 45 n/a 19 11 271 
It) furnished 
1985 % 22 35 11 14 18 120 
1979 % 25 40 n/a 15 19 67 
.. 
. '-ll:"nished 
1985 % 39 19 11 10 20 71 
1979 % 25 44 n/a 18 13 338 
\ll 
1985 % 29 29 11 13 18 191 
431 
'~13LE 13.6 INSTALLATION OF MISSING BASIC AMENITIES* 
IN SA~WLE PROPERTIES 1980 - 1985 : I 
• '~LE AREA wi th All Without All Amenities Percentage Number 
Ameni ties in 1979 of houses 
in 1979 All ins talled Not all ins talled where amenities 
by 1985 by 1985 missing in 1979 
were installed 
by 1985 
Unfurnished Houses 
~ld H.A.A.s ( .) % 89 9 2 83 
~ew H.A.A.s (0) % 47 38 14 72 
~ . LA. s % 78 11 11 50 
~)( Provisional 
~learance (/.) % 35 37 27 57 
~est of 
~nner City % 79 14 7 67 
~11 Unfurnished 
~eighted Total 
Houses -
~ontinuing 
l-touseho1d % 78 15 10 58 
~ew Household % 61 38 1 98 
':total % 76 15 8 65 
~11 Furnished Houses -
~eighted Total % 80 16 2 87 
~ote: * Basic Amenities = Inside WC, Bath or bathroom, wash hand basin, 
kitchen sink and hot & cold supply to bath, basin and sink. 
(/.) 
Old HAAs declared by 1979 
New HAAs declared since 1979 - removed from provisional clearance 
in 1975 but not declared HAA by 1979 
Ex Provo Clearance - removed from provisional clearance in 1975 
but not declared HAA by 1985 
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56 
76 
125 
S1 
115 
1465 
174 
1639 
630 
conducive to such investment in unfurnished property: combining low real 
growth in rental income from unfurnished property with high inflation, 
high house price inflation and negative real rates of interest on money 
borrowed to fund acquisitions, together with a supply of house 
improvements grants to upgrade new acquisitions. Capital growth can be 
seen either as 'bonus' on top of the rent income, property inves tment 
sheltering the landlords' capital from the effect of inflation, or as a 
speculation gain from property dealing. The latter seems to be important 
to active purchasers in the 1970s and 1980s and the former is more 
important to the long standing owners who had not sold (all) their 
acquisitions of earlier decades. 
It is important, however, not to overstate the significance of capital 
gain to all landlords, because the discussion so far in this section has 
not dealt with the in ten tion of those who did not purchase property. A 
third of all unfurnished houses had owners who first became landlords when 
they inherited it, and another 20 per cent had landlords who 
coincidentally acquired residential property as part of a wider commerical 
transaction. Moreover, half the furnished property had landlords who 
first became owners for non residential reasons. Thus, whilst the driving 
force behind active investment in private rented property is financial, 
changes in ownership also derive from inheritance and a range of 
miscellaneous reasons tied up with the trading and personal circumstances 
of companies and individuals. 
This is illustrated by Table 13.5 which shows that a significant minority 
of sample properties were not currently regarded as investments in 1985. 
It also re-emphasizes, however, that only a minority of properties were 
regarded in 1985 as investments for their rent income and that despite 
significant real increases in rental income betweem 1979 and 1985, 
discussed in a later section, there is very little evidence, comparing the 
responses of landlords in the 1980 and 1985 surveys that landlords' 
perceptions of their investments had changed much in the six years. 
1919 to 1985: Installing amenities and doing repairs 
The follow up survey confirmed the results of the earlier study and showed 
that between 1980 and 1985 a combination of active purchasing of tenanted 
property by 'dealing' landlords, improvement grant incentives, improvement 
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area declarations and the use by the City Council of its statutory 
enforcement powers was successful in securing the installation of missing 
basic amenities. Unlike the period before 1980, however, it also showed 
that this combination was successful in getting repairs done between 1980 
and 1985, as well as in getting amenities installed. 
As Table 13.6 shows, twice the proportion of properties in the HAAs 
declared by 1979 had all the basic amenities, compared with the 'control' 
group of properties removed from the provisional slum clearance programme 
at the same time as the properties in the older HAAs. In 1985 these 
'control' properties were either in the new HAAs declared since 1979 or 
still in the 'exprovisional clearance' group. This difference in 1979 
was due as much to the greater use by the City Council in the HAAs, than 
in the control group, of its statutory powers to compel landlords to 
improve as it was to the differential percentage grant payable (at that 
time) in HAAs. The research also showed that elderly households were 
worst off of all, as far as amenities were concerned, except in improve-
ment areas where policy had been as successful in getting amenities 
installed in houses rented to the elderly, as much as in any other houses. 
On the other hand, this 'success' was also due, in part, to the lower 
repair standards then set by the City Council (but since upgraded), so 
that, although a greater rate of improvement (putting in baths and the 
like), took place in HAAs, these were not in a markedly better state of 
repair than elsewhere. The research also concluded that up to 33 per cent 
of unimproved properties would be 'willingly' improved with a 50 per cent 
grant, but that if grants rose to 75 per cent, or if the local authority 
used its enforcement powers, a further 40 per cent would be improved and 
missing amenities installed. In any case many unimproved properties had 
only just been acquired by their current owner and it was only a matter of 
time before work began. 
Table 13.6 shows that missing amenities had continued to be installed. The 
weighted total of properties let unfurnished in 1985 shows that a quarter 
of the properties were without one or more amenities in 1979 but that by 
1985 they had been installed in 65 per cent of them. It also shows that 
87 per cent of the properties let furnished 1n 1985 (including those let 
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TABLE 13.7 INSTALLATION OF MISSING BASIC AMENITIES IN SAMPLE PROPERTIES 1980-1985 11 
Changes in Occupancy With All Without All Amenities Percentage of Weighted 
and Area Amenities in 1979 houses where Number 
in 1979 amenities 
All Not all missing in 
installed installed 1979 were 
by 1985 installed by 
1985 
(a) Continuing Tenant 
of House Let Unfurnished 
in 1979 - all % 77 14 9 61 1522 
- new landlord % 65 24 11 70 164 
(b) New Tenant in 1985 
.p- of House Let Unfurnished 
I...N in 1979 and 1985 - all % 54 45 98 146 V'1 
- new landlord % (80) (20) (l00) 15 
(c) New Tenant in 1985 
of House Let Unfurnished 
in 1979 {jrld Furnished % 52 43 5 89 207 
in 1985 % 72 28 100 80 
(d) New Tenant in 1985 
of House Let Furnished 
in 1979 and 1985 - all % 99 <1 (25 ) 390 
- new landlord % 100 80 
Note Small numbers in brackets. 
unfurnished in 1979) which did not have all the amenities in 1979 had got 
them by 1985. Only 8 per cent of unfurnished houses lacked one or more 
amenity in 1985. 
Table 13.6 also shows that the 'success' story of the older HAAs had been 
repeated in the new HAAs, so that 72 per cent of houses without amenities 
in 1979 had them by 1985. What is particularly interesting is that this 
achievement was not restricted solely to the newer HAAs but also in the 
remaining 'ex-provisional clearance' addresses, where nearly 60 per cent 
of houses without amenities had them by 1985. Together with the similarly 
high percentage in all the sample areas (although with GIAs only just 
making 50 per cent), this suggests, not only that area policies had con-
tinued to 'bite I, but also that the availability of preferential grants 
outside HAAs since 1980 for all dwelling lacking amenities, irrespective 
of whether they were inside or outside HAAs, together with the temporary 
'boost' in the rate for intermediate grants to 90 per cent between 1982 
and 1984 had had the widespread effect of inducing improvement, thus 
bearing out the conclusions of the earlier project. 
It is also noticeable from Tables 13.6 and 13.7 that the extent of 
improvement depended, too, on a change in occupancy. Proportionally fewer 
of the unfurnished properties that had been relet had all amenities in 
1979, compared with those which had not had a change in occupancy. 
Proportionally ~ of the missing amenities had however been installed 
where there had been a change in occupant, than where there had been no 
change. This difference was due to the fact that houses where there had 
been a change in occupant were mainly occupied in 1979 by elderly tenants 
_ who were worst off in amenity terms, only 44 per cent of single elderly 
having all of them then. Since then landlords had installed the missing 
amenities in almost all the relet properties. The lower rate of 'improve-
ment' amongst 'continuing' tenants was due to the fact that many of the 
unimproved properties were still occupied by elderly tenants - and the 
rate of improvement had been much higher in properties occupied by other 
continuing tenants. This suggests therefore that 'tenant resistance' (a 
phrase coined by landlords in interviews) amongst the elderly was a factor 
in explaining the existence of residual rump of unimproved properties 
after a six year period which had seen a substantial installation of 
missing amenities elsewhere. Although smaller proportions of the elderly 
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CHANGES IN HOUSE CONDITION T 
)\.t~es Let 
~~ \1rnished 
:t d' Housing 
~1:::ion Areas 
leo,. . 
• "!w' Housl.ng 
~ 1::: ion Areas 
~l:)~ral 
~l::"ovement 
. ~ <;1S 
t h •• 1 
.t:'rOVl.Sl.ona 
.~ <;1rance 
, 
~~ t of 
lh . '\~r Cl. ty 
Percentage of total Houses 
With Major Defects* 
1979 1985 
80 71 
81 41 
76 56 
96 72 
70 41 
Percentages of the Houses 
Which had Major 
Defects in 1979 
but did not have 
them in 1985 
27 
54 
44 
27 
53 
Which did not have 
Major Defects in 
1979 but which had 
them in 1985 
64 
20 
57 
(SO) 
26 
Sample 
Numbers 
55 
80 
125 
SO 
115 
'''~-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
.:t Unfurnished 73 50 30 
Weighted 
Totals 
1640 
.:t Furnished 87 57 36 14 616 
:l::~1 77 48 46 27 2256 
",------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
'l::~: * Major Defect. More than minor repairs needed to roof or 
chimney or gutters & rain water pipes or 
external walls or evidence of rising damp. 
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tABLE 13.9 CHANGES IN HOUSE CONDITION II 
Percentage of total Houses 
with Major Defects 
1979 1985 
(::C)ntinuing Household 
~ t House Let 
'tlltfurnished in 
:t~79 - all 71 
, with new 
landlord 89 
, 
:t ~ew/Household in 
~85 of house ~ ~ t unfurnished 
l.l) 1979 and 1985 
........ 
all 
, . h 
73 
45 
39 
43 
Percentages of the Houses 
Which had Major 
Defects in 1979 
but did not have 
them in 1985 
49 
60 
52 
Which did not have 
Major Defects in 
1979 but which had 
them in 1985 
31 
(33) 
31 
Sample 
Numbers 
Weighted 
Numbers 
1523 
165 
147 
Wlt new 
landlord (33) (6) (80) 17 
',------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
t • ~ew' Household ln :t~85 of house :t~t unfurnished in ~ ~ 79 and furnished 
l.l) 1985 - all 92 , 
wi th new 
landlord 97 
t 
• ~ew' Household 
~ l) 1985 of house 
::t ~ t furnished 1n 
52 44 
72 27 
( 13) 
(50) 
206 
79 
~79 and 1985 
, 11 84 56 35 10 379 
, a 
with new 
. landlord 96 94 4 (50) 50 
,,------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
~ll Houses 
'l:: tQeni ties 
l.. t).stalled in 
!:}79 
{tQeni ties put 
~ t). since 1979 
~t all 
73 
92 
54 38 34 1763 
23 76 (0) 352 
~tQeni ties in 
'~!:}79 91 5 39 (8) 150 
',------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
) Small sample 
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lacked amenities by 1985, 20 per cent of the single elderly still did so 
and they were worst off in addresses in GlAs and 'ex provisional 
clearance' addresses which had seen a less intensive investment of staff 
by the City Council than in the new HAAs. 
Table 13.7 confirms that improvement was also associated with a change in 
ownership, especially amongst unfurnished property with continuing tenants 
where, in the 1980s, new landlords had acquired properties with 
proportionally fewer amenities than those owned by other landlords and had 
subsequently improved a greater proportion of those that were without 
amenities. This corroborates the evidence about the motives of active 
purchasers in the 1980s, buying tenanted property with the intention of 
getting grants to subsidize modernising for sale - and presumably overcom-
ing 'tenant resistance' in the process. Indeed, it is relevant to note 
that in 40 per cent of the cases where amenities had been installed since 
1979 for continuing tenants, the tenants said that neither they nor the 
Council had asked the landlord to get the work done. 
To see how the state of repair had changed, the house condition survey 
carried out in 1979 was repeated in 1985. Fieldworkers were required to 
categorise each element of a building's external fabric on a range of 
defects, specific for each element of the fabric. Field work checks 
confirmed the reliability and consistency of the results which accorded 
very closely with independent assessment. Tenants were also asked to 
describe any repair work carried out since 1979 - and any needed in 1985. 
In Tables 13.8 and 13.9 addresses have been classified into those with and 
without major defects to their external fabric in both 1979 and 1985, the 
latter addresses requiring more than minor repairs to remedy defects to 
chimneys, or roof covering or gutters and rainwater goods or external 
walls, or having evidence of rising damp. 
Overall there had been a reduction from 77 to 48 per cent in the number of 
houses with major defects. Just under half the houses with major defects 
in 1979 did not have them in 1985 though a quarter of the houses without 
such defects in 1979 had 'slipped' by 1985. As with the installation of 
amenities these changes were also associated with the type of tenancy, 
changes in ownership and with Council policy. 
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First, it can be seen from Table 13.8 that more property let furnished in 
1985 had major defects in 1979 than property then let unfurnished and that 
there had also been less amelioration in their state of repair so that 
only a third of those with major defects had their disrepair remedied 
compared with half of the unfurnished properties. 
Second, Table 13.9 shows that whilst a change in ownership since 1979 was 
associated with a greater reduction in major defects, this was not inde-
pendent of properties' unfurnished or furnished status. Where the 
property was originally let unfurnished in 1979 and was still let in that 
way in 1985 there had been an improvement for all properties. Where there 
was a new landlord, not only were the properties in a worse state in 
1979 than others, but proportionally more of them had had major defects 
removed by 1985, providing further confirmation of the willingness of 
actively acquiring landlords to improve unfurnished houses - ready for 
sale in the future. As far as properties let furnished were concerned, 
not only had there been less of an improvement in their repair state than 
unfurnished properties but the Umi ted improvement that had occurred had 
been restricted to properties where there had been continuity of 
ownership. New landlords of furnished property - whether previously let 
unfurnished or not - acquired property which was in a similarly poor state 
in 1979 to that owned by continuing landlords, but had done very little by 
1985 to remedy these conditions since acquiring the properties. 
Third, there is evidence for the impact of local authority policy in 
Tables 13.8 and 13.9. There is an association between the installation of 
missing amenities and the rectification of defects. Although there had 
been an improvement in the condition of all unfurnished properties, it was 
most marked in the case of those which had had missing amenities installed 
_ installations which almost invariably involved the use of grants. These 
properties were in a very poor condition in 1979 but only a quarter had 
major defects in 1985, compared with half all other unfurnished proper-
ties. Grant aided properties were thus twice as likely to experience a 
reduction in major defects. That this was not the case before 1980 has 
already been explained. The change is due to the higher standards 
required of landlords in 1985 by the local authority. Comparison of the 
440 
work done on properties by landlords between 1974 and 1979 with that done 
between 1980 and 1985 confirmed the higher standard carried out with 
grants in the latter period. 
It is apparent, therefore, that by 1985, the payment of grant for the 
installation of missing basic amenities enabled the simultaneous remedying 
of repair defects to a higher standard. Area improvement policy was also 
important as the results in Table 13.8 suggest. The changes in old HAAs 
reflected the poor standards of earlier eras. The number of properties 
previously without major defects which slipped into this category reflects 
the 'patch and mend' approach of earlier years. Since few houses in the 
old HAAs had had grants since 1979, the new 'regime' on standards had not 
had an impact. By contrast, there had been marked reduction in major 
defects in new HAAs but, by way of further contrast, there had been fewer 
reductions in addresses in the ex-provisional clearance areas which had 
major defects, despite the installation of amenities with grants in these 
areas. This suggests that area policy had an independent effect from 
grant policies and standards, since there had been a bigger improvement in 
conditions in new HAAs, compared with addresses removed from clearance, 
both when amenities were installed and when they were not. The 
concentration of staffing resources and the use of the powers of 
persuasion and statute in these new HAAs had enabled a deliberate attempt 
to raise standards to succeed. 
This was confirmed by an analysis of the number and types of repairs 
between 1979 and 1985 reported by continuing tenants. In new HAAs over 
half the tenants said that more than minor works had been done to two or 
more specified items of essential repair on a list shown to them during 
the interview. By contrast, only 28 per cent of all continuing tenants in 
the sample as a whole reported this scale of activity. Not surprisingly 
the extent of external repairs reported by those interviewed correlated 
very closely with the independent assessment of external condition by the 
fieldworkers in the surveys, the changes revealed by comparing the 1979 
and 1985 surveys, and the extent of outstanding repairs reported by the 
tenants. So that the worse the condition in 1979, the more essential 
repairs were done; the more repairs were done, the greater the improvement 
in condition and the lower the likelihood that there would be a slip from 
any good conditions prevailing in 1979. According to tenants a much 
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greater number of repairs were done when amenities were installed and when 
the tenant had asked the local authority to get the work done. Thus the 
Council tended to get involved with the worst property and secured the 
biggest improvement. 
As far as outstanding repairs reported by tenants are concerned, there was 
a fair measure of agreement between tenants' and surveyors' perceptions of 
the need for essential repairs to elements of the external fabric. 4 in 
10 tenants said their houses needed repairs compared with 5 in 10 houses 
according to the independent assessment. In effect, tenants agreed that 
houses acquired in the 1970s and 1980s needed fewest repairs. What was 
also noticeable was that, where there was a difference of opinion between 
tenants' and the fieldworkers' assessment, it was over furnished proper-
ties, where 6 in every 10 needed essential repairs in 1985, but only 4 in 
10 tenants perceived this as being the case. To the extent that such 
tenants had neither been in the house for long nor were likely to stay for 
long, this comparative lack of concern about the need for repairs also 
probably meant a lack of tenant pressure on landlords to get the work 
done. 
Overall, however, two thirds of tenants had asked for repairs to be done, 
and as many as a third had first asked over a year before. Although 57 
per cent had received positive or vaguely positive replies, they were 
generally pessimistic about the chances of the work being done - only 21 
per cent thought it would be done within 6 months and 28 per cent 'never'. 
Indeed the greater the need, the lower the expectation that work would be 
done - or that when it was done, that all the jobs required would be 
carried out. In other words tenants whose properties had not been 
significant ly improved or repaired in the previous six years were not 
optimistic about anything being done in the next year - and up to 10 per 
cent of those who said repairs were needed had also been in touch with the 
Council. 
Nevertheless, two thirds of tenants said they were 'very' of 'fairly' 
satisified with the way their landlord carried out the repairs for which 
he or she was responsible, particularly furnished tenants, and those 
unfurnished tenants whose properties had had amenities installed, been 
repaired or needed few essential repairs. Where tenants were 
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dissatisified, it was not so much with the quality of work that was done, 
but with the time it took them to get landlords to do repairs. Although 
tenants thought properties acquired in the 1970s or 1980s needed least 
repairs, there was no evidence, one way or the other, to suggest that 
tenants of unfurnished properties with new owners since 1979 saw their 
landlords as providing them with a better or worse delivery of repair 
services than tenants of other properties, but tenants of furnished 
properties with new landlords since 1979 were much less satisfied than 
other furnished tenants about repairs. 
To summarise this section: there had been a measurable improvement in 
conditions between 1979 and 1985. These improvements were closely 
connected with local authority policy and action, as well as with changes 
in ownership as 'dealing' landlords interested in capital gains used 
improvement grants to bring properties up to a better standard prior to 
sale. Furnished properties were in the worst state of repair and had 
tenants who perceived disrepair least. While they were more content as a 
whole than unfurnished tenants with the repair service provided by their 
landlord, this was not so where the owner was new since 1979. 
Thus in supply terms, there had been an improvement in unfurnished 
lettings which were in decline, but little improvement in furnished 
property which commanded (see below) bigger rents and which were not in 
decline, overall. Landlords saw the need for repairs least of everyone and 
in hardly any of the interviews did landlords say that essential repairs 
to sample properties were needed. On the other hand, 47 per cent of the 
sample had landlords who said that all or some of their whole portfolio 
needed modernising. Only one in five of these had owners who said 
'nothing' would persuade them to carry out improvements and repairs, 90 
per cent of these being in the ownership of long standing landlords 
established before the 1970s. The majority of the rest of the long 
standing owners said that improvement was not worthwhile financially. 
Landlords' replies suggested that a combination of grant avallabil1 ty 
(references to restrictions on the availability of non mandatory grants at 
the time in Sheffield), higher grants (especially for properties recently 
acquired), tenant willingness, and local authority pressure would encour-
age modernisation. Many unmodernised properties were held by landlords who 
had invested for capital gain: they were looking for bigger grants. 
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Smaller landlords were more likely to say they would respond to a 
combination of tenant and local authority pressure. On the evidence, few 
properties would be improved if equity sharing loans were introduced (At 
the time of the survey this was a Government proposal). Only 20 per cent 
of the sample whose landlords had not modernised all their properties had 
owners who said they would do so with such a loan, a proportion which rose 
to nearly 30 per cent in the case of furnished property and fell to 10 per 
cent in the case of unfurnished property and property whose owners had 
invested for capital gain - the latter not surprisingly less likely to 
modernise with such a loan than with a straight grant, which need not be 
repaid so long as the landlord lets for the requisite number of years. 
1985: Tenancies and Licences 
This section examines the kind of agreements landlords had with their 
tenants and licencees and the basis upon which rents were fixed. It also 
looks at landlords' opinions about the advantages and disadvantages of 
different kinds of agreements and methods of rent setting. 
The statistics about agreements illustrated in Figure 13.2 were derived 
from a series of questions during interviews with tenants, which were 
designed to allow their types of agreements to be identified as accurately 
as possible (see Appendix 5). This information was not collected in 1979, 
so it is not possible to make comparisons between the types of letting 
then and in 1985, in cases where there were new tenants or licencees. 
Figure l3.2A reveals that nearly three quarters of all tenants had 
regulated tenancies and only a minority had licences or other agreements 
with less protection, while only 4 per cent had protected shortholds. 
Nearly two thirds had registered Fair Rents. 
The remaining sections of Figure 13.2 illustrate the substantial 
differences between continuing and new tenants and between unfurnished and 
furnished tenancies. Figure 13.2B shows that almost all continuing 
tenants had regulated tenancies (a quarter of these were controlled 
tenancies at the time of the 1979 survey) and registered Fair Rents. Most 
had verbal agreements and periodic tenancies. By contrast half those who 
had taken up new tenancies of houses let unfurnished had written 
agreements and since 13 per cent had shortholds by no means all had 
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periodic tenancies. Nevertheless as many as two-thirds had regulated 
tenancies so that 80 per cent of the (limited amount) of unfurnished 
reletting was being provided in the form of protected tenancies. 
In contrast the majority of new lettings of furnished houses were not 
protected, since just over half the occupants of houses let both furnished 
and unfurnished in 1979 had licences in 1985. Agreements were defined as 
licences if the occupants had non exclusive occupation agreements, based 
on details about the occupants' agreement with their landlord, on whether 
the agreement and liability for rent was an individual or group 
responsibility, on whether exclusive occupation was given, and on whether 
the landlord had the right to chose who moved in to replace anybody who 
left. On this basis (setting aside what a Court might hold following 
street v Mountford), half all new furnished agreements were licences. 
Only a third of furnished lettings were protected, and of these, a third 
were shorthold tenancies. Unsurprisingly the majority of rents were 
privately agreed rather than registered Fair Rents. 
The survey of landlords confirmed this picture. Most properties had 
landlords who knew the nature of the letting agreement with their current 
tenant - (92 and 84 percent in the respective cases of unfurnished and 
furnished properties). 87 per cent of 1985 unfurnished tenancies were 
regulated tenancies. 88 per cent had registered Fair Rents. In the 10 
per cent of cases where one of these unfurnished tenancies had been relet 
at some time since 1979 the previous agreement was very similar to the 
1985 agreement. By contrast only 18 per cent of furnished tenancies were 
regulated, 26 per cent were licence agreements, 28 per cent were shorthold 
tenancies, and 11 per cent were some other form of less protected agree-
ment. Far more of these lettings had been relet since 1979. In 80 per 
cent of cases the previous letting was furnished. For the most part the 
letting agreements of past and then current tenancies were the same 
although there had been some 'transfer' from regulated tenancies to 
licence agreements. 
What were landlords' views about rents and agreements? First, rent 
fixing. Landlords, particularly owners of unfurnished properties saw lots 
of advantages in Fair Rents. Only 22 per cent of the sample had landlords 
who saw no advantages at all in Fair Rents (but particularly landlords 
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investing for capital gain), and only 17 per cent had owners with no views 
at all on the possible advantages. Indeed only 12 per cent of unfurnished 
property had owners who said there were no advantages to Fair Rents - and 
this was equally the case for landlords of the '70s and '80s as it was for 
those who started up in earlier periods. By contrast, only 29 per cent of 
furnished properties had owners who saw advantages, whenever they had 
'started up'. All of the advantages quoted were in respect of the value 
of an independent assessment of the rent - irrespective of 'continuing' or 
'new' landlord. Thus 22 per cent of unfurnished properties had landlords 
who said it was a fair method of putting ~ the rent, 23 per cent that 
there was value in the independent assessment of the rent, 16 per cent had 
landlords who specifically talked about fairness to both landlords and 
tenants, whilst 13 per cent were owned by landlords who said it avoided 
'aggro' from the tenant. 
Not unexpectedly - given the above results - 48 per cent of unfurnished 
property had owners who saw no disadvantages to Fair Rents, although here 
it was the more established landlords who were more likely to see no 
disadvantages, this perhaps reflecting the abolition of rent control and 
the real rise in the value of Fair Rents since 1979 (see next section). 
Thus 53 per cent of unfurnished property acquired before the 1970s have 
owners who see no disadvantages compared with 47 per cent and 33 per cent 
of property whose owners acquired in the 1970s and 1980s respectively. 
Furnished properties, however, had owners who were only too ready to 
pinpoint the disadvantages of Fair Rents - and few of their tenancies were 
let on such rents - only 14 per cent saying there were no disadvantages. 
The most prominent complaint was that rents were fixed too low, were not 
'market rents', were below Council Rents, or were not reviewed often 
enough - the latter was a comment made often by new landlords. 
Landlords were also asked their views about the nature of regulated 
tenancies, licence agreements and shorthold, asking views only of those 
landlords who said they knew enough about them to give their views. 
Landlords of unfurnished property were more likely to understand what a 
regulated tenancy was than landlords of furnished property - 59 per cent, 
compared with 24 per cent. It was apparent from their views that the 
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generally favourable assessment of the Fair Rent system was not also 
extended to the system of regulated tenancies per se with all the 
consequences it had for tenants' security (especially those investing for 
capital gain). 53 per cent of properties had owners who saw no advantages 
at all in regulated tenancies, and the landlords of 16 per cent said there 
were none for landlords. Continuing and new landlords held the same 
views. Insofar as advantages were identified they were that regulation 
permitted independent assessment of rents and that tenants were afforded a 
degree of security. A greater proportion of the sample had owners who 
identified disadvantages in regulated tenancies. Only 26 per cent of 
properties had landlords who could not identify any disadvantages - and 
landlords of almost no furnished properties said there weren't any 
disadvantages. The principal disadvantages were the difficulty of 
'getting rid' of a 'bad' tenant or of securing vacant possession, 
together with the consequences of rents becoming registered, or, in 
landlords' words, 'controlled'. 
Only 9 per cent of the sample had landlords who had used licence 
agreements, but not only had half the furnished properties had landlords 
who said they used 2£ had heard of licences, but so too had nearly half of 
the whole sample. Nevertheless only 29 per cent of furnished properties 
not currently let on licence, had landlords who said they had considered 
using them and, moreover, only a quarter of the sample had landlords who 
said they knew enough about licences to discuss them. 
Unsurprisingly the advantage of licences were seen to be in the question 
of security. Only a quarter of addresses with landlords who had views had 
owners who said there were ~ advantages in licences. The advantages were 
the ability to gain repossession, and some also mentioned that it was 
safer for capital inves tment. More simply put, it gave landlords more 
'rights'. But licences were not without blemish and only 31 per cent of 
the sample had owners who saw no disadvantages. Amongst the disadvantages 
noted were the legal doubts surrounding licences, including some explicit 
references to the Street v Mountford case (which had been the subject of 
extensive debate in the local press, featuring local landlords just before 
the survey), and some references to the lack of licencees' obligations 
towards the property. Only 21 per cent of properties with landlords who 
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let on licence had owners who said they would 'definitely' or 'probably' 
continue to let property, in the event of court rulings that licence 
arrangements were protected. 
Finally, landlords were asked about shorthold. Knowledge of shorthold was 
qui te extensive as 60 per cent of the sample had landlords who used or 
knew about it. In fact 20 per cent of the sample had landlords who let on 
shorthold (not necessarily for the sample property), including 13 per cent 
of unfurnished and 34 per cent of furnished property. However, of those 
whose landlords had only heard of it, only a minority (16 per cent 
unfurnished and 32 per cent furnished) had owners who had considered using 
it. But here knowledge was greater amongst the newest landlords, with 38 
per cent of all properties acquired in the 1980s having owners who let on 
shorthold (including 56 per cent of furnished property). Indeed,only half 
the unfurnished and 40 per cent of the furnished property acquired before 
the 1970s had owners who let or had heard of shorthold, compared with 80 
per cent of both unfurnished and furnished property acquired in the 1980s. 
The advantages were seen to lie almost entirely in the ability to get 
vacant possession, or ensure tenant turnover. 59 per cent of the sample 
had owners who said there were no disadvantages, especially owners of 
furnished property. What disadvantages there were, included the risk of 
getting rents registered. 
The contrast in agreements and rents therefore lies between unfurnished 
and furnished accommodation. Landlords of unfurnished accommodation let 
it on regulated tenancies, despite reservations about its implications for 
the long term security of tenants, made relatively little active use of 
shortho1ds, and appeared positive about the advantages of Fair Rent 
registration. By contrast, there was little evident willingness to let 
furnished accommodation on protected tenancies or to register rents and an 
indication that accommodation would be withdrawn from the market if it 
could not be occupied on licence agreements (but see Chapter 14 on their 
policies about vacancies). 
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1979 to 1985: Rents and Rent Increases 
The tables in this section show just how much rents had increased over the 
six years, doubling in real terms in unfurnished property (allowing for 
quality change) whilst in furnished property increases was slightly ahead 
of inflation). 
Tables 13.10 to 13.13 show annual rents in 1979 and 1985, net of any 
charges incorporated in the rents for rates, services and water charges. 
Tables 13.10 to 13.12 show the annual rent per house - where more than one 
household lived at an address in 1985 the total net rent paid by all 
households has been calculated. Table 13.3 shows annual rent per 
habitable room. No allowance for voids has been made in calculating the 
rent received by landlords annually - nor for any other expenses (but see 
Chapter 14, on landlords' rates of return). 
Table 13.10 shows that the mean and median annual rents for unfurnished 
and furnished houses were very different. For houses let unfurnished in 
1985, the means were £189 and £514 in 1919 and 1985 respectively. In 
1919, 96 per cent of unfurnished rents were below £400 but by 1985 only 18 
per cent were below this, whilst 31 per cent were more than £600. The 
1979 and 1985 mean rent for houses let furnished in 1985 (which includes 
those which were previously let unfurnished in 1919) were £786 and £2,248 
respectively. In 1919 only 12 per cent of furnished rents were more than 
£1,500. By 1985, 77 per cent were above that, including 36 per cent above 
£2,500. The average household size in the furnished sector was 3.2 in 
1985, so that 3 adults contributed to the average rent - about £14 per 
week over a 52 week year. In the furnished sector, there were significant 
differences in the annual rent of houses rented by students, the 
unemployed and those in full time jobs: £2,593, £2,364 and £1,664 
respectively. There are no such differences in relation to the work heads 
of households do in the unfurnished sector. 
discussed at the end of this section. 
The reasons for this are 
Table 13.10 also shows the rent increases that occurred to rents since 
1919 for various categories of changes to basic amenities and tenancy. 
First, the rents of unfurnished houses which had seen no change in 
occupancy, and which had all the basic amenities in 1919, more than 
doubled over a period when the retail price index and average earnings 
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Table 13.14 
state of 
Repair 
No defects 
Only minor 
defects 
Major defects 
All* 
Annual Net Rents for Unfurnished Houses According to 
Presence/Absence of Amenities in 1985 and state of Repair in 1985 
£pa 
WHh all basic amenities Without all basic amenities 
Mean Standard No Mean Standard No 
Deviation Deviation 
583 106 37 
589 217 112 386 220 13 
581 214 177 329 161 29 
583 228 329 347 180 42 
*Includes those without external condition survey 
index of all employees rose by 174 and 167 per cent respectively. With 
rents rising on average from £212 to £563 over the period, this meant that 
rents had doubled in real terms. Where houses did not have all amenities 
in 1979, average rents were less than £100 per annum in 1979, with median 
rents not being much more than a £1 weekly rent. Many were controlled 
tenancies. Whether or not the amenities had been subsequently installed, 
rents rose considerably: to just over £300, on average, for those still 
without amenities, reflecting the provisions of the 1980 Act which 
abolished controlled tenancies, and to £553, on average, where all 
amenities had been installed by 1985. In the latter case rents rose £9 a 
week, on average, since 1979. 
Section (b) of Table 13.10 gives the relevant figures for the limited 
number of unfurnished properties that had been relet by 1985. It should 
be noted that the median figures are very similar to the equivalent cases 
where there has been no change in occupancy, al though the means are 
higher, indicating a small percentage of relets at much higher than 
average rents. 10 per cent were relet at over £800p.a. reflecting the 
more recent date of registrations (see below). In unfurnished lettings, 
therefore, landlords and tenants had experienced significant increases in 
rents, both as a consequence of improvement and of a general increase in 
rent levels in excess of earnings and retail prices in general. Most 
unfurnished rents were registered Fair Rents and there were few cases of 
privately agreed rents for comparison. Nevertheless it is worth noting 
that privately agreed rents were 75 per cent lower than Fair Rents, 
controlling for amenities and change of occupancy, reflecting in some 
cases a failure to register Fair Rents where rents were decontrolled in 
1980. Where houses were managed by agents rather than their landlords, 
unfurnished rents were significantly higher, at £648 compared with £500. 
This seems to be because agents ensure that registered rents are reviewed 
as regularly as statute permits, thus maximising their clients' rental 
income - and, since they receive fees as a proportion of rents, their own 
commission. 
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Table 13.15 Regressjon analysjs: Dependent variable annual net rents, 
Unfurnished Houses, 1985 
(a) (b) 
From Landlord Survey From Tenant Survey 
Registered Rents All Rents 
Independent 
Variables Beta t Beta t 
REGDAT .484 3.905** 
YRMOVE .325 1. 9000 0.097 1.621 
LOCATION -.049 -0.400 0.006 0.119 
HSESIZE -.008 -0.059 0.011 0.215 
ROOMS -.048 -0.308 0.187 3.423** 
HSETYPE -.124 -0.943 -0.059 -1.119 
AMEN85 .143 1.089 0.022 0.435 
NODEF -.040 -0.290 0.274 1.539 
MEDDEF -.058 -0.443 0.383 1.427 
MAJDEF 0.309 1.101 
HHSIZE -.257 -1.388 -0.032 -0.525 
HOHFTJOB -.013 -0.090 0.092 1.549 
DOLE -.145 -1. 041 0.145 2.649** 
HOH INC 0.035 0.602 
HH INC 0.042 0.734 
R2 0.44 R2 0.11 
F 2.65* F 3.04** 
DF 52 DF 359 
**Significant at (0.01 
* SignHicant at >0.01 <0.05 
o Signjfjcant at >0.05 <0.1 
oJ REGDAT = date Fair Rent last registered; YRMOVE = date of household moved 
to address. LOCATION = dummy, 1 = East of City; 2 = West of CHy; 
HSESIZE = buHding frontage; ROOMS = no. of habitable rooms; 
HSETYPE = dummy, 1 = m.i d terrace, 0 = others; AMEN8S = dummy, 1 = possesed all 
basic amenities in 1985, 0 = did not; NO, MED and MADEl" = dummies for no, 
medium and major defects to external fabric (see previous text). HHSIZE = 
total number in household; HOHFTJOB = dummy, 1 = head of household in fulltjme 
employment, 0 = other; DOLE = nos. of adults without work; HOH INC = head of 
household gross weekly income from all sources; HH INC = total gross weekly 
income of all household members. 
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Although the levels of rents shown in Table 13.14 are sensitive to the 
presence or absence of basic amenities, they do not seem sensi ti ve to 
disrepair, since there are no significant differences in the rents of 
unfurnished houses in different states of repair, all other things being 
equal. 
Table 13.15 tabulates the results of a regression analysis which examined 
the relationship between (a) Unfurnished Fair Rents (with rents data taken 
from the information given by landlords) and (b) All unfurnished rents 
(with rent data taken from the tenants' survey), and a range of variables 
rela ting to properties and occupants. The results tabulated were the 
regressions with the greatest explanatory power. Whilst the variables 
included in neither result explain, however, more than half the variation 
in unfurnished rents and, in the case of (b), explain very little, they do 
suggest that the date at which a Fair Rent was registered was the most 
powerful influence on this variation. It also confirms that the date on 
which tenants moved into a property was also important, suggesting that 
this has an independent influence on rents. The regression coefficients 
of other variables in (a) were small and none of the 't' values were 
significant. In some cases the signs on the coefficients are 
counterintuitive. For example, in equation (a) the number of rooms is 
negatively associated with the rent. Equation (b) explains very little of 
the variation in rent (even though this was the best of a series of runs), 
although in this one the sign on the number of rooms is what might be 
expected. In the case of neither equation did repair variables come out 
as significant, the coefficients were small, and the signs 1n relation to 
the existence of disrepair in (b) were positive. If repair was an 
influence negative signs would have been expected. 
The most dramatic increases in rents of furnished houses were found 
amongst the properties let unfurnished 1n 1919 but let furnished by 1985. 
Continuing landlords received very substantial increases, as rents rose 
from just under £300 for a house with all the amenities in 1919, to over 
£2500 in 1985 (with at the same time an increase in the costs of letting -
see section in the next chapter on rates of return). This change was 
associated more with new rather than continuing landlords, including those 
who had purchased these houses sometime since 1919 on a vacant possession 
basis. Where houses were let furnished in 1979 and 1985 rents had 
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increased the least since they have 'merely' doubled on average, rising 
from just over £1200 to just over £2400 or from £230 to £450 per habitable 
room. The median increase is only just over the increase in retail 
prices so that rents in the furnished sector had broadly kept pace with 
inflation. 
It has already been noted that furnished rents were higher where the head 
of household was a student or unemployed. Given the fact that 55 per cent 
of student heads and 78 per cent of the unemployed claimed Housing 
Benefit, it is possible to argue that Housing Benefit had 'driven up' 
rents and that, as a measure to sustain rent paying ability, it had 
enabled landlords to extract more rent from properties where tenants were 
on Housing Benefit - and indeed to favour tenants on benefit above those 
who were not. 
In fact, knowledge of the Housing Benefit System was quite extensive 
amongst landlords, since 89 per cent of the sample had owners who knew 
about it. Of those that did, 56 per cent had landlords who thought it had 
helped them and this was equally true of owners of unfurnished and 
furnished property. From the property owners' viewpoint, the merits of 
Housing Benefit were that it made arrears less likely and (potentially -
at least if it worked) could guarantee rent via the rent direct system. 
Although only a minority of all sample properties, 7 per cent, had owners 
who said it enabled a higher rent to be charged (and this included the 
houses whose owners referred to what they regarded as abuses of the system 
by 'other' landlords to extract higher rents), 30 per cent of furnished 
houses had landlords who said Housing Benefit allowed them to fix higher 
rents. 
Whilst the results of the survey did show a higher increase since 1979 in 
rent of houses which were let fUrnished in 1979 and 1985, and which were 
rented in 1985 to those who claimed Housing Benefit, compared with those 
who do not, the degree to which tenants received Housing Benefit in 1985 
did not statistically explain as much of the differences in furnished 
rents as did the size of the household. Households headed by students and 
the unemployed did not live in larger houses than others, but they lived 
in larger households - 3.6 people for students, 3.1 for unemployed and 2.6 
for others. The rent per room was positively related to the number of 
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Table 13.16 Regressjon analysis: dependent variable annual net rents, 
furnished houses, 1985 
Independent 
variablesi 
LOCATION 
HSESIZE 
ROOMS 
HSETYPE 
AMEN85 
NODEF 
MEDDEF 
MAJDEF 
HHSIZE 
HOHFTJOB 
DOLE 
STUDENTS 
HOH BEN 
HOH INC 
HH INC 
R2 = 0.59 
F = 8.83** 
DF = 93 
Beta t 
-.069 
-0.870 
.083 1.064 
-.038 
-0.386 
-.008 
-0.114 
-.135 -1. 71 0 
-.156 
-1.050 
-.338 
-0.945 
-.406 
-1.138 
.258 1.8860 
.191 1.936 
.113 1.305 
.576 4.329** 
.201 2.466* 
** Significant at (0.01 
* Sj.gni.fjcant at )0.01 (0.05 
o Significant at )0.05 (0.1 
i As defined for Table 13.15 except: 
STUDENTS = no. of students in household 
HOH BEN = Housing Benefit claimed by head of household 
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students in a household, which suggests that landlords charged on a per 
household member basis, as much as in relation to the size of the houses 
and its facilities. This was of course entirely consistent with the use 
of non exclusive occupation agreements, where each individual had a 
responsibility for the rent. The rents for houses on licence agreements 
were £2898 p.a. compared with £2248 for all furnished houses. This was 
confirmed by analyses of rent per person which found no significant 
difference in the rents per person between students, the unemployed and 
other furnished tenants at all household sizes. 
Table 13.16 tabulates the results of a regression analysis in respect of 
rents for furnished houses. The dependent variable was the annual net 
rent for a whole house and the independent variables related to 
characteristics of the houses and the occupants. The independent varia-
bles explained substantially far more of the variation in furnished than 
in unfurnished rents. The signs of the regression coefficients are 
broadly what might be expected in a competitive market. The sign for 
location is negative however, indicating that rents are higher, ceteris 
paribus, on the east side of the city than on the west, although since the 
University and Polytechnic are on the west side it might have been 
expected that rents would be higher nearer these institutions (although a 
more explicit distance measure might have given better results). The 
signs for house size and type suggest that rents are positively related to 
larger and non terraced houses, although the actual number of rooms has, 
unexpectedly, a negative size. On the other hand the amenities and 
disrepair variables come out with negative signs, indicating the rents are 
discounted for poor conditions, to some extent, in the furnished sector. 
However the t values are small in relation to the regression coefficients 
and are not significant (amenities is only weakly significant). It is the 
personal characteristics of the occupants that are most significant. The 
regression coefficient for the number of students in a house has a high t 
value, which is highly significant. Whether or not the head of household 
claimed housing benefit is less significant, and has a lower regression 
coefficient and t value than the number of students. Neither variables 
measuring income entered the equation. The fact that housing benefit 
statistically explains some of the variation in rent does not mean that it 
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[,ABl£' 1.1.11 PROPORJTOU OF !l£A1JS OF flO{fSl'flOIO RECEIVINC 
HOUSING BENEFIT BY ANNUAL RENT AND GROSS INCOME 
OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 
Annual Net Rent Weekly Income 
Less than 
£40 (N) £40 - £79 (N) 
(a) Unfurnished Houses 
Less than £400 37% (24) 63% (27) 
£401 - £600 66% (47) 59% (69) 
£601 - £800 57% (28) 58% (50) 
£801 plus 33% (3) 83% (6) 
Total 56% (102) 60% (152) 
(b) Furnished Houses 
Less than £800 0% (1) 40% (5) 
£801 - £1000 100% (1) 0% (1) 
£1001 - £1500 50% (4) 40% (5) 
£1501 - £2000 15% (13) 40% (5) 
£2001 - £2500 83% (2) 50'7, (12) 
£2501 - £3000 547 (11) 337 (6) 
£3001 plus 100% (12) 80% (10) 
Total 61% (54) 50% (44) 
£80 plus (N) All (N) 
17% (6) 47% (57) 
17% (36) 51% (152) 
18% (28) 47% (106) 
33% (6) 53% (15) 
18% (76) 49% (330) 
20% (5) 27% (ll) 
0% (1) 33% (3) 
0% (1) 40% (10) 
33% (3) 24% (21) 
0% (4) 57~ (28 ) 
0% (2) 427 (19) 
100% (1) 91% (23) 
20% (15) 50% (116) 
'causes' the higher rent. Give the low income of tenants, it would be 
expected that high rents would be associated with the head of household 
claiming housing benefit. 
Table 13.17 confirms the dependence of low income private tenants on 
Housing Benefit. The fact that so many claimed Housing Benefit in 1985 is 
a reflection of the low income of pensioners, students and the unemployed, 
as much as the increases in rents discussed in this section. Altogether 
48 per cent of heads of household received money from Housing Benefit, 
including both unfurnished and furnished tenants, and including 60 per 
cent of heads of elderly households, but only 10 per cent of those with 
full time jobs. Table 13.17 shows that in unfurnished accommodation the 
proportion of tenants who received Housing Benefit does not vary with the 
rent, but does vary with the head of household's income, since the 
proportion falls from 59 per cent of those with less than £80 per week 
gross to 18 per cent of those with more. In the furnished sector, rents 
as well as incomes are related to the proportion claiming - claimants 
falling when head of household income is £80 a week or more and rising to 
two thirds when annual rents are in excess of £2000 per house - the latter 
a reflection of the number of student claimants in such properties. 
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CHAPTER 14 
THE FUTURE: DISINVESTMENT, RATES OR RETURN, AND POLICY CHANGES 
Introduction 
The previous chapter has reviewed the evidence about the changes that 
occurred between 1979 and 1985. This chapter looks at the evidence from 
the survey about landlords I plans for their properties, the rates of 
return they were getting from their property in 1985, and at the sorts of 
policy changes they wanted. It concludes by discussing what conclusions 
can be drawn from the survey evidence about investment and disinvestment 
in the private rented sector. This latter theme is returned to in the 
final chapter of the thesis, which also examines the policy implications 
of this evidence. 
The Future: Landlords Plans for the Sheffield Panel 
Landlords were asked in 1986 what they would expect to do with their 
property, supposing it "became vacant tomorrow". The results shown in 
Table 14.1 reveal that there had been almost no change in intentions, 
compared with the views expressed by landlords in 1979. In 1979 the 
owners of 68 per cent of furnished houses said that they would relet. In 
1985 81 per cent of furnished houses had owners who said they would relet, 
only 13 per cent would be sold and the rest would be used in other ways, 
including providing accommodation for relatives. In 1979, the owners of 
only 32 per cent of unfurnished houses said they would relet if there were 
a vacancy "tomorrow". In 1985 the proportion was 37 per cent to be relet, 
60 per cent to be sold and the remainder to be used in other ways. 
There was no difference in terms of the date the property was acquired -
and, by imp l1cation, when the owners first become landlords. The only 
noticeable difference was that a higher proportion of unfurnished property 
acquired in the 1970s and 1980s was to be relet - 49 per cent compared 
with 27 per cent of property acquired before the 1970s. Examination of 
the evidence on the use of improvement grants suggested that this was 
because of reletting conditions attached to the grants of all sizes of 
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TABLE 14.1 WHl\T Ll\NDLORD WOULD DO WITH ADDRESS IF IT BECAME VACANT TOMORROW 
UNFURNISHED 
PROPERTY 
Date Acquired:-
Before 1970 % 
1970-1979 
1980-1985 % 
Relet 
27 
56 
32 
Sell 
72 
41 
64 
UNWEIGHTED 
Sl\MPLE 
other 
3 
4 
N Relet 
99 % 29 
59 % 60 
22 33 
WEIGHTED 
SAMPLE 
Sell Other 
70 
38 2 
62 4 
N 
177 
119 
42 
-------.-----~----------.--- ---- -- -------- ------ -~-------------------------
Total 37 GO 2 180 % 40 58 338 
---- ------------------- ------- - ------ ------- ---_._------ ------------ ----~~-
FURNISHED 
PROPERTY % 81 13 (:, 69 % 81 14 4 114 
._---- ----------------------_.-
TOTAL 
SAMPLE % 49 47 3 249 % 50 47 3 452 
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landlords, so that these results confirmed the conclusions reached in the 
1979 study - that grants get property improved but retained them in the 
private rented sector only temporarily. 
46 per cent of the unfurnished sample had had a grant since 1974. 28 per 
cent between 1974 and 1979, and 17 per cent since 1979. 37 per cent of 
unfurnished houses acquired before 1970 had a grant, so too ha ~ 59 per 
cent of those acquired in the 1970s and 56 per cent of those acquired in 
the 1980s. Thus, at the time of the 1986 survey, the greatest 
proportionate recent use of grants had been amongst property acquired in 
the 1970s and 1980s, where the greatest proportionate intention to relet 
was expressed. The landlords of 78 per cent of unfurnished houses 
improved with grants had accepted reletting conditions. Where no grant 
had been made since 1974 only 22 per cent of properties were to be relet, 
the respective percentages for properties improved with grants between 
1974 and 1979 and after 1919, being 52 and 65. Once these letting 
conditions finally expire, there is no reason to suppose that landlords 
will not sell upon vacant possession. Indeed, the proportion of 
properties improved with grants that landlords said they would relet if a 
vacancy occurred in 5 years time was only half of those that they said 
they would relet if a vacancy occurred "tomorrow". As a consequence, 
there was no difference in the proportion of properties likely to be relet 
in the long (5 year) term according to the date of their acquisition - the 
figure being only 1 in 5 of all unfurnished properties, whether improved 
with grants or not, and whatever date grants, if used, were awarded. A 
simi lar pattern was found for furnished property improved with grants. 
One third of all furnished addresses had grants since 1974. All of these 
are to be relet "tomorrow", but in five years time only half of them will 
be relet. 
The general conclusion must be that, by the mid 1980s, there had been no 
change in landlords' attitudes towards retaining or selling unfurnished 
property, so that in 1986 ~ontinued decline could be anticipated in its 
supply. Indeed as many properties belonging to landlords who bought them 
for continued let ting were to be sold as any other. Only the small 
minority of unfurnished property regarded primarily as investment for rent 
income were likely to be relet on any significant sale. Thus, whilst 53 
per cent of these would be relet, only 28 per cent of those regarded as 
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investments for capital growth, 27 per cent of those regarded for both 
capital and rent, and 30 per cent of those regarded as liabilities, or in 
other ways, were to be relet. (Proportions are similar to those found in 
1979.) It appeared, therefore, that landlords interested in capital 
growth intended to realise this growth upon vacant possession, instead of 
"shel tering" their capital in property. Indeed a number of landlords 
commented that the difference between the inflationary environment of the 
1980sand of the 1970s made investment in private rented property for 
capital growth less desirable then than in the past. Nor would it seem 
that the substantial increase in rents between 1979 and 1985 had been 
sufficient to persuade landlords to retain their investments - only a bare 
majority of those interested in rent income would do so. The next section 
shows that most properties had owners who thought the level of rent 
insufficient, taking everything into account. Yet, only 32 per cent of 
properties with landlords who thought the current rent sufficient, would 
relet the same percentage whose landlords thought the rent was 
insufficient. Similarly, there was no difference between properties 
whose landlords had had grants to improve them, according to the degree of 
satisfaction from both the rental and capital growth return from the net 
of grant improvement investment. 
The explanation for this lies, not only in the low level of returns, 
notwithstanding the real increases in rent, but also in the "hidden" costs 
of being a landlord in the context of the old average age of the owners of 
the majority of the unfurnished rented sector. Thus, whilst the owners 
of half the unfurnished properties to be sold said this was for financial 
reasons, the landlords of over a third said it was because of a 
combination of their age, the degree of commitment involved and the bother 
and "hassle" of being a landlord - bearing in mind that 35 per cent of 
unfurnished properties are managed by the owners themselves. The 
remaining 14 per cent of properties had landlords who had a variety of 
reasons for selling, and these included a few comments about pressure 
from the local authority in relation to repairs. As far as the properties 
being sold for financial reasons, 27 per cent had landlords who wanted to 
extract their capital, 37 per cent who said their return was poor in 
relation to non property investments, 17 per cent who said it was poor in 
relation to other property investments, and only 10 per cent who referred 
to the high management and maintenance costs involved. This latter, 
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cost-related reason was referred to much less often in 1985 than in 1979 
as a reason for selling property. The fact that "hassle" is an important 
reason for selling by landlords of unfurnished properties can be related 
to the fact that 44 per cent of houses being managed by agents were to be 
relet, compared with 26 per cent of those the owners looked after 
themselves. This is not to suggest that agents relet property solely in 
their self interest (retaining a management portfolio) rather than their 
clients'. It is, rather, to suggest that agents absorb the "hassle" on 
behalf of their clients, since, on evidence, they alone took all the 
decisions in respect of fixing and collecting rents, selecting tenants, 
seeing to minor repairs and serving notices for over three quarters of the 
sample under their management. But on questions involving reletting 
vacant property and carrying out major repairs, the decision was taken by 
the clients, not the agents, for 60 per cent of the properties concerned. 
To some extent the higher intended reletting of agent managed property can 
be explained by the greater use of grants by agents' clients in the years 
recently before 1986. Over half "their" properties had been improved 
compared with a third of those managed entirely by their owners. Thus 
properties owned by larger landlords, especially companies and trusts were 
more likely to be managed by agents, and were more likely to be relet 
"tomorrow" because they had been recently improved. In the long run, the 
agents' clients were more susceptible to economic imperatives in deciding 
to relet, than to the "bother and fuss" of looking after property "at my 
age". Only 25 per cent of self-managed properties were to be sold because 
of financial reasons, compared with 58 per cent of those managed by 
clients, whilst it was to avoid "hassle" that 75 per cent of self-managed 
properties were to be sold. 
Only 44 per cent of unfurnished properties to be relet, were to be relet 
for the rent income it would bring, although a further 9 per cent were to 
be relet for the rent plus capital appreciation in relation to the 
landlord's tax position on capital gains. In addition 16 per cent were to 
be relet for capital appreciation. 19 per cent were to be relet for 
improvement related reasons, either because of grant conditions or because 
it would create building work for the land lords' firms. (I t is worth 
noting that 33 per cent of properties which would be sold in five years 
time, even if they were to be relet "tomorrow", had landlords who said 
this was because of reletting conditions.) The remaining properties to be 
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relet "tomorrow" were to be let for job or charitable reasons (especially 
by Trusts providing housing for their members). Not surprisingly, 68 per 
cent of furnished properties were to be relet for the rental income, and 
21 per cent for a combination of rent, capital growth and other reasons. 
For the future, the limited reletting of unfurnished tenancies "tomorrow" 
was to be on a similar basis as 1986. Only 10 per cent were to be relet 
furnished. This is a similar finding to the 1979-80 survey. Clearly 
owners of unfurnished lettings did not consider transferring them to the 
apparently more "lucrative" furnished market. The transfers of 
unfurnished to furnished letting had mainly come about as a consequence of 
ownership changes. Owners of 82 per cent of the unfurnished property 
which was to be relet "tomorrow" would be let on regulated tenancies - and 
only 12 per cent were to be let on shorthold tenancies, although this 
proportion was greater for properties whose landlords would relet in five 
years time. The owners of 90 per cent intended to charge registered Fair 
Rents. The 1986 pattern of agreements, was also to be repeated when 
furnished tenancies were relet "tomorrow" , with an absolute reduction 
(because of sales) of regulated tenancies and proportionately fewer 
licences and proportionately more shorthold agreements. 
Who did these reletting landlords prefer as tenants? The first point to 
note is that landlords had definite preferences. The owners of 74 per 
cent of the furnished houses said they preferred single people, especially 
young single people, and particularly students. Indeed 57 per cent of 
furnished houses were owned by landlords who preferred students. 
Unfurnished houses had landlords with a greater diversity of preferences, 
but only 10 per cent preferred singles and 46 per cent couples without 
children. The reasons for the differences are related to tenant turnover, 
in respect of furnished tenancies, and care of the property, in respect 
of unfurnished tenancies. Thus the owners of 61 per cent of furnished 
properties considered the turnover of tenants important, and the 
landlords of 22 per cent said they considered reliability in paying rent 
significant. Hence the preference for singles in general and students in 
particular. Students, of course, are more likely to be able to "form" 
households of a large enough size to command a high rent for a house on 
the basis of per person rent. This arises because students are more 
likely than others to "search" in groups and have extensive knowledge of 
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potential "sharers". The owners of unfurnished tenancies were much more 
concerned with the way tenants took care of their property and whether 
they held "responsible" at ti tudes towards it, the owners of 53 per cent 
holding such views. Not surprisingly, therefore, over half the properties 
which were to be relet, (including 70 per cent of furnished ones) had 
landlords who preferred not to let to certain types of tenants: owners of 
unfurnished property preferred not to let to singles and couples with 
children (even though they did), whilst landlords of furnished property 
also preferred not to let to couples with children though some 
properties ~ also owned by landlords who preferred not to let to 
students. 
Rates of Return 
Two methods of calculating rates of return on landlords' investments have 
been used. First, nominal rates of return, calculating the percentage 
return annual rents gave on 1985 vacant possession capital values. 
Second, the net present value of the rents and capital appreciation earnt 
by the purchase of unfurnished houses at sitting tenant prices in 1979 and 
let ting them for six years, compared with the a Herna ti ve inves tment of 
the 1979 prices paid for these properties in Building Society deposits and 
in equities. 
Four pieces of information were used to calculate rates of return. 
First, for the whole sample, information was collected from landlords on 
net rents for each sample address, taking care to ensure that any relevant 
deductions were made from gross rents in respect of rates, heating, 
lighting and other services. Where Fair Rents were registered and they 
were still at a stage, rather than the full Fair Rent, the current 
recoverable staged rent was recorded. 
Second, where a full interview was done, landlords were asked whether the 
net rent was sufficient from their point of view, "taking everything into 
account." The question came at the end of the section on rents and was 
preceded by questions on rents, on what rents should cover, on the annual 
management and maintenance costs for the property, and on whether repair 
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spending on the property was restricted to an annual predetermined amount. 
If the current rent was not sufficient, landlords were asked to say what a 
sufficient would be. (See Appendix 5 for the questionnaire used.) 
Third, information was collected on capital values for all sample 
properties by asking landlords and agents to estimate the vacant 
possession capital value of each property. Where property was bought 
after 1914, details of purchase prices were recorded. 
Fourth, where a full interview was done and where postal questionnaires 
were sent out, landlords were asked to state the annual management and 
maintenance costs of the sample property - both in total and item by item 
for insurance, management (including agents' fees), repair and maintenance 
and (if relevant) depreciation on furniture and fittings. 
Before examining the resul ts of the rates of return calculations three 
observations must be made about the reliability of the data on rents, 
values and costs. 
First, the rents data shown in Table 14.3 compares closely with the data 
from the tenant survey. The respective means for each of the tenant and 
landlord survey for unfurnished tenancies are £514 p.a. and £604 p.a.; for 
furnished tenancies they are £2,248 p.a. and £2.205 p.a. 
Second, the vacant possession value estimates compare closely with 
information about purchase prices from the survey data of the 1919 private 
rented houses which were owner occupied by 1985. The mean vacant 
possession value estimated by landlords were: unfurnished-mean = £12,921, 
N = 131; furnished-mean = £ 16,825.N = 30). The prices paid by owner 
occupiers for the 1919 sample sold into owner occupation were collected in 
the 1985 follow up. The mean 1985 prices of those which were bought with 
vacant possession, which had all amenities in 1919, and when bought, and 
which had not been bought from a builder were unfurnished = £11 702, N = 
54; furnished = £15,913, N = 11). 
Third, the management and maintenance costs could not always be estimated 
neither in the total nor for individual items. Where they were estimated 
the costs were as follows. The mean annual overall estimated cost (where 
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the total was given) for unfurnished houses was £244 (N = 68) for the 
previous year. For furnished houses it was £612 (N = 40). The mean 
annual cost for individual items was, for unfurnished and furnished houses 
respectively: insurance: £33 and £68; management costs and fees: £52 and 
£127; depreciation on fittings etc. for furnished houses was £229; and the 
mean annual maintenance and minor repair was respectively £138 and £296. 
In most cases few landlords made allowances for the cost of their own time 
when they, 
property. 
rather than agents, carried on the management of their 
As Table 14.2 shows, most properties were owned by landlords who expected 
rents to cover minor repair and management costs (91 per cent and 88 per 
cent respectively), and most had owners who said that the rent from the 
property did cover these costs - 73 per cent and 80 per cent respectively, 
(though lower in the case of unfurnished than furnished properties). 
Fewer, but still a large proportion of properties. 71 per cent, had owners 
who expected rents to give a return on major repair and improvement 
expenditure, but only 40 per cent of these houses had owners who said the 
rent actually did give the return they expected - 35 and 55 per cent in 
the case of unfurnished and furnished properties respectively. 
Only 65 per cent of properties had landlords who expected rents to give a 
return on purchase price (especially larger landlords and those seeking 
capital growth), 54 per cent of unfurnished and 76 per cent of furnished 
properties having such owners. The relevant percentages with landlords 
expecting rents to give returns on current market value with vacant 
possession were 60 per cent for all - and 51 per cent and 75 per cent for 
unfurnished and furnished. In each case less than half the properties 
whose landlords expected such returns on prices had rents which were 
sufficient to give the return expected. The proportions of houses whose 
rents give the expected return on vacant possession value are less than 50 
per cent for all and 56 per cent in the case of furnished and 28 per cent 
of unfurnished houses. 
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TABLE 14.2 WHAT LANDLORDS THOUGHT RENTS SHOULD COVER 
Percentage of Properties 
Management Costs 
Minor Repairs 
Major Repairs 
Return on acquisition 
price# 
Return on vacant 
possession value 
Whose Land lords 
said lent should 
cover item 
Unfurnished 
% (N) 
93 (114) 
85 (113) 
68 (104) 
54 (70) 
51 (104) 
Furnished 
% (N) 
88 (b6) 
92 (66) 
78 (63) 
76 (63) 
75 (60) 
Whose landlords 
said rent did cover 
item* 
Unfurnished 
% 
68 
76 
35 
40 
28 
Furnished 
% 
82 
86 
55 
64 
56 
Notes * Percentage of the properties whose landlords had said rent should 
cover item. 
# Excluding inherited properties. 
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Whilst 84 per cent of houses had landlords who said they did not restrict 
spending on repairs to a predetermined amount, only 32 per cent of 
unfurnished houses (but 72 per cent of furnished houses) had owners who 
said that the rent was sufficient from their point of view "taking 
everything into account", irrespective of when they acquired it. 
In Table 14.3 rents are related to landlords' intentions about reletting 
or selling their property should a vacancy arise "tomorrow". 
shows what level of rents landlords considered to be sufficient. 
It also 
The mean unfurnished rent of all the sample is £604 p.a. Where owners 
were asked, only 29 per cent had owners who thought the rent sufficient 
and in their case the mean rent was £573. Properties whose owners thought 
the rent insufficient had rents only slightly lower, at £549, but such 
properties had landlords who wanted a rent of £1,018 p.a. as a sufficient 
rent. Adding properties with "satisfied" and "unsatisfied" owners 
together , gives a mean net sufficient rent in 1986 of £858 p.a., or 
£16.50 per week - compared with the current (1986) mean of £11.61 per 
week. It should be stressed, however that this average sufficient rent 
would not be sufficient for those who were dissatisfied in 1986. 
Most unfurnished properties had landlords who intended to sell them when 
they became vacant and, as Table 14.3 shows, current (1986) and sufficient 
rents were higher where the property was to be relet, compared with where 
it was to be sold (including properties where the owner intended to do 
something else apart from reletting). Thus, where properties were to be 
relet the mean current (1986) rent was £640 p.a. compared with the annual 
rent of £585 of the properties which were to be sold. Table 14.3 also 
shows, inter alia, that the mean sufficient rent for properties to be 
relet would be £945 p.a. compared with £806 for those to be sold, but 
whereas the difference in 1986 rent between those to be sold and those to 
be relet is statistically significant, the difference in sufficient rent 
is not. 
Simi lar differences can be found amongst furnished properties but the 
scale of the difference between 1986 and sufficient rents is, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, less marked. Thus 1986 rents were £2,205 p.a. on average 
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TABLE 14.3 RENTS OF PROPERTIES IN LANDLORD SURVEY 
1985 Rents p.a. All 
UNFURNISHED 
Net Rent p.a. 
£60-1 
N 
170 
FURNISHED 
Net Rent p.a. 
£2205 
N 
63 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1985 Rent 
Relet 
Sell 
£640 
£585 
Was Sufficient £573 
Was Not Sufficient £549 
64 
105 
37 
74 
£2391 
£138-1 
£2411 
£1663 
50 
10 
43 
17 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All £557 
---------------~----- -----------.---- .. 
SUFFICIENT 
RENT All 
Relet 
Sell 
£858 
£945 
£806 
1 1 1 
103 
37 
65 
£2199 
£2472 
£2567 
£1834 
60 
53 
44 
8 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1985 Rent Was Sufficient £573 
Was Not Sufficient £1018 
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37 
66 
£2411 
£1649 
43 
10 
and a sufficient rent in 1986 would have been £2,472 on average - bearing 
in mind that two thirds of furnished properties have landlords who regard 
£2,411 on average as a sufficient rent. 
Pre tax nominal rates of return have been calculated in four ways. First 
a gross current rate of return - annual current rents expressed as a 
percentage of the vacant possession capital value estimated by landlords 
or agents. Rents are net of rates and service charge, but no allowance 
has been made for void or bad debts. In the furnished sector the survey 
evidence on void periods between tenancies suggests that an allowance of 
10 per cent per annum for voids would be the maximum allowance 
appropriate. Second, a gross sufficient rate of return using the rent 
regarded as sufficient by the landlord. Third and fourth, net rates of 
return for current and sufficient rents have been calculated. This has 
been done on the basis of the management and maintenance costs described 
earlier. Two versions have been used. First, using the actual costs 
stated. In many cases landlords could not estimate all items and, 
therefore, the total costs in some of these cases is on the low side, 
although for 40 per cent of the properties landlords were able to provide 
full information. In the second version the information on repairs 
provided by landlords for properties where all costs were known have been 
used to fill in the missing cases for other properties and insurance and 
management costs (where relevant) have been calculated on the basis of the 
vacant possession value and rent income respectively. It should be noted 
that the estimate of net sufficient rates of return is based on current 
costs in a context of insufficient rents - so some costs could be expected 
to rise if rents reached levels regarded as sufficient. 
The results of these calculations are shown in Table 14.4 and reveal the 
not unexpected difference in gross rate of return between unfurnished and 
furnished property - with gross return on unfurnished property at just 
over 5 per cent, being about a third of the gross return on furnished 
property which is 14 per cent. 30 per cent of the gross unfurnished 
returns were in each of the respective ranges 4-4.9 per- cent and 5-5.9 per 
cent. Only 28 per cent gave returns of 6 per cent or more (and only 11 per 
cent were 8 per cent or more). Furnished returns were widely spread about 
the mean, 42 per cent being 17 per cent p.a. or greater. The results also 
shOW that where unfurnished properties had landlords who regarded the rent 
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~ ~r: 14.4 RATES OF RETURN 
'~ 
. ~ ~ FNISHED 
. ~ rSHED 
ft~ fZNISHED 
" ~ BE RELET 
:~~ ~.~ ~ fZNISHED 
. ~ BE SOLD 
c~ ~~. ~ ?:~ ~ rSHED 
; ~ BE RELET 
.. ~ 
. ~ rSHED 
GROSS 
% p.a. (N) 
5.22±1.52 (113) 
14.08t5.58 (25) 
5.49 (45 ) 
5.15 (62) 
14.19 (21 ) 
13.49 (4) 
NET 
(ESTIMATED COSTS 
USED) 
% p.a. (N) 
3.37±1.20 ( 11 3 ) 
9.45±5.80 (25) 
3.57 (45 ) 
3.29 (h2 ) 
9.31 (21 ) 
10.23 (4 ) 
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GROSS NET 
SUFFICIENT SUFFICIENT 
(ESTIMATED COSTS 
USED) 
% p.a. (N) % p.a. (N) 
6.70±3.47 (61 ) 4.78;!:3.31 (60) 
14.92~6.75 (20) 10.71±7.06 (20) 
6.43 (20) 4.35 (20) 
7.06 (36) 5.21 (35) 
14.56 (17) 10.30 (17) 
16.93 (3) 13.00 (3 ) 
as sufficient the return is still only just above 5 per cent. Properties 
with owners who regarded the rent as insufficient gave returns of just 
under 5 per cent but their owners regarded (by implication of the 
sufficient rent they estimated) nearly 8 per cent as a sufficient gross 
rate of return. Overall therefore 7 per cent seemed to be, on 
average, the gross rate of return on unfurnished property which was 
sufficient "taking everything into account" - although owners who were 
dissatisfied in 1986 were looking for a return somewhat higher than this. 
As already noted, most furnished houses had landlords who regarded the 
current rent as sufficient, but when the sufficient rents of the minority 
who are "dissatisfied" with the current (1986) rent are taking into 
account the overall gross sufficient rate of return is increased 
marginally on the current gross rate of return. 
The results also show that rates of return were not substantially 
different (nor significantly so, statistically) for houses which were to 
be sold upon vacancy, compared with those that were to be relet - either 
in terms of gross or gross sufficient rate of return. Both unfurnished 
properties with "selling" and with "reletting" landlords had owners who 
regarded 7 per cent, or thereabouts, as the gross sufficient rate of 
return - although interestingly landlords whose properties are managed by 
agents said that 6.2 per cent was sufficient - compared with 8.6 per cent 
estimated by other landlords. Nor were vacant possession values 
statistically significantly different for houses to be sold from those to 
be relet. This suggests, in part, that the absolute level of rent is as 
important a factor in decisions about reletting as is the rate of return 
earnt on vacant possession value. 
Finally Table 14.4 also shows net returns - that is the gross returns less 
management and repair costs. Net returns for unfurnished houses were just 
over 3 per cent (4.2 per cent using actual costs rather than estimated 
ones in the cases where information was missing). For furnished property, 
they were 9 per cent (10.8 per cent for actual costs). Sufficient net 
returns are just over 4 per cent - tantalizingly just, in view of the 
proposals of the Inquiry into British Housing about rents in the private 
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rented sector (see Chapter 2.7). The figure ~ 4 per cent for properties 
managed by agents. 
estimated costs. 
They are just over 5 per cent using quoted not 
The furnished equivalents were much higher, reflecting the greater returns 
required from the ownership and management of this sort of accommodation 
and - probably - the fact that owners underestimated the costs of self 
management, given the time they put into the management of these 
properties. Another way of looking at this is to say that net returns of 
this order seem to be required to reflect the commitment of time involved. 
Only 6 per cent of furnished properties were managed by agents, 80 per 
cent had owners who lived within 5 miles of them (25 per cent within a 
mile) and 37 per cent were visited weekly or fortnightly by their landlord 
(compared with 13 per cent of unfurnished property). 8 per cent had 
owners who were full time landlords and 62 per cent of furnished 
properties had landlords (companies and individuals) who got a half or 
more of their total gross income from pre tax rent income (compared with 
24 per cent of unfurnished properties). 
Given these results, it is not surprising, therefore, that six in ten 
unfurnished properties were to be sold if they became vacant "tomorrow". 
Investing the vacant possession value in an alternative investment, with 
less risk, like a Building Society, would give returns significantly 
greater than the pre tax net return which rents earn them on this value. 
However, these estimates of nominal rates of return ignore two 
considerations. First, they ignore the fact that returns on sitting 
tenant values are much higher, given that sitting tenant values are 
considerably below vacant possession. Second, they exclude the real 
capital gains received in addition to rent income - "obtained" by virtue 
of retaining the ownership of property instead of selling where nominal 
returns on vacant possession value are comparatively low. 
Table 14.5 gives the results of some calculations which attempt to 
incorporate these two considerations. It was difficult to collect precise 
estimates of sitting tenant values. In principle, prices paid for 
properties with sitting tenants will be a function of the rent to be paid 
and the yield, the latter related to the return required as well as to 
expectations about future rent increases and the degree of risk. However, 
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given the fact that much recent investment has been by "dealing" 
landlords, speculating in property for capital gain, prices paid for 
sitting tenant acquisition will include an element for future capital 
appreciation and for the "hope" value of securing vacant possession and 
being able to sellon the open market at prices owner occupiers are 
willing to pay. Thus, landlords will pay a premium for hope value on top 
of the discounted steam of annual net rent income. The sitting tenant 
value therefore represents the price a landlord will pay to get the rent 
income and capital growth a property can give. Vacant possession value, 
on the other hand, represents the price owner occupiers are prepared to 
pay to live in their own home. The implications of this gap between these 
two values for rented property have already been explored in Part 2 of the 
thesis and is further explored later in the concluding section of this 
chapter and in the last chapter of the thesis. Table 14.5 reveals that, 
under certain circumstances, landlords achieved returns from sitting 
tenant values which were comparable with those that they could have earnt 
in alternative investments. 
Table 14.5 compares the net present value in 1979 of the returns landlords 
got between 1980 and 1985 by buying unfurnished property in 1979 with 
sitting tenants and with all the basic amenities (and therefore with no 
"improvement" investment over the period), with the alternative investment 
of placing the sitting tenant price in a Building Society or in equities. 
The calculations are based on a sample of 77 properties for which 1985 
vacant possession values had been estimated and which met other criteria 
listed. Sitting tenant prices are based on a comparison of survey figures 
of prices for sample properties purchased after 1974 with vacant 
possession. This showed that sitting tenant values in 1979 were one sixth 
of vacant possession prices, rising to one third by 1985. Accordingly the 
sitting tenant price of the sample used in the calculations of Table 14.5 
have been calculated as 17 per cent of their 1979 vacant possession value, 
adjusting the 1985 data for regional house price movements in older 
housing to give 1979 prices. The average for the sample was £1,401. The 
1979 net present value of the pre-tax net rents has been calculated from 
the survey data on 1979 and 1985 rents and 1985 costs, extrapolating the 
rent data to give rents for the intervening years 1980 to 1984 and 
adjusting the costs by repair and maintenance price indices to give costs 
for the years 1980 to 1984. The net rents thus calculated for each of the 
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(a) Average Net Present Value of Income Earnt Between 1980 and 1985 from 
Investing the 1979 Sitting Tenant Price of a Sample of Unfurnished 
Houses. 
Invested in the sample of 
unfurnished properties with 
sitting tenants 
Pre tax rent 
Pre tax net rent plus capital 
appreciation of sitting 
tenant value 
Invested in alternatives 
Pre tax interest from 
Building Society 
Annual yield plus capital 
gain from equities 
5% 
£ 
1,131 
3,183 
908 
2,003 
DISCOUNT RATE 
10% 15% 
£ £ 
943 802 
2,497 1,992 
783 688 
1,559 1,233 
(b) Percent of cases when net present value of investment in unfurnished 
houses was greater than alternative investment of same sum 
Pre tax net rent compared with 
Building Society 
Equities 
Pre tax net rent plus 
capital appreciation 
compared with 
Building Society 
Equities 
53 
6 
100 
97 
52 
8 
99 
97 
Table 14.5 Net Present Value of Alternative Investments 
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50 
9 
99 
96 
years 1980 to 1985 have been discounted by 5, 10 and 15 per cent to yield 
the net present value of the rent income gained from investing the sitting 
tenant price in the sample of properties. In addition allowance has been 
made for the discounted capital growth in the sitting tenant value 
comparing 1985 with 1979 sitting tenant values thus taking into account 
the increase in sitting tenant value as a proportion of vacant possession 
value. Sitting tenant values were fixed at one third of 1985 vacant 
possession valuation. 
Two alternative investments of the sample's sitting tenant prices were 
used. Discounted annual interest from investing in Building Societies has 
been calculated using deposit rates for each of the years grossed up by 
the standard rate of tax (to be equivalent with the rent calculations). 
Discounted annual interest from investment in equities plus the capital 
gain in equity investment has also been calculated. 
The period 1979 to 1985 was a period when the rents for the sample 
properties doubled in real terms, and Table 14.5 shows that in half the 
cases investment in sitting tenant property gave a better return - at all 
three rates of discount considered - than the comparable inves tment in 
Building Societies. Moreover other calculations suggested that over the 
period considered, average nominal gross rates of return on sitting 
tenant value, were 14 per cent in both 1979 and 1985, treble the gross 
return in vacant possession value shown for 1985 in Table 14.4. The 
reason why returns on sitting tenant value did not increase over a period 
when rents doubled in real terms is that the sitting tenant prices 
increased by doubling in response. Vacant possession values increased 
much less - by 50 per cent in nominal terms on average. As a consequence 
gross returns on vacant possession value rose from 2 to 5 per cent over 
the six year period. 
The evidence suggests, therefore, that many landlords who invested in 
property in 1979 were correct to do so - at least given the assumptions 
buil t into these calculations. However the alternative investment in 
BuUding Societies may not be the appropriate comparison. Building 
Society investors do not share in the capital appreciation of the 
properties on which their money is lent. Table 14.5 also shows, 
therefore, that if capital appreciation on the sample property is also 
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taken into account the investment in property gave a greater return in 
almost all cases. On the other hand, if investors, instead of buying 
property (with all the risks involved) put the alternative into equities 
(with the possibility of capital gain but with the greater risk involved 
in comparison with Building Societies), they would have achieved a greater 
return in almos t all cases, unless the capital appreciation of the 
property investment is taken into account. 
The calculations suggest, therefore, that whilst nominal rates of return 
on vacant possession values are lower than in comparable investments, the 
returns on sitting tenant values have been comparable with alternative 
investments in most cases, provided that appreciation in the capital 
value is taken into account. Similar calculations to those made for the 
sample of unfurnished property were also made for a sample of furnished 
property, though this time using vacant possession values as the basis 
for the investment. Similar conclusions were reached. Nominal returns on 
current vacant possession are comparable to other investments but unless 
capital appreciation is taken into account the net present value of rents 
does not make property investment as attractive an alternative as 
investment in Building Societies or equities in about half the sample 
cases. 
These calculations confirm, therefore, that landlords were "correct" to 
look on their investments for the capital growth they would give rather 
than on the rental income they could get. Property inflation has been an 
important factor in shaping recent investment in the private rented 
sector, an experience which has been shared elsewhere. (See for example 
the experience of the United States described in Downs, 1983.) However, 
this investment is inevitably risky, not only because estimates of future 
property prices are speculative, but because it requires a pool of 
wi Uing investors to buy at sitting tenant prices, to enable earlier 
investors to realise their capital gain. If that is not the case, the 
investment must be regarded as inherently less liquid than investment in 
Building Societies and equities which, for a given level of risk and 
liquidity requirement, might be better investments. The evidence 
presented in the last Chapter suggests, however, that the main focus of 
current investment is notsomuch to earn the appreciation in sitting tenant 
values as to buy at sitting tenant value in the expectation, (given the 
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age of unfurnished tenants and the mobility of furnished tenants), of 
selling at vacant possession value. Such investment would appear to meet 
risk and liquidity requirements more than investment in sitting tenant 
prices. Calculations on the sample showed, for example, that at 15 per 
cent discount rate the investment of sitting tenant values in 1979 would 
have brought in by 1985, on average a net income of £688 from a Building 
Society, £1,233 from equities and £12,651 from net rents of property 
investment and disposal of the property at vacant possession price - the 
latter "gain" providing a substantial cushion for any net of grant 
improvement expenditure to be incurred during the life of the investment. 
There was, of course, a risk for dealers buying just one or two properties 
that tenants did not vacate their property within the expected time 
horizon. Such risk can be minimised by buying a lot of such property in 
the expectation that they will generate vacancies for sale on a regular 
basis. 
It is in the light of findings like these, that alternative methods of 
fixing rents have been proposed to ensure that longer term investment in 
private rented housing gives returns comparable to those that can be 
obtained from alternatives, but taking into account capital appreciation. 
The concluding part of this section looks at what would have happened to 
rents in Sheffield in 1985 were two of these proposals to have been 
implemented then. 
Firstly, an estimate has been made of the likely level of rents for the 
sample addresses if the proposals of the Inquiry with British Housing were 
implemented. Briefly, the proposals are to index-link rents with vacant 
possession capital values to give landlords a 4 per cent annual return 
onto which would be added the costs of management and maintenance. 
(Inquiry into British Housing, 1985. ) The calculations i llustra ted in 
Table 14.6 have used annual costs estimated for the sample addresses in 
the landlord survey. 
In 1985 the mean annual rent of the unfurnished addresses where landlords 
estimated vacant possession values was £660; for the furnished addresses 
it was £2,044. The Inquiry proposals would have led to rents of £761 and 
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TABLE 14.6 RENTS FOR UNFURNISHED ADDRESSES IN 1985 BY RENTS FIXED 
ACCORDING TO PROPOSALS OF THE INQUIRY INTO BRITISH HOUSING 
1985 Rents* Inquiry Rents E (pa) # 
E (pa) 
<500 500-599 600-699 700-799 800-899 900+ Total 
% 
<500 % 7 33 27 13 7 13 13 
500-599 % 6 12 41 29 6 6 15 
600-699 % 12 31 36 14 7 37 
700-799 % 6 19 29 35 9 28 
800+ % 42 28 28 6 
Total % % 12 27 30 19 10 (112 ) 
Notes * Rents information from landlords answering questions on 
---" 
rents and vacant possession values. 
# Rents ~ Vacant possession value x 0.04 + Current (1985) Annual 
Management and Repair Costs 
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£1,355 respectively. Unfurnished rents would have risen by £2 a week on 
average whilst furnished rents would have fallen by £13 a week per house. 
Not all unfurnished rents would have risen, since 15 per cent would have 
gone down, and 23 per cent would stay roughly the same. Indeed, the 
impact of the proposals, as Table 14.6 shows, would have been to spread 
the distribution as well as to increase rents, on average. As a 
consequence the increase would have fallen unevenly on existing tenants, 
particularly elderly tenants, who would have experienced increases of £3 
per week. By contrast the rents of all furnished tenants would have 
fallen. 
Secondly, an estimate has been made of the likely level of rents in 1985 
for the sample if the proposals of the British property Federation 
(already referred to) had been implemented. Briefly it will be recalled, 
that the Federation suggested to the House of Commons Select Committee on 
the Environment that rents which provided a 9 per cent gross return on 
vacant possession values would be appropriate, given that capital 
appreciation would be earnt in addition to the gross return. The gross 
return would provide for operating costs as well as an investment yield 
(HCEC, 1982, Vol. 2). These proposals are illustrated in Table 14.7. They 
would have to lead average unfurnished rents of £ 1,165 per annum - an 
increase of nearly £ 10 a week. Almost all rents would have risen as 
Table 14.7 shows, but once again the elderly would have experienced the 
biggest increases since the rents for the houses they occupied in 1985 
would have risen £12 a week. Meanwhile all furnished rents would have 
fallen to £1,527 a year on average. The fact that furnished rents would 
have fallen so considerably under both proposals reflects the fact that 
neither of the calculations adequately incorporates the return on time 
invested that landlords expected in 1985 from furnished lettings. 
Policy Changes Landlords Wanted 
Before examining the policy changes landlords wanted to see in 1986 if it 
is worth finding out if they had noticed any changes since 1979 - or since 
they started letting, where that was later. More (52 per cent) 
unfurnished properties had landlords who thought there had been changes 
than did furnished properties <33 per cent), and the more longstanding 
landlords thought so, too. A wide range of changes were noted, the 
higher level of rents being mentioned most often, with 42 per cent of 
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1985 Rents· Rents £ (p.a.) 
£ (p.a.) 
<800 800-999 1000-1199 1200-1399 
<500 % 13 40 14 20 
500-599 % 12 30 36 18 
600-699 % 9 21 36 19 
700-799 % 6 26 16 29 
800+ % 28 42 
Total % 9 25 27 33 
Notes • Rents information from landlords answering questions on 
rents and vacant possession value. 
Rents = Vacant possession value x 0.09 
1400+ Total 
% 
13 13 
6 15 
14 37 
23 28 
28 6 
16 ( 112) 
Table 14.7 Rents for Unfurnished Addresses in 1985 by Rents Fixed According 
to Proposals of the British Property Federation. 
properties having owners who singled this out. But not all changes noted 
were regarded as positive. The reduced availability of improvement 
grants, in particular, together with a more "aggressive" attitude by the 
local authority towards repairs was also noted. Surprisingly, in view of 
the number of times it was mentioned in 1979 as a desirable change, the 
changes to the system of grant made in 1980 was mentioned by only a few 
landlords. 
On balance however landlords who thought there had been changes considered 
they had been for the better - 55 per cent of properties having owners who 
thought things were much, or a little, better (including the owners of 
62 and 36 per cent respectively of unfurnished and furnished property) and 
only 31 per cent had owners who thought things were a 11 t tle or much 
worse. Agents were more likely to have noticed changes and to have 
thought things had got better. 
What changes then did landlords want to see? They were asked what changes 
would most help them. Higher rents were selected by the owners of over 
half the unfurnished properties, so that despite the real increases in 
rents, between 1979 and 1985, further increases were s till regarded by 
landlords as a major desirable change, though of somewhat less importance 
to owners of furnished property. Indeed whilst it was the single most 
important change for the owners of 36 per cent of unfurnished property 
this was so for the owners of only 21 per cent of furnished property. 
Getting rent increases on a more regular basis was also selected by the 
owners of 38 per cent of unfurnished property (especially those acquired 
in the 1970s and 1980s) and 14 per cent of furnished property, but it was 
the single mos t helpful change for the owners of very few furnished 
properties. Bigger rents and more regular rent increases were the single 
most helpful changes wanted by the owners the owners of over half the 
unfurnished sample. 
property, for whom 
They were less important to owners of furnished 
paying less tax on rent income was of greater 
significance. Over half furnished property had owners who selected this 
as a helpful change and 30 per cent had landlords who regarded it as the 
single most important change. The fact is, that most furnished properties 
were held by landlords who "trade" as individuals and have not formed 
companies for tax purposes. 
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It... };; 14.8 CHANGES TO POLICY THAT WOULD MOST HELP LANDLORDS 
(Percentage of Properties Whose Landlords Said Change Would Help) 
Percentage Selecting 
Each Change As Helpful 
Unfurnished Furnished 
l-1igher Rents 
t-lore Regular 
~ent Increases 
l:..ess Tax on 
~ent Income 
Basier Repossession 
~or Tenant Abuse 
~asier Repossession 
~or New Tenancies 
~asier Repossession 
~f all for all tenancies 
~ess delay and expense in 
~oing to Court to get 
~epossession 
~bolition of Fair Rents 
~igger Improvement 
~rants 
59 42 
38 14 
38 53 
39 25 
8 14 
12 22 
26 10 
11 10 
39 29 
127 71 
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All 
53 
29 
43 
34 
10 
16 
20 
11 
36 
198 
Percentage Selecting 
Change As The Most 
Helpful 
Unfurnished Furnished 
36 21 
18 2 
13 30 
12 14 
o 6 
7 6 
o 5 
4 5 
1 1 11 . 
127 71 
All 
29 
11 
19 
12 
2 
6 
2 
4 
10 
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Get ting easier repossession of tenancies was, with two exceptions, of 
secondary importance to rents and tax. Only a minority of both 
unfurnished and furnished property had landlords who wanted easier 
repossession of either new tenancies or all tenancies, and few had 
landlords who also rated either of these as the most helpful changes. This 
is equally the case for new as well as more longstanding landlords. 
Indeed, with the single exception of improvements grants noted below, 
there are no significant differences in the views of old and new 
landlords. Although landlords of few properties wanted to have the easier 
repossession of their tenancies, they did want it in cases of tenant abuse 
and, significantly, more owners of unfurnished than furnished property had 
landlords who wanted less delay and expense in going to Court. 
(Unfurnished properties were involved in the few cases of experience of 
Court action for possession picked up in this sample.) Finally it should 
be noted that, despite the desire for higher rents and more regular rent 
increases, only 10 per cent of the sample had landlords who wanted the 
Fair Rent system abolished and the owners of only 4 per cent rated its 
abolition as the most helpful change. Bigger improvement grants were 
selected as a helpful change by the owners of 39 per cent of unfurnished 
property and, in the case of both unfurnished and furnished property, it 
was properties with new and bigger owners whose landlords were more likely 
to want this change. Overall however grants rated as the single most 
important change for the only 10 per cent of the sample. 
The changes landlords wanted to see therefore were primary to do with 
rents and incomes and, although some modification of legal and procedural 
matters in respect of tenant abuse and court hearing would be desirable, 
partial or wholesale deregulation did not seem high on the agenda for the 
owners of the majority of the private rented sector in inner Sheffield in 
1986. Whilst this was the case in respect of owners who were selling as 
well as those reletting, it should be noted that "sellers" of unfurnished 
property rated policy changes in respect of regularity of rent increases, 
paying less tax and getting easier possession for tenant abuse as more 
important than "reletters", who were more concerned than "sellers" with 
the availability of improvement grants, reflecting the plans of acquiring 
landlords to improve what they had already acquired as well as their plans 
to acquire more. 
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Conclusions: Investment and Disinvestment 
The follow up study has shown that decline in private unfurnished renting 
will continue, because returns are inadequate for investors in relation 
to alternative investments and to the non-financial costs of management. 
The gap between sitting tenant values and vacant possession values 
continued to exist, (even though it appeared to have been closing in the 
six years) and landlords intended to realise the higher vacant possession 
value by selling when their then current tenants left. Rents gave 
landlords a pre tax return on vacant possession value of about 3 per cent, 
after deducting management and maintenance expenses. Higher, less risky, 
returns could be earnt from the "trouble free" and more liquid investment 
of the vacant possession value in Building Societies and equities. The 
capital gains that could be earnt, in addition to rents, from continued 
letting did not seem sufficient to compensate for the lower return from 
rents - even though taxation was paid only on the real, not the nominal, 
capital gains (at least provided the landlord was not a "dealing" 
landlord). 
The gap between sitting tenant and vacant possession value arises because 
owner occupiers are prepared to pay more for the housing in question than 
investors would pay for a tenanted property i.e. the discounted stream of 
annual net rents, given the yield required and risk involved, is less than 
potential home owners would pay to buy the houses to live in themselves. 
In part this is a reflection of the extent to which registered Fair Rents 
are set "artificially" below market rents, but it is also a reflection of 
the way the market values houses for home ownership, of the subsidy home 
owners receive, and of the low level of incomes of private tenants. It 
remains open to doubt whether rents paid by low income tenants would rise 
sufficiently in a deregulated market for the gap between sitting tenant 
and vacant posseSSion values to close - at least not without an injection 
of subsidy for tenants, that would enable rents to rise to the level 
required to narrow the gap. 
So long as this gap exists, landlords want to sell - but to realise the 
higher vacant possession value they have to hold onto their properties 
until they become vacant - being prepared to sell only at sitting tenant 
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value in the light of circumstances surrounding their age, capital 
requirements, and their assessment of the risk of holding properties as 
tenanted investments before they became vacant. 
Yet the existence of gaps between sitting tenant and vacant possession 
value not only explains why existing landlords want to sell, it also 
explains why new landlords want to buy. There is little evidence that 
current purchasers of unfurnished property are seeking long term property 
investments as income yielding inflation-proofed assets. Rather they seek 
to exploit the gap between sitting tenant and vacant possession value by 
acquiring property with sitting tenants. They make capital gains by 
selling at vacant possession value when the current tenants quit. 
Meanwhile they increase their potential profit by carrying out 
improvements which will increase the value of property but ensuring that 
they do not get caught in a valuation gap (i.e. the increase in value of 
older improved property is less than the total expenditure on improvement) 
by using improvement grants to subsidise the work - and being prepared to 
accept relet ting conditions on grants, by let ting for the requisite 
number of years before selling, to ensure that the grants do not have to 
be repaid. Since they are exploiting this gap, they are prepared to pay 
more than sitting tenant value because of their expectation of capital 
gain on top of rents. The prices they are prepared to pay are greater 
than investors looking at the property as a rent yielding investment would 
pay. This both discourage such investors and increases the probability of 
existing landlords selling to dealers exploiting the gap. 
Thus the gap between sitting tenant and vacant possession value creates 
conditions where property dealers find investment in private renting 
attractive, especially private individual investors and small specialist 
private companies who can afford the comparatively modest investment 
required, compared with the requirement for investing in commercial 
property (Darlow 1983). A combination of low initial investment, 
subsidised improvement and financial gearing enables these dealing 
landlords to acquire and add to their portfOlios relatively quickly -
which are then sold off equally quickly over a similar period. It is not 
surprising to find therefore that it was the size of improvement grants 
that would be the most helpful policy change to new investors. 
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As a consequence, the recent investment made in private renting by 
"dealing" landlords actually hastens the decline and - on the evidence to 
hand - should not be read as a sign of long term reinvestment in private 
rented property. Decline is hastened because these landlords are actively 
acquiring property from other long-standing "investing" landlords (some of 
whom might be prepared to relet) and their reasons for doing so are to 
exploit the gap between sitting tenant and vacant possession value by 
selling as soon as possible. 
The local authority passively mediates in this decline, because the 
availability of improvement grants is crucial to the operation of dealing 
landlords, given the manner in which it makes subsidised improvement of 
the houses possible, thereby also subsidising an improvement in the 
saleability of the property. In like manner, the local authority's 
willingness to use its repairs enforcement powers is also important to 
"dealing" landlords' strategy. Notices served on more long standing 
"investing" landlords, not only result in these landlords complying with 
the terms of the notices, but also (and more likely) result in their sale 
to actively acquiring "dealing landlords" - whose willingness to buy them 
is enhanced by the availability of mandatory grants on properties with 
statutory notices on them. Similarly the designation of improvement 
areas, and the involvement of Building Societies in "adopting" HAAs and 
supporting home owners buying into these areas, sustains the speculative 
activity of dealing landlords. 
In describing those who have been actively buying unfurnished property as 
"dealing" landlords this thesis has, perhaps, portrayed a provincial 
equivalent to the London "flat break up" investors (Hamnett and Randolph, 
1988). The equivalence is not exact. The commodity is a house not a 
mansion block. Moreover, the London investors actively created the 
mortgage market for the sale of the flats they had acquired. In Sheffield 
the "dealers" have been dependent more on local authority action and 
initiative to create the circumstances for improving and selling what they 
had acquired. But what is equivalent is the exploitation of the value gap 
between sitting tenant and with vacant possession. "Dealing", or 
"trading", landlords are to be distinguished from "investing" landlords 
who seek returns on their investment from rent - and capital growth - not 
just speculation on the value gap. 
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Thus the decline of unfurnished private renting arises from the actions of 
both the more long standing "investing" landlords who sell up, because 
rents neither give adequate returns nor compensate for the "hassle" of 
being a landlord, and "dealing" or "trading" landlords who actively buy 
into privately renting to exploit value gaps for the speculative purpose 
of making capital gains on sale. This is not to say that landlords are 
either "dealing" or "investing" landlords. Some may be both. What is 
more certain is that "dealers" depend for their activities on "investors'" 
willingness to sell their low yield and troublesome investments. 
The analysis above does not explain the trends in furnished property, 
where supply had been much more resilient. Here too there have been 
substantial changes in ownership, particularly as unfurnished property has 
become let furnished in parallel with a change in landlord. To a limited 
extent, this arises from the activities of "dealing" landlords letting 
formerly unfurnished property as furnished lettings. When a vacancy 
occurs, while letting conditions on grants are still operative, the 
landlord lets on terms which virtually guarantee vacant possession when 
the letting conditions are no longer operative - i.e. furnished lettings, 
including licence agreements, to young singles. This is not the usual 
approach, however, for dealing landlords, no less than investing landlords 
of unfurnished property, do not relet unfurnished property as furnished 
property - partly because of the higher management costs involved and 
partly because many dealing landlords' properties are managed by 
professionally qualified agents who do not want to get into the management 
of furnished lettings, not the least because of the need to operate on the 
margins of the legal framework, 
professional codes of conduct. 
in a way which would compromise 
Thus, most furnished property belongs, not to dealing landlords, but to 
investing landlords actively putting capital into rent yielding assets, 
including those purchased with vacant possession. Capital growth is an 
element in the calculation, but the continued willingness of investing 
landlords to relet suggests that real capital gains are seen as an 
addition to the stream of rent income secured by these investments, not 
the sole rationale of the investment. The returns were regarded as 
satisfactory and were made possible by the substantially higher rents per 
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house paid by groups of young single people for non exclusive occupation 
agreements, whose ability to pay whilst unemployed or on student grants 
was sustained by Housing Benefit. But it is also evident that to make 
these competitive returns from renting out property bought with vacant 
possession as furnished housing in 1985, landlords had to adopt a strategy 
which, perhaps, best describes them as "property milkers". To start with, 
they bought property which was badly repaired. To make competitive 
returns (i.e. ones which compared with alternatives in respect of 
financial terms as well as with risk and liquidity) they had to let in 
ways which put their agreements beyond the scope of the Rent Acts. In 
other words only by operating outside or on the margins of, the legal 
framework, and by letting on licence agreements could they get the rental 
income they needed and also maintain the liquidity of their investment by 
minimising their tenants security. They also had to minimise operating 
costs and this could be done by neglecting property repairs. All of this 
was not without risk - the risk that agreements might be challenged, and 
the risk that the local authority would enforce repairs. Such risk 
requires a premium on the return required, which has to be reflected in 
higher rents and/or lower operating costs, if the landlord is to make 
money out of a risky business. 
In other words, to supply furnished pri va te rented housing profitably, 
landlords had to buy disrepaired housing, neglect repairs and let outside 
the Rent Acts. It simply would not have been profitable to let well 
maintained property bought with vacant possession within the Rent Acts to 
low income tenants. If landlords were to make competitive returns and 
social objectives (like security and habitable housing) were to be 
achieved, some form of additional subsidy was required. 
At the conclusion of the 1985-86 follow up study, however, the supply of 
property for furnished letting seemed to be assured, provided there was an 
adequate supply of "down market" property to buy, provided the local 
authority did not enforce repair standards, nor helped tenants challenge 
"sham" licences (thereby simultaneously raising landlords' costs and 
reducing their incomes, as rents got regis tered in the process), and 
provided that low income, young consumers continued to have the ability, 
through rent support schemes, to pay the level of rents needed to sustain 
landlords rates of return. It did not, however, look as if the property 
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would be let in a way which provided young single people with secure, well 
repaired and low rent housing. 
This then was the evidence that was available in 1986 about the nature of 
private rented investment in Sheffield in the early 1980s, and about the 
way it was shaped by policy. 
It was evident from both the 1979-80 and 1985-86 studies that local 
authority policy and practice in Sheffield had been of significance in 
shaping landlords' decisions, 
repairs and improvement. 
both in respect of investment and of 
By 1986 it seemed important to widen the horizon, to see what other local 
authorities' policies and practices about private were, and to consider 
ways in which these could be made more effective in raising standards for 
low income tenants, in the context of overall Government policy. 
By 1986 it seemed, too, that overall Government policy would change - both 
in respect of the regulatory framework about rents and security and of 
the framework for grants and the enforcement of standards. It seemed 
important to examine the emerging proposals in the light of the research 
evidence. It is to these issues that Parts 4 and 5 of the thesis now 
turn. 
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PART 4 
LOCAL AUTHORITY POLICIES ABOUT 
PRIVATE RENTED HOUSING 
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CHAPTER 15 
LOCAL AUTHORITY POLICIES ABOUT PRIVATE RENTED HOUSING: 
INTRODUCTION TO 1987 SURVEY 
Objectives 
Parts 2 and 3 of this thesis have reported on the results of a detailed 
survey in Sheffield. The main objectives were to examine the impact of 
two phenomena on physical conditions in the private rented housing stock. 
First, the impact which the LHA's policies had on the investment decisions 
of private landlords. Second, the impact which changes in the ownership 
of private rented housing had on improvements and repairs to the stock. 
The research reported in this part of the thesis are the results of the 
author's 1987 survey of other LHAs which put the Sheffield findings in a 
wider context. In part this enables a judgement to be made as to how far 
the Sheffield results 'travel'. 
Apart from the above specific objective there were two main aims. First, 
to identify the policies towards private rented housing with respect to 
repairs and improvements pursued by LHAs. Almost all LHA powers in this 
area are discretionary. There is a potentially wide range, therefore, in 
the policies and practices that LHAs can follow, given their relatively 
unfettered freedom to decide whether to use these powers, and if so, how 
to implement them. The first main aim of this study was, therefore, to 
enumerate the way LHAs used their powers and to relate this use to the 
different circumstances LHAs found themselves in. As well as describing 
and analysing this use of discretionary power, it was also the intention 
of this part of the research to make proposals for any changes to these 
powers which would make them more effective. 
The second main aim was to find out if there was any evidence elsewhere of 
the kind of changes in ownership that had been discovered in Sheffield. 
For example, was the phenomenon of property dealing unique to Sheffield or 
was it occurring in other LHAs and, if so, of what type and under what 
circumstances? 
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In making proposals for reforms and/or extensions to LHAs powers to 
enforce and grant aid repairs and improvements, particular attention has 
been paid to three pieces of evidence. First, the experience of the 
sample of LHAs chosen and their own opinions about such changes. Second 
proposals made by independent commentators, professional institutions and 
the local authority associations. There has been considerable discussion 
about the effectiveness of the enforcement and grant aid systems in 
general, and in particular in relation to HMOs, and these are fully 
discussed. Third, the Government's recent al terations to LHAs' 
enforcement powers and their further proposals to amend the house 
improvement grant system. The Housing Act 1988 incorporated amendments to 
LHAs' repairs enforcement powers. The 1985 Green Paper and 1981 
Consultation Paper on improvement grants led the way to proposed changes 
now in the Local Government and Housing Bill. (This Bill was tabled in 
February 1989, just after the cut-off date for including new material into 
the final draft the thesis and therefore, the amendments referred to in 
the thesis were those in the Consultation Paper). Finally, in respect of 
Government proposals, account has been taken of the 1988 Consultation 
Paper on LHA powers about HMOs. Each of the substantive chapters in this 
part of the thesis evaluates the likely impact of the Government's 
proposals. 
The results of this research are reported in the four following chapters. 
Chapters 16 to 18 deal with the way LHAs use their powers to improve 
standards in unfurnished houses, or the long term sector, as it has been 
called. It also reports on the experience of property dealing in other 
LHAs. Chapter 19 looks at HMOs and examines in particular how LHAs use 
their discretionary powers to deal with standards in shared houses and to 
improve conditions for tenants in the 'rapid turnover sector', as Chapter 
~ described it. 
Each chapter contains an enumeration of LHAs' powers in the respective 
area; a review of previous studies of the use of these powers; the 
evidence on their use derived from the 1981 survey; and a review and 
evaluation of proposals for alterations to these powers. 
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The evidence on the use LHAs make of their powers in 1987 is derived from 
the author's survey of 41 urban English LHAs in the Northern and Midlands 
standard regions. The next section describes the survey methodology. 
Survey Methodology 
The sample LHAs were drawn from a stratified sampling frame of all "urban" 
local authorities in the five standards regions, of the North, North West, 
Yorkshire and Humberside, East Midlands and West Midlands. The survey was 
restricted to these authorities because the aim of the study of LHA policy 
about private renting and its impact was to put the detailed study of the 
sector in Sheffield in a wider context. Thus the survey was confined to 
urban LHAs and did not include any in Greater London, the rest of the 
South East, East Anglia or the South West (nor Wales nor Scotland) because 
these areas were subject to different market pressures, compared with LHAs 
in the North and Midlands, whereas the sampled urban LHAs in these regions 
were thought more likely to reflect Sheffield's experience. 
The intention in carrying out the survey was first to collect information 
about urban LHAs' policies affecting private renting and to examine how 
their, largely, discretionary powers in this area are used; second to 
collect evidence about the impact of these policies; and third to identify 
whether there were any differences between LHAs. These 0 bj ec ti ves are 
also related to work originally undertaken by Martin who initially 
collected information from 28 urban LHAs about their policies towards the 
improvement of private rented houses (Martin, 1983). He followed this up 
with a detailed study of the use made of improvement grants by private 
landlords in four LHAs with contrasting policies about private renting 
(Martin, 1985). A further objective, therefore of the current survey was 
to see whether the principal findings of both Martin's, as well as the 
author's work, particularly with respect to the activities of "new breed" 
or property dealing landlords, in the early 1980s were still relevant in 
the later 1980s. 
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To do this, all the LHAs in Martin's sample were included in the current 
study but the sample size was increased by 17 to a total of 45. Within 
the constraint of including all Martin's sample the aim was to draw a 
sample representative of different types of urban LHAs and of the three 
Northern and two Midlands standard regions. 
The sample frame included all 'urban' local authorities in the five 
standard regions and was stratified using the OPCS socio-economic 
classification of health and local authorities (Craig, 1985). All the 
local authorities in the following classifications were included: 
commuting areas; suburban areas; less remote areas; resort and retirement 
areas; towns with some surrounding countryside; major industrial areas; 
The Black Country; Pennine towns and similar; cities and more industrial 
service centres; less industrial service centres. 
As Table 15.1 shows, LHAs in the sample frame had 77 per cent of all the 
households who rented from private landlords in the North and Midlands, 
and 88 per cent of those who rented furnished accommodation. Table 15. 2 
provides a more detailed breakdown of the private rented sector between 
the different types of urban LHAs in these regions, the distribution of 
sampled authorities between the urban LHAs and the size of the private 
rented sector in the sampled LHAs in each type. 
The 45 LHAs were drawn from the sample frame by a four stage procedure. 
First, the number to be drawn from each classification was approximately 
proportional to its share of the North and Midlands total of private 
rented households. Second the number to be drawn from the North and from 
the Midlands, within each classification, was proportional to each 
region's share of private rented housing in the classification. Having 
thus calculated the number of LHAs needed from each classification, the 
authori ties in Martin's sample were automatically drawn from the sample 
frame. The remaining numbers were then drawn at random from an alphabeti-
cal list of LHAs for every classification divided separately into northern 
and Midlands authorities. 
The final distribution of LHAs is shown in Table 15.2. As Table 15.1 
indicates, the 45 sampled LHAs had 50 per cent of all private households 
in the North and Midlands in 1981. They had 61 per cent of those renting 
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Table 15.1: THE PRIVATE RENTED SECTOR IN THE NORTH AND MIDLANDS(l) 
Local Authorities Rented with 
business or 
job 
'ODD 
'Urban,(2) Authorities: 
sampled 46 
(of which responding LHAs) (43) 
not sampled 41 
'Urban' Total 87 
Non 'urban' authorities 57 
Total 144 
Notes 
(1) . Standard Regions as defined in text 
(2) Local authorities as defined in text 
Errors in addition are due to rounding. 
Source: 1981 Census County Reports 
0' 
,0 
32 
29 
61 
39 
Rented Rented 
unfurnished furnished 
'ODD 0' 'ODD 0' ,0 ,0 
240 52 94 61 
(226) (89 ) 
122 26 42 27 
362 78 136 88 
102 22 20 12 
464 156 
Total Total 
Private Households 
Rented 
'000 0' '000 0' ,0 ,0 
380 50 4287 52 
(358 ) (4066) 
206 27 2322 28 
586 77 6609 80 
178 23 1695 20 
764 8304 
Tab1e 15.2: THE PRIVATE RENTED SECTOR IN 'URBAN' LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN THE NORTH AND MIDLANDS 
Type of local Author~ty Total Housenolds Private Reming Ratlo of private renting ,\lo of l!-lAs in Number of LAs sampleo In PrIvate Renting Housenolas 
Houseno1ds households in North to r'lC1r tln sClmole currenc study on sampled LAs 
Mldlands 
,\lorth Midlanos Total !; No !; in Nortn !; in Tot, No. O' ., 
Community Areas 123,858 12,S17 2 29:71 1 0 1 2 10,725 100 1 
Surburoan Areas 554,320 49,641 8 58:"2 T 2 2 /0 9 20,2/01 7i 5 
Less remote, malnly rural 2S3,631o 37,713 6 52:"8 0 5.181 100 ClreCls 
Resort an,j retnemenc 202,555 
" 
0 5,329 100 Clreas 23,997 100:0 
i O,""rlS wl tM sanle 652,851 ., 9 23,535 79 5 50,S93 9 72 :28 ., 
" \J'1 sur,CJul,ulny coul1try - -0 ~ore lncust~lal areas 1,!:.77,J53 113,003 19 63:37 6 6 3 c 20 55.271 St ~L! \JJ The B1ack Country 55/0. i43 53,696 9 0: 100 3 0 
" 
-
9 53,696 Q l!.:. 
?ennln e towns:!: Slmllar 1,026,761:. 7/0,995 13 79:21 6 6 8 18 60.731 -. 1 ' -~ 
Citles dna ~ore lnoustrla1 1, 62/0,883 165,71/0 28 27 1107,SOl 93 39 se rv lee =en [. r~s 92:8 11 12 
Less lnousc:lal serVlce 37,693 3,887 100:0 0 Z 3,887 100 
centres 
--- ---
iotal 6.608,65" 58S,7S6 100 68: 32 28 29 16 45 100 360.097 73 100 
furnished, but only 32 per cent of those renting with a business or job, 
reflecting the urban bias of furnished lettings and the rural bias of job 
related lettings. It also indicates that they had 65 per cent and 69 per 
cent respectively of the total and of the furnished sector in the urban 
LHAs. Table 15.2 shows the share sample LHAs in each classification have 
of the all private rented households in the sample. It indicates that 
there is an over-representation of larger LHAs, that is, LHAs in the 
sample from the Black Country, Pennine Towns and Cities and More 
Industrial Service Centres have a greater share of the total private 
renting households in the sample than their classification has of the 
private renting population. This arises because of the sampling method 
used, and the fact that the process of combining random and pre-selection 
of LHAs resulted in LHAs with a larger than average private rented sector 
for the classification being incorporated. 
The LHAs were invited in late 
to do so. Interviews about 
senior officers in the firs t 
1986 to take part in the survey. 41 agreed 
LHA policy and its impact were held with 
half of 1987. All of the interviews were 
conducted with a semi-structured questionnaire, taping the interview, of 
which a transcript was typed up after the interview. Where replies could 
be coded up to give categorised data, they were transferred to a coding 
schedule for subsequent statistical analysis. The officers interviewed 
were responsible for both policy formulation and implementation and were 
usually drawn from one or more of Environmental Health, Housing and 
Planning Departments. Prior to and after interviews, three kinds of 
background information were collected: relevant official documents 
(committee reports, minutes, and published reports); statistical data from 
the LHA about enforcement and grant aid; and statistical data from 
official and unofficial series i.e. Census of Population, 1981; DoE's 
Local Housing Statistics; and CIPFA. 
41 LHAs agreed to take part and all were interviewed. Not all however 
were able to furnish complete background statistical data on enforcement 
and grants. In terms of inner area designations, the 41 LHAs contained 21 
partnership and programme authorities and 20 other designated and 
non-designated districts. 28 were in the three northern standard regions 
and 13 from the two Midlands regions. The average number of households in 
each of these authorities is shown in Table 15.3. Appendix 6 contains the 
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Table 15.3: 
PClrtllersilip 
Proyrannllc 
Other DesjynClLed 
OLher 
SlZE or rrn\lAIE RENIED SECIOH IN 1981 IN SAMPLlD 
L1IAs BY INNLH AREA SIAILJS 
ToLal Huu~Jeho1ds 
( 'ODD) 
t 73.9 
115.0 
Districts 95.7 
61.4 
99.4 
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Average size of Private 
Rented in LHAs 
Unrurnished Furnished 
( '000) ( '000) 
11.4 5.6 
6.1 2.5 
5.5 0.9 
3.1 1.0 
5.5 2.2 
interview questionnaire used to collect statistical data from the LHA, the 
semi-structured questionnaire used in the interviews and a list of the 45 
sample LHAs. 
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CHAPTER 16 
PROPERTY DEALERS, LOCAL AUTHORITY POLICY AIID THE REPAIR 
AI1D IMPROVEHEIiT OF UIIFUBIIISHED PRIVATE RENTED HOUSING: 
A REVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Introduction 
This and the two succeeding chapters examine the policies of urban loc~l 
authorities in the five standard regions of northern and midlands England 
in respect of the repair and improvement of unfurnished private rented 
housing. They are companions to Chapter 19 which deals with the 
application of these same authorities' discretionary powers to regulate 
standards in multi-occupied and shared housing. Whereas the latter 
chapter is concerned with conditions in the rapid turnover furnished 
subs ector of private renting, Chapters 16 to 18 deal with conditions in 
the unfurnished long term subsector, comprising the majority of privately 
rented dwellings and subject to continuing decline as landlords sell, 
typically terraced housing, to owner occupiers when they get vacant 
possession. 
This chapter describes LHA enforcement and grant aid powers and examines 
previous evidence about the impact that local housing authorities 
(henceforth LHAs) have had on the repair and improvement of unfurnished 
private rented houses. Chapter 17 examines the results of the author's 
survey of the contemporary policies of 41 urban LHAs in the "North" and 
"Midlands" and their impact. Chapter 18 looks at policy recommendations, 
in the light of both these results and of other proposals by government, 
professional bodies and previous researchers in this field. 
Enforcement and Grant Aid Povers 
Changes in Conditions in Private Rented Housing and the Deyelo~nt of LBA 
powers 
The convent tonal wisdom is that private landlords rarely carry out repairs 
and improvements. The 1911 Housing Policy Review suggested at least two 
reasons for this low level of activity. First, the number of potential 
tenants seeking accommodation exceed supply and in a sellers' market 
landlords can let even poorly maintained property, provided it is not so 
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bad that it attracts action by LHAs to enforce standards. Second, many 
LHA powers to regulate conditions depend, in practice, on tenants 
initiating action. If they feel insecure, and know they would have great 
difficulty finding somewhere else to live, they will be unlikely to use 
the procedures open to them if the result 1s either harassment by their 
landlord or increased rent which they cannot afford after the works have 
been completed. (DoE, 1977a; See also Shelter's evidence on this to House 
of Commons Environment Committee (HCEC, 1982 p.87».-
At the heart of the problem of poor conditions is the age of the stock and 
the impact which rent control and regulation, together with the low 
incomes of tenants, have had on landlords' abi l1ty and willingness to 
maintain the old fabric, let alone install modern amenities. Table 2.17 
in Chapter 2 showed that unfitness, disrepair and the lack of amenities 
were not phenomena confined to private rented houses. 63 per cent of all 
homes private rented in 1981 were built before 1919. Other houses built 
before 1919 which were owner occupied by 1981 were almost as equally 
disrepaired, and although double the proportion of the former compared 
with the latter were unfit or lacked amenities, the problem of substandard 
housing was obviously not confined to private rented housing. A similar 
picture emerges from the proportion of dwellings shown to be in poor 
condition (defined as unfit or lacking basic amenities or needing urgent 
repairs costing more than £1,000) in the 1986 House Condition Survey. 
Again, Table 2.19 showed that, whilst a greater proportion of private 
rented dwellings were in poor condition than owner occupied dwellings at 
all ages, the difference was least amongst the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century stock (built before 1919, comprising 69 per cent of all 
private rented houses). The age of the stock and the manner of its 
original construction dictates the need for modernisation in both sectors. 
Almost all of it was originally owned by private landlords. As it has 
progressively been sold off it has been bought, typically, by low income 
owner occupiers who face considerable difficulties in maintaining it, 
despite a wide range of central and local government programmes designed 
to combat conditions (see for example Karn et al 1986). 
Landlords, too, face considerable financial constraints. In part this is 
the result of rent regulations which limits rents, but it is also due to 
the low level of their tenants' income. These imply that even market 
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rents in a deregulated sector would not rise to give landlords the 
competitive returns they would require to make regular investment in 
maintenance and modernisation a worthwhile project (see, for example, 
HCEC, 1982). Britain is not alone. Rent restrictions and 
"anti-landlord" legislation are not the only - or even the main - reason 
for bad conditions. Low levels of demand and inadequate subsidies are 
just as important (See for example, Harloe, 1985, for international 
comparisons.) So far as rent restriction is a factor, however, limiting 
what landlords can change for accommodation, the reduction of maintenance 
is one way of maintaining profitability (see Frankena, 1975 for a 
theoretical discussion of this). 
LHAs' powers to secure better conditions in the private rented sector have 
to be seen therefore in the wider context, not just of rent restrictions, 
but also of tenants' incomes, knowledge, security, and the way the tax and 
subsidy system discriminates against private renting. LHAs' powers to 
enforce standards exist therefore in recognition that landlords do not 
have many, if any, financial incentives to carry out repairs and 
improvements. Gradually it has come to be recognised that enforcement 
cannot be effective unless accompanied by 'inducements' in the form of 
grants and permissible rent increases to defray the costs of improvement 
or of major repair. The grants available to private landlords have 
evolved in post war years so that more of the costs of enforceable repairs 
and improvements are grant aided now than in earlier decades. Similarly 
the systems of rent control, rent regulation and rent allowances have been 
gradually restructured to give landlords more adequate compensation for 
the costs of maintenance and modernisation at the same time as protecting 
tenants' abilities to pay. 
The following paragraphs provide only an outline of the contemporary 
system of an enforcement and grant aid (for detailed discussion of the 
legislation on enforcement see Arden, 1985, 1986; Ormandy and Burridge 
1988; for the principal government circular on the current grant system 
see DoE, 1980 - the modifications to this can be followed up in the 
relevant volume of the Encyclopaedia of Housing Law; for the latest 
Government priorities, see DoE, 1988b). More detail about the system is 
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also provided in the section on the results of the research. It is 
important at this stage to stress that much of LHAs' powers in this area 
are discretionary. 
Enforcement and Grant Aid: The current (February 1989) position 
As for enforcement, LHAs can use Public Health Act powers to get statutory 
nuisances abated - this means making landlords deal with individual items 
of disrepair which are prejudicial to health e.g dampness caused by a 
leaking roof. Landlords can be prosecuted for non-compliance and LHAs can 
do work in default. Under the Housing Acts they have long had duties to 
serve notices to get unfit houses made fit where this can be done at 
reasonable expense. (Currently S.189 of Housing Act, 1985.) Since 1969 
they have also had powers to require landlords to remedy disrepair to fit 
houses, the intention being to prevent landlords allowing houses to become 
so disrepaired that they fall into unfitness, incapable of repair at 
reasonable expense, so that tenants have to vacate and landlords get 
vacant possession. This power can be exercised on a LHA's own initiative 
(currently S.190 of Housing Act 1985). LHAs have also had powers to 
require repairs to a fit house if its tenant complains that its 
conditions interferes with his or her material comfort. These Housing Act 
repair powers enable LHAs to get much more substantial work done than 
under Public Health legislation and their use has grown as improvement has 
replaced redevelopment as the appropriate way of dealing with older 
housing. It was not until 1980 however that landlords could get repairs 
grants as of right when served with repair notices under the Housing Acts. 
LHAs can also do work in default and recover costs. LHAs were first given 
powers to insist on missing standard amenities (bath, inside WC etc) being 
installed in improvement areas in 1964, but these were not much used. In 
1974 the powers of compulsory improvement were modified. LHAs were enabled 
to serve notices on their own initiative in statutory improvement areas 
(on any dwelling lacking amenities whether or not disrepaired) but had to 
await tenants' written representations elsewhere. The work must be capable 
of being done at reasonable expense. Mandatory intermediate grant is 
payable where such notice is served. LHAs can require property to be 
improved to either a full standard - all amenities, fit, in good repair 
and meeting insulation standards - or a reduced standard. Where landlords 
do not comply with notices LHAs can do work in default and recover their 
costs. Landlords also have the right to require LHAs to buy the property. 
510 
The Housing Act 1988 amended some of these repair enforcement powers, 
thereby fulfilling the Government's promise, made during the Bill's 
passage through Parliament, that it would give LHAs stronger powers to 
enforce repair notices. The main changes enable LHAs to initiate all 
types of notice, allow them to get landlords to execute repair notices 
sooner by making it a requirement to specify in notices a date by which 
works must start, make it an offence for landlords to intentionally fail 
to comply with notices, give LHAs tougher powers to do work in default, 
make repair notices registerable land charges (and thus the responsibility 
of any linked company to which a landlord transfers property as a way of 
evading liability), and gives LHAs the power to recover the costs of any 
work done in default from the person having control at the time the demand 
for expenses is made (similarly frustrating evasive tactics by landlords 
with shell companies)(See DoE, 1989a). 
As for grants, the current position is that landlords have a right to a 
repair grant where they are served with a repairs notice and to an 
intermediate grant where they are served with a provisional or full 
improvement notice. Intermediate grant is in any case mandatory where a 
house lacks any of the standard amenities and applications are duly made. 
Repairs grants on the other hand are discretionary in cases where notices 
have not been served and are designed in all cases to remedy substantial 
and structural repairs to old dwellings, defined as pre-1919, which have 
all the standard ameni ties. The dwelling must be in reasonable repair 
after the work, having regard to its age, character and locality. So far 
as intermediate grants are concerned, grant aid is for the installation 
of missing amenities but dwellings must also be fit for human habitation 
after the works and intermediate grant can also cover some of the 
additional works of repair needed to achieve fitness (unless the LHA 
dispenses with this requirement). As well as being a term used 
co lloquially to describe all grants in a generic sense, LHAs also have 
discretion to award an "improvement grant" for works beyond those covered 
by the intermediate grant, i.e. alteration, enlargement, rewiring, central 
hea ting may all qualify. No more than 50 per cent of the grant may be 
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attributable to repair except if the dwelling is in substantial and 
structural disrepair - when up to 70 per cent can be devoted to repairs. 
After works the dwelling must have all standard amenities, be in 
reasonable repair (given its age, character and locality) meet 
construction, condition, service and amenity standards (i.e. the 10 point 
standard) similar to those specified for fitness but with the inclusion of 
insulation, and provide satisfactory housing for 30 years. The LHA can 
reduce all these conditions, save only for the fact that the future 
"life" must be at least 10 years. There are also special grants for 
houses in multiple occupation. (See this volume, Chapter 19). 
For each grant there are eligible cost limits based on a complex formula 
depending on the type of grant. The current limits were introduced in 
September 1988, updating ones previously fixed in 1984. If it is an 
improvement grant the cost limit depends upon whether the dwelling is a 
priority category (until September 1988, properties that are unfit, or 
lack amenities, or in need of sUbstantial and structural repair or in a 
housing action area (HAA) or for adaptation for a disabled person); 
whether it is a listed building; whether it is in London or elsewhere and 
whether it is for conversion. If it is an intermediate grant there is a 
tariff for each amenity and a full or reduced repairs element. If it is a 
repair grant, whether it is a listed or unlisted building. As an example, 
the limit for non priority improvement grant on an unlisted building 
outside London at the time of this survey was (the new limits are in 
brackets) £6,600 (£9,400); for a priority case it is £10,200 (£14,500). 
Normally grant aid of 50 per cent of the limit is given, but for improve-
ment grants up to September 1988 it was 75 per cent in a HAA, for unfit 
dwellings, where works involved installing amenities or remedying 
substantial and structural disrepair or making adaptations for the 
disabled. In GIAs it 1s 65 per cent. In cases of undue hardship 
percentages can be increased by 15 per cent from 50 and 75 per cent. All 
of these are maximum percentages and LHAs have powers to pay discretionary 
grants at less than the appropriate percentages. Intermediate and 
mandatory repairs grants must however be paid at the appropriate 
percentage, i.e. 75 per cent (except in cases of hardship, where 90 per 
cent applies). For a temporary period, between March 1982 and April 1984 
the percentage for all intermediate and repairs grants approved within 
that period was 90 per cent. When the grant limits were revised in 
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September 1988 the pr10r1ty category for el1g1ble expense and the 15 per 
cent grant rate was w1thdrawn from dwell1ngs lacking basic amenities for 
the purposes of discretionary improvement grants. Subsequently (see 
below) the rate of grant on intermediate and mandatory repairs grants has 
been limited to 20 per cent. 
This basic framework was erected in the Housing Act 1980 which modified 
the then ex is ting one in respect of grant percentage and grant aid for 
repairs. In particular, it enabled repairs grants to be awarded to any 
qualifying dwelling, not just those in HAAs with owners in hardship. It 
extended the priority categories for discretionary grants to those listed 
above, irrespective of the location, not just dwellings in HAA as was the 
case between 1914 and 1980. It also increased from 50 to 70 per cent the 
proportion of discretionary grant that can cover substantial and 
structural disrepair. These changes and their significance for the 
enforcement of standards in the private rented sector are dealt with in 
the next chapter. However it is also relevant at this stage to note that 
LHAs were given greater discretion in 1980 to relax the standards expected 
to be achieved with grant aid. Moreover the standards specified by 
statute are in themselves less stringent than in the past. Thus a 
"reasonable" standard of repair is now expected of dwellings benefiting 
from improvement grants (as well as reaching the fitness standard) rather 
than a "good" standard under the 1974 Act. This change implemented a 
policy to improve a larger number of dwellings to an adequate standard 
than a smaller number to a high standard. On completion of an intermediate 
grant a dwelling is required only to be fit for human habitation (and even 
this requirement can be waived) whilst applicants need not install all 
missing amenities. There is thus no repair standard as such for an 
intermediate grant and the 15 year life requirement was removed, although 
if the repairs element of the grant is used the dwellings should meet the 
"reasonable" standard. Repairs grants for works to remedy substantial and 
structural disrepair (roofs, external walls, foundations, floors, internal 
walls, ceilings and staircases) should assist dwellings reach the 
"reasonable" repair standards. Reasonable is taken to mean having regard 
to age, character and locality and, so far as intermediate grants are 
concerned, the likely future life of a dwelling. 
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However, where grants are being used to comply with the requirements of 
repair or improvement notices, the requirements of the notices must be met 
and LHAs will not use their powers in respect of grants to dispense with 
usual standards. Thus where a repairs notice is served in respect of a 
house that is unfit (S.189 of Housing Act 1987), it must be made fit for 
human habitation in the terms defined by the Housing Act, 1985. Where 
however a repairs notice is served in respect of a house that is fit but 
needs substantial repairs to bring it up to a "reasonable standard" (S.190 
(1) (a» the notice will specify the works required to achieve such a 
standard having regard to age, character and locality; where a repair 
notice is served in respect of a fit house where a tenant has complained 
that its conditions interferes materially with his or her personal comfort 
(S. 190 (1)( b» the notice will specify what is needed to eliminate this 
interference. S.190(1)(b) was introduced because of difficulties of 
enforcing disrepair under the Public Health Act in respect of nuisances 
which were not 'statutory'. Both "reasonable standard" and "material 
comfort" are not defined and some latitude therefore is provided for 
interpretation by LHAs. In the case of S.189 notices, the house must be 
capable of being made fit at reasonable expense - a calculation involving 
the value of the unrepaired house, the cost of works (less any grant and 
increased rent), and the value the house will have when fit. If the house 
cannot be made fit at reasonable expense the LHA must convene a "time and 
place" meeting to consider its future; which may lead to an undertaking by 
the owner to do the necessary work or to its closure or demolition or 
alternatively to its purchase by the LHA. Whilst matters of reasonable 
expense do not expressly apply to S.190 notices, it is one which LHAs "may 
properly have regard to when reaching their own decision or whether or not 
to exercise discretion" (Arden 1986, p. 238) • Indeed the courts on an 
appeal may take a wider social view of reasonable expense under this 
section (Arden 1985, p.208). Finally in the case where a LHA serves a 
compulsory improvement notice, it can pursue the full or reduced 
standard. The former means that the dwelling must have exclusive use of 
all amenities, be in good repair, having regard to age, character and 
locality, meet insulation standards, and be fit, with a future life of 15 
LHAs can waive any (in part or total) of these - hence the reduced years. 
standard. However these standards must be capable of being achieved at 
reasonable expense. 
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All grants are paid subject to a number of conditions. Of particular note 
is that private rented houses must be available for letting for five years 
(7 in HAAs). LHAs may request landlords to let on regulated tenancies. 
From 1989 they can impose conditions related to letting on an assured 
tenancy (for assured tenancies, see Chapter 20). They may require a Fair 
Rent to be registered - and must do so in GIAs and HAAs - unless it is, 
after 1988, an assured tenancy. Letting conditions cannot be imposed when 
a grant is paid following a compulsory improvement or repair notice, but 
LHAs can impose other conditions. In future Exchequer contribution to LHA 
grant expenditure will depend on LHAs applying these conditions in certain 
cases (see DoE 1988c, 1989a). 
In essence, therefore, LHAs have a lot of effective discretion in 
determining detailed standards. In choosing they can, within reason, 
decide whether or not to take action on substandard housing and if so what 
instrument to use. This is crucial when capital allocations are 
insufficient to fund mandatory grant applications. 
Tbe IIlpact of Enforceaent and Grant Aid: 
Previous Research 
Statistical evidence 
Statistical Evidence and 
The conventional wisdom that landlords rarely carry out repairs or 
improvements is belied, to some extent, by statistical evidence. For 
example there was an increase between 1967 and 1971 of 230,000 in the 
number of privately rented dwellings that were fit and had all amenities. 
There was an increase of 120,000 on the same measure between 1971 and 1976 
(Todd et al 1982, Table 13). 
Moreover, as Table 16.1 reveals, a considerable number of grants have been 
paid to the "other" category of private owners since 1973. They were 
running at a very much higher level in 1973 than in subsequent years up to 
1980. This reduction reflects the impact of the 1974 Housing Act, i.e. 
the loss of the 75 per cent rate on all grants available in Development 
and Intermediate Areas under the terms of the Housing Act, 1971, and its 
restriction in 1974 to HAAs; the reintroduction of restrictive conditions 
to prevent grant "abuse" by landlords (see below); and the failure of 
eligible cost limits to keep pace with inflation. Over this period the 
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Table 16.1 GRANTS PAID TO OWNER OCCUPIERS OF PRE 1919 DWELLINGS 
AND ALL PRIVATE LANDLORDS* IN ENGLAND 
YEAR 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
GRANTS(a) 
(No.) 
148,092 
96,013 
57,166 
50,055 
48,484 
45,698 
49,623 
57,365 
86,603 
189,598 
190,033 
104,218 
86,536 
83,903 
OWNER OCCUPIERS 
DWELLINGS RATE 
( '000) (per '00) 
2844(g) 5.21 
2900(g) 3.31 
2964(g) 1.93 
3076(e) 1.63 
3132 (f) 1. 55 
3188 (f) 1.43 
3244 (f) 1.53 
3300( f) 
3356(c) 1.71 
3421(d) 2.53 
3485(d) 5.44 
3548(d) 5.36 
3612(d) 2.88 
3679(d) 2.35 
3739(a) 2.24 
PRIVATE LANDLORDS GRANTS TO PRIVATE 
GRANTS(a) DWELLINGS(b) RATE LANDLORDS AS % OF 
(No. ) ( '000) (per '000) ALL GRANTS 
66245 2744 2.41 31 
41335 2622 1.58 30 
19014 2495 0.76 25 
15728 2342 0.67 24 
13588 2236 0.61 22 
10683 2139 0.50 19 
8967 2042 0.44 15 
1952 
10821 1876 0.58 16 
16093 1799 0.89 16 
26329 1725 1.53 12 
32815 1655 1.98 15 
27427 1586 1.73 21 
20649 1516 1. 36 19 
15903 1453 1.09 16 
Sources (a) DoE Housing and Construction Stalistics. London, HMSO (various issues). 
(b) DoE Housing and Construction Statistics, London, HMSO, (various issues). NB Up to 1975 published data 
includes housing associations. An estimate of the numbers of latter dwellings for each year has been 
deducted. 
(c) DoE House Condition Surveys • London, HMSO. 
(d) 1981 figure plus (for each year) the decline in private renting shown in Column 5 adjusted for clearance 
and demolition. and sales to local authorities/housing associations. 
(e) DoE House Condition Survey 1976, London, HMSO. 
(f) By interpolation 
(g) 1976 figure less, annual decline in private renting, adjusted for slum clearance etc. 
Note * Includes grants to housing associations under private owner legislation. 
rate of grant take up fell from 2.41 in 1913 to 0.44 per cent in 1919, a 
fall experienced in parallel by the rate at which owner occupiers of pre 
1919 properties took up grants. Since then it has risen again in both 
tenures, reflecting the availability of 15 per cent and repairs grants on 
qualifying properties irrespective of their location (and not just in 
HAAs) and the two year 'boost' given by the 90 per cent rate for 
intermedia te and repairs grants in the 1982 budget, since when it has 
fallen back again in both tenures. 
Desirable though this level of activity is, it is well below what is 
needed. The rate is less than half that in comparable owner occupied 
housing. If allowance is made for the fact that a third of the private 
rented total was built after 1919 (and therefore less likely to be in need 
of grant aid) private landlords' rates are still well below owner 
occupiers' i.e. private rented rates in 1919 and 1984 adjusted for age 
before 1919 would be 0.66 and 2.91 respectively i.e. only about a half 
owner occupiers' despite the greater proportionate need for investment to 
combat unfitness and the lack of amenities. 
It is also important to recognise the extent to which work is carried out 
by tenants themselves. The social survey follow up to the 1981 House 
Condition Survey reckoned that £0.4 billion of the £0.1 billion spent on 
home improvements and remedial work in the private rented sector in 1981 
(including a notional cost for unpaid labour) had been spent by tenants 
themselves (DoE, 1983). In particular it showed that whilst most tenants 
spent very little, some spent quite substantial amounts. It also showed 
that where landlords had carried out works before a new tenant moved in, 
the tenant subsequently carried out a similar amount of work. Nevertheless 
the survey also confirmed how much less was done in pre 1919 pri va te 
rented houses than similarly aged owner occupied ones. Only 15 per cent 
of the former had experienced work of modernisation, modernisation and 
repair or rehabilitation, compared with 35 per cent of the latter between 
1916 and 1981, broadly confirming the evidence about the comparable grant 
take up rates between the two tenures. 
A somewhat similar picture emerges from the result of the 1986 English 
House Condition Survey (DoE 1988a). This shows that a significant number 
of private rented tenants carried out work. Indeed even though 40 per 
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cent did not regard the house as their responsibility, as many as 21 per 
cent did prompt maintenance and 28 per cent did essential maintenance to 
their homes. As Table 16.2 reveals, tenants did little by way of major 
work. A 1 though landlords did work on only 44 per cent of all their 
dwellings they did it on 50 per cent of dwellings built before 1919 
compared with 75 per cent of owner occupiers of similarly aged dwellings. 
It was estimated that £1 billion was spent on private rented dwellings in 
1986, 30 per cent by tenants, 60 per cent by landlords and 10 per cent in 
the form of grant aid. On average £758 was spent on each dwelling, of 
which landlords spent £500, but this average reflects significant expendi-
ture on a few dwellings, whilst most dwellings benefited from much smaller 
amounts. Where major work (more than £400) was done, landlords spent 
£1,616 compared with £3,315 by owner occupiers. Amongst pre 1919 dwell-
ings the respective figures for all work are £2,312 and £4,562. Landlords 
are thus spending about half that of owner occupiers on Similarly aged 
property. 
Where landlords did work it tended to be essential work to dwellings. 65 
per cent was necessary in the sense of expenditure on fabric repairs, 
services or external decoration. Owner occupiers and landlords of pre 
1919 dwellings did similar sorts of essential work (like roofs and 
gutters) but owner occupiers also carried out works to increase comfort 
and appearance. Where tenants did do work, it tended to be done by 
younger and better off tenants on items which increased the comfort and 
appearance of their homes (like bathrooms and kitchen units). Indeed 70 
per cent of all jobs by tenants were done for this reason. Only those of 
recent residence length did work to remedy defects to fabric. 
It appeared that 42 per cent of the jobs done by landlords had been 
initiated by their tenants. Most landlords appear to have carried out the 
work when asked. In only 16 per cent of cases did tenants report 
difficulty getting work done (compared with 52 per cent of local authority 
tenants). 
Factors beh1nd ~proveaent 
Three factors are of importance in explaining the extent to which LHAs 
have been successful in achieving the modest amount of improvement shown 
in Table 16.1. 
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lable 16.2 PERCENTAGE OF DWELLINGS WHERE WORK DONE IN 1986 
Date of By Owner Occupiers By Tenants By Landlords(1) 
Construction Major(2) All Major All Major All 
Before 1919 25 75 4 37 17 50 
1919-1944 22 81 3 27 11 32 
1945-1964 18 75 9 33 24 54 
After 1964 17 16 5 16 19 
All 21 77 4 31 17 44 
(1) Note Reported by tenants. (2) Note Costing> £400 (or would have done if 
carried out by contractor). --
Source DoE (1988) English House Condition Survey 1986. London, HMSO. 
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First, the application of statutory enforcement powers and second, and 
probably more significant, the availability of financial assistance to 
back up enforcement. As Cullingworth emphasised in his note of reserva-
tion to the Denington Committee on older housing standards, compulsion is 
an ineffective instrument if landlords are unable to get a return on the 
investments they are being compelled to make (MoHLG, 1966a). The existence 
of historical rent controls and contemporary rent regulation means that 
grant aid is essential to give landlords competitive returns when 
improving their property - though it is widely accepted that grant aid 
will not make it anymore worthwhile retaining rather than selling vacant 
property than otherwise. It is important therefore for enforcement to 
work hand in hand with ways of assisting landlords to bear the cost. Grant 
aid is not the only way. Harloe and colleagues reported, for example, how 
in the early 1970s a London Borough permanently rehoused landlords' 
tenants, provided grants for improving the vacant property, and nominated 
tenants for the post improvement dwellings thereby enabling the 
landlords to receive the full rather than phased increase in rent straight 
away CHarloe et al, 1974. See also Manchester City Council, in HCEC, 
1982). 
Third, success in getting desirable standards is not independent of the 
type of landlord. The manner in which the property is regarded as an 
investment, and relative access to capital is particularly important. 
Success is also probably not independent of tenants' attitudes. Up until 
1972 tenants could obstruct improvement if they could not afford a 
consequent rent increase. Upon the introduction of rent allowances 
this ground for preventing improvement was repealed, but tenants may still 
hold up improvement on the grounds of undue disturbance. Nor can the 
social relations between landlord and tenant be left out of the account. 
Elderly, individual landlords owning a few properties with few liquid 
assets and their elderly tenants may have a common interest in deferring 
repairs and improvement, the former in avoiding financial and 
organisational costs, the latter in avoiding disturbance and rent 
increases. In his study of Lancaster, in the early 1960s, Cullingworth 
commented that it was quite common for such bargains to be struck. 
Landlords did not extract the full rent increases that they were entitled 
to if tenants did not insist on repairs. This had been happening for many 
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years with tenants often doing repair work themselves (Cullingworth 1963). 
He emphasises the extent to which tenants were satisfied with their lot 
because of the low rent and the absence of 'rules'. As a consequence 
scope for large scale improvement was severely restricted by an inability 
or unwillingness to pay singificantly higher rents, since the economic 
cost of maintaining old rented property was far in excess of the price 
tenants were prepared to pay. There was, in his words, a "socially 
acceptable rent limit for old housing" (Cullingworth, 1963 p.155). In 
contrast, where tenants find that their home has been acquired by a new 
landlord who does not do repairs and appears to be anxious to get them to 
quit, they may not complain to their LHA about enforCing repairs for fear 
of further intimidation and harassment. 
Some statistical evidence on tenants' satisfaction with the state of 
repair of their homes can be found in the English House Condition Surveys 
(DoE, 1983, 1988a). In 1981, for example, 29 per cent of private tenants 
(but 54 per cent of owner occupiers) in dwellings that were fit but 
seriously disrepaired thought their homes were either almost perfect or 
better than would be expected. Whilst this shows that private tenants 
gave the poorest stock a lower rating than owner occupiers, there was a 
consistent tendency for occupants to underestimate defects in comparison 
with professional surveyors. They differed largely because occupants 
believed nothing was wrong or they were, quite simply, not bothered about 
it. As many as 49 per cent of pri va te tenants intended to do nothing 
about the defects they had identified. These were long term elderly 
occupants, and the fear of disruption, general inertia or even choice were 
behind their failure to initiate action. 
A similar pat tern emerged from the results of the 1986 survey. 29 per 
cent of private tenants saw their houses to be in a poor state of repair 
whereas the surveyors found 38 per cent to be in this state. The 
difference was much less than amongst owner occupiers only 4 per cent of 
whom thought their houses were in a poor state whereas the surveyors 
thought 12 per cent were. 
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Studies of the use of enforcement powers 
Most studies of the use of Public Health and Housing Act power have 
concluded that they are arduous, time consuming, and do not necessarily 
achieve what is required. Hadden studied the use of these powers in 1977 
in five case study LHAs and pointed out how little analysis had been made 
up to then of the way these formal powers were used (Hadden, 1978). He 
also concluded that enforcement was as essential as grant aid and that all 
LHAs used statutory powers widely. Public Health Act powers were found to 
work well and could be quickly pressed to satisfactory conclusions. There 
was evidence that landlords respected them and that LHAs were prepared to 
use default powers to get what were, of course, minor works done. Whilst 
Housing Act powers were also widely used, they were rarely pursued to 
completion either by landlords or by LHAs. Only a third of notices were 
complied with, some of the balance being completed by LHAs (or by Housing 
Associations) upon transfer of the property, whilst the rest dragged on 
with work undone. Hadden found that compulsory improvement was 
ineffective because it was procedurally complex, providing great scope for 
owners to delay, whilst LHAs waited to see if owners used rights to serve 
purchase notices before taking default action, which was itself difficult 
to organise. LHAs were also critical of the standard which could be 
achieved through the enforcement of improvement and repair notices in 
relation to what they could do in default, in relation to the inadequate 
financial provision for repairs within the grant scheme, the (then) 
restriction of repair grants to HAA, and because of problems arising with 
the criteria for defining reasonable expense. LHAs were much happier when 
properties were transferred to their own, or housing associations' 
ownership, because they could then achieve better standards. Indeed in 
serving both improvement and repair notices LHAs were often trying to 
achieve other ends i.e. with improvement notices to secure a transfer of 
ownership and with repair notices to secure applications for grants to the 
higher improvement grant standard (at that time there was no mandatory 
right to repairs grants). 
In other words LHAs were not necessarily trying to achieve the standards 
indicated in enforcement notices. Hadden concluded that LHAs often only 
achieved the standards they wanted when properties were acquired by 
themselves or housing associations. The enforcement system had a number 
of problems: confusing and overlapping standards (themselves considered 
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inadequate by LHAs), complex procedures, reluctance on LHAs' part to do 
work in default, and pervasive delays. Because of this, standards were 
best achieved by social ownership. However Hadden proposed a series of 
procedural and structural changes to enforcement which could make 
rehabilitation by landlords more effective and make it possible to get 
decent work done by regulating private renting rather than buying it out. 
These proposals are reviewed in Chapter 18. 
Not all LHAs, however, found compulsory improvement as unsuccessful as 
this. Wi th commitment and determination it could work, particularly if 
landlords expected LHAs to follow up notices rigorously. Indeed one 
London Borough showed that it was possible to get work done within two 
years of the service of a provisional notice (National Building Agency, 
1919). Although most other available statistical evidence about the 
experience of operating the 1914 Act powers bears out Hadden's case study 
evidence (see Thomas, 1986, p.84), several local authorities did use them 
successfully. Moreover a study of a sample of HAAs, fi ve years after 
declaration, found that half the improvement notices had been complied 
with by landlords and that only 16 per cent had not had any action taken 
on them, the balance being transferred to LHAs or housing associations 
(Forrest and Niner, 1982 ). The authors commented on how procedures had 
worked for the benefit of tenants and that, in particular, "time and 
place" meetings pursuant to provisional notices had been effective means 
for consultation and provision of information, especially about rehousing 
arrangements. Few tenants subsequently complained about anything except 
the workmanship of the builders and about redecoration, whilst 
arrangements for rehousing during the time work was done appeared to have 
gone well. That is not to suggest, however, that tenants are always keen 
to start proceedings, for the study also showed that only 25 per cent of 
tenants in houses where no work was done had gone to their LHA to request 
action. Nor is it to suggest that dwellings improved by landlords under 
compulsory improvement powers stay privately rented for long. For 
example, whereas 79 per cent of dwellings subject to compulsory 
renovation, on which work was completed between 1976 and 1981, had the 
work done on them by private landlords, only 32 per cent were still 
privately rented by 1981 (DoE, 1983 Table 61). 
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Another study specifically examining LHAs use of enforcement powers 
emphasised their discretionary nature and how the development of grant aid 
has relegated their importance (Burridge, 1987). The discretionary nature 
of these powers is reinforced by the ambiguity of definitions of 
"fitness", "nuisance", "major disrepair" and "personal comfort" and by the 
fact that LHAs need not initiate action, except in the limited 
circumstances of proven unfitness and in statutory improvement areas. As 
a result, financial influences can structure the way enforcement is used. 
It can also be shaped to fit in with elected members' and officers' 
chosen strategies but, more fundamentally, it is the financial and 
economic climate which is paramount. 
From a study of 32 LHAs in England, Burridge concluded that the 
enforcement of broad discretionary standards had declined in recent years. 
The availability of grant has led to environmental health officers 
spending much more time negotiating over grant aid (and appropriate 
standards) to eliminate poor conditions than enforcing a particular 
standard. He specifically argues that challenges to unfitness 
determinations have fallen as repairs grants have become more widely 
available. Officers now serve notices to justify grants and engage in a 
good deal of non-coercive negotiation and bargaining with landlords. So 
long as grants are available, negotiation rather than enforcement will be 
used to sustain discretionary standards. Burridge hints, however, that 
this is not universal practice since he found greater reliance on 
enforcement in "inner city" LHAs with high proportions of private rented 
housing. 
He also observes how fluctuations in capital funds determine strategies. 
That is, when funds are short, enforcement can fall as LHAs try to limit 
their commitment to mandatory grant. Discretionary standards enable them 
to do this and thus they can effectively ignore the existence of 
unfitness. Meanwhile current government proposals to redefine unfitness, 
to render all grants to landlords discretionary and subject to a test of 
resources will effectively reduce LHAs financial commitment to private 
renting. Burridge also drew attention to the effect that regional 
differences in house prices had on the effectiveness of enforcement, 
through the criterion of reasonable expense. Houses with similar disre-
pair, and with similar costs of rectifying these, command very different 
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open market prices in different regions of the country, making it more 
likely that repairs could be enforced in some areas but not in others. 
This is particularly crucial where grants cover only a small proportion of 
the cost. In drawing these conclusions Burridge echoed earlier findings 
about reasonable expense, not the least about procedural uncertainty as to 
whether the open market valuation of a post improvement house should be 
the vacant possession or sitting tenant value. Currently opinion favours 
the concept of willing buyers and sellers, taking all relevant factors 
into account, including the age of tenants, their security and likelihood 
of remaining in occupation (see also Arden, 1986; Hadden, 1978). 
Ironically if the unfitness standard is reduced fewer houses will be 
eligible, costs will be less and more will be repairable at reasonable 
expense (Burridge, 1987). 
Statistical evidence from the Institution of Environmental Health Officers 
confirms the importance of informal approaches (IEHO, 1985b). In 1983 
action was taken on 50,000 properties to get them made fit or to remedy 
disrepair or nuisances. 42 per cent were dealt with informally, 36 per 
cent under the Public Health Act and only 21 per cent by Housing Act 
Repair Notices. (This means that repair notices were served at a rate of 
7 per cent of unfurnished privately rented houses, 2 per cent via what is 
now S.189 and 5 per cent via S.190.) 
One further study of enforcement in 20 LHAs in England, "weighted in 
favour of urban areas", came to similar conclusions (Hawke and Taylor, 
1984). It found that use of Public Health Act powers was very popular, 
especially in rural areas. Procedures were simple and straightforward (by 
comparison with disrepair under the Housing Act). Reasonable expense was 
not a criterion. The courts upheld LHAs' notices. The whole matter 
could be pressed to a speedy conclusion. But these powers were not used 
as much in inner area LHAs undertaking urban renewal strategies. These 
LHAs favoured what are now S.189 powers (in respect of unfit houses) but 
found them complex and time consuming to use, especially in relation to 
reasonable expense. LHAs were reluctant either to do work in default 
(because of the scale of the work involved) or to see closure or demoli-
tion as the alternative outcome. On the other hand these LHAs did find 
that (what are now) S.190 powers in respect of major disrepair to fit 
houses could be used in the early stages of implementing statutory 
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improvement areas to encourage a more far reaching process of upgrading, 
by getting landlords to apply for discretionary improvement grants. They 
were popular because reasonable expense did not have to be taken into 
account (or at least, if it did, wider social issues could be drawn into 
the account) whilst "substantial disrepair" is a flexible term. Whilst 
these powers were popular, Hawke and Taylor also found their use on 
decline with the contraction of capital funds for grants. Thus 
enforcement was an essential part of a strategy to get landlords to 
achieve higher standards, but where this failed LHAs were faced with the 
administrative problems of doing work in default and reclaiming costs, as 
well as having to settle for lower standards than they wanted. 
Statistical evidence about the impact of enforcement was also found in the 
first round of the study of the Sheffield panel of private rented proper-
ties in 1979 (This volume). Twice the number of properties in HAAs had 
been improved compared with a matched "control group" of similar proper-
ties not subject to HAA status. This difference was shown to be due as 
much to the greater use of enforcement in HAAs as it was to the higher 
rate of grant (75 per cent) available only (at that time) in HAAs. The 
successful use of enforcement was, however, itself due to the higher grant 
landlords got when doing the required work. The "success" of these 
policies was also due to the low standards (then) set by the LHA and to 
the deliberate acquisition of tenanted properties by builder landlords for 
improvement. Enforcement was particularly important in getting more long 
standing landlords to improve. 
This was later confirmed in a study of enforcement in 31 LHAs by Martin 
(Martin, 1983). He found that "builder landlords" were actively acquiring 
and improving tenanted property but that enforcement of standards 
(including high standards) was also successful, either in getting long 
standing landlords to improve, or to sell up to "new breed" landlords or 
housing associations. 
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Studies of landlords' use of iaprovement grants 
Many studies have suggested that landlords have few incentives to carry 
out improvements or major repairs and that enforcement is essential to get 
things done. Enforcement however cannot be entirely effective where what 
is required is unprofitable to landlords, if LHAs have to do work in 
default, and recover costs from rent or charges on properties. 
The 1969 and 1974 Housing Acts are significant watersheds in the develop-
ment of grant aid. The growing reliance on improvement rather than 
redevelopment strategies has also meant a growing dependence on the 
willingness and on the financial and organisational ability of owners, 
including landlords, to repair and improve their properties. 
Before the 1969 Act, incentives to get landlords to carry out repairs and 
grant aided improvements had been progressively increased in the context 
of the Rent Act. Thus in 1949, landlords were entitled to raise con-
trolled rents by 6 per cent of net-of-grant improvement expenditure, but 
had to let for 20 years. This was raised to 8 per cent in 1954 and to 
12.5 per cent in 1961, with the letting condition reduced to 10 years. By 
1964 limited powers of compulsory improvement were brought in and the 
letting obligation fell to 3 years. As far as repairs were concerned (for 
which there was no grant aid of any kind until 1969) landlords were 
broadly entitled to raise controlled rents in relation to expenditure and 
multiples of rateable value. 
The fact that so little was achieved was a matter examined in depth in the 
mid 1960s (see, for example, Committee on Housing in Greater London 
(Milner Holland), 1965; Nevitt, 1966). The Milner Holland Committee 
concluded, inter alia, that "the grant system is working very slowly and 
has so far done little to improve the dwellings and areas of greatest 
need" (Ibid p.112). It put forward four reasons for this. First, the tax 
system discriminated against private landlords since they could not set 
depreciation, or sinking funds, against taxable income. This was 
particularly problematic where the future life of property was as little 
as 15 to 20 years. Nevitt calculated that the 'net' return on capital was 
not 12.5 per cent but was in fact 6 per cent (if tax was paid at 7s 9d in 
the £). "As money cannot at present be borrowed at less than 6 per cent 
interest, it is clear that landlords who are borrowing money from outside 
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sources cannot 'afford' to improve their property unless it has a life of 
about 30 years" (Nevitt, 1966, p.42). The second reason was the existence 
of rent control which led to properties falling onto disrepair. To improve 
property by putting in the standard amenities, landlords had to make 
properties fit, but grants did not cover repairs and so landlords had to 
fund all the repair costs. Third many landlords had no access to loan 
funds and fourthly many lacked the ability to organise improvements. 
The Milner Holland Committee was, in conclusion, pessimistic of either 
coercion or encouragement getting landlords to improve, a view shared by a 
Government commissioned study of the potential for area improvement in a 
north west town. The Deeplish study concluded that "if this low potential 
(of landlords) for improvement is related to the great necessity for 
improvement in this sector, where on average only 14 per cent have the 
five standard amenities, the outlook for improvement by landlords is not 
hopeful" (MoHLG, 1966b, p.37). 
The 1969 Housing Act was founded on the principal of voluntary persuasion 
and many of the conditions for using grants (e.g. on resale) were relaxed. 
As well as modifying the grant system (so that for the first time repairs 
became eligible for grant aid, but only within the confines of the 
discretionary improvement grant), it also built on the Rent Act 1965 to 
create further incentives for private landlords. The 1965 Act had 
introduced the Fair Rent system for regulating rents in the decontrolled 
sector. Under the 1969 Act landlords of controlled tenancies whose 
properties met a qualifying standard (fit and with all amenities) could 
get their tenancies decontrolled and eligible for Fair Rents, with the 
consequent increases for tenants phased in. Tenants could object on the 
grounds that they could not afford the rent or did not want to be 
disturbed. The former right was removed in 1972 when the Housing Finance 
Act introduced rent allowances for tenants. This Act also provided for 
the automatic block decontrol of controlled tenancies (by rateable value 
bands) unless they were unfit, without the necessity for qualifying in 
other respects. This process was halted in 1975 although finally all 
remaining properties were decontrolled in 1980. Nevertheless the Fair 
Rent system in principle provides incentives for landlords to improve 
regulated tenancies since they can apply at any time for a rent to be 
reregistered if conditions in a property change. 
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The design and experience of the 1969 Act and associated legislation such 
as the Housing Act 1971 (which temporarily raised the rate of grant to 75 
per cent in Development and Intermediate Areas) in operation has been 
well documented (e.g. Gibson and Langstaff, 1982; Thomas, 1986). One of 
the main concerns about take up by private landlords was the abuse of 
grants in Inner London in areas of bad housing, but high demand, where 
speculators evicted furnished tenants who had limited security and 
"winkled" out unfurnished tenants, by cash inducement or harassment, in 
order to convert houses into flats for sale to owner occupiers at the time 
of the house price "boom" in the early 1970s. Much evidence on this was 
presented to a House of Commons Expenditure Committee (House of Commons 
Expenditure Committee, 1973). There was much less activity as far as the 
improvement of the long term unfurnished sector was concerned, especially, 
but not only in areas of low demand. In a study of Bristol the point was 
made that policies had failed to consider explicitly the demand for 
improvement amongst low income private landlords (and low income owner 
occupiers too). Demand had been grossly overestimated and facilities for 
borrowing the balance of grants were insufficient to induce expenditure 
(Kirwan and Martin, 1972). Similar conclusions were reached about NE 
Lancashire where it was found that tenants had little desire to pay more 
or to put pressure on their landlords. The study thought few landlords 
would take advantage of the "decontrol by improvement" provisions (Robert 
Matthew, Johnson Marshall and Partners, 1971). The Francis Committee 
concurred. Improvements were too costly and returns were too low. 
Landlords would not opt to decontrol (Committee on the Rent Acts, 1971). 
The evidence to the 1973 Commons Committee validated these predictions. It 
took the view that, in areas of low demand and poor housing, landlords 
preferred to sell rather than relet when they got vacant possession and 
that, in the meantime, they were unlikely to improve unless pressure was 
brought to bear (House of Commons Expenditure Committee, 1973, p.18). The 
Committee had been given evidence that the 1964 Act compulsory improvement 
procedures were cumbersome, that only the five point (amenity) standard 
could be achieved, whilst repairs were essential as well, and that tenants 
were reluctant to initiate action. The Committee argued that the proposed 
new compulsory powers (incorporated in the 1974 Act) were a step forward 
and that there should be a substantial increase in improvement in GIAs and 
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HAAs, provided LHAs exercised their powers to initiate action. Outside 
these, the proposed reintroduction of resale restrictions should not be a 
disincentive to voluntary improvement. Evidence presented to the Commit-
tee suggested that grant rates of 75 per cent - even 100 - were needed to 
entice landlords to improve. In other words the grant of 75 per cent then 
available in Development and Intermediate Areas should be extended 
everywhere for private landlords and not (except for HAAs and GIAs) be 
dropped to 50 per cent as intended (and implemented in 1974). Many who 
gave evidence argued for 10 year resale conditions, together with LHA 
nominations of tenants to any vacancies before the 10 years was up. 
The Housing Act 1974 once more remodelled the grant system and its design 
and implementation have also been extensively studied (see, for example, 
Gibson and Langstaff, 1982; Thomas, 1986). Of particular relevance to the 
private rented sector were the powers to declare HAAs where the highest 
rate of grant and repairs grants were only available; the policy back-
ground favouring the social ownership of private rented housing, using 
housing associations with their new financial regime to buyout landlords; 
the switch to compulsory rather than voluntary modes of improvement and 
the reintroduction of resale (or letting) conditions. 
Subsequent research revealed that improvement ~ private landlords was 
patchy. A review of the official monitoring of a sample of HAAs commented 
that a combination of property condition, inadequate incentives, and the 
inefficiency of compulsory powers had meant that private renting was the 
"bug bear" of most HAAs. Even with a grant, improvement was beyond the 
means of most small landlords" (emphasis added) (Monck & Lomas, 1980). 
This was indeed the case in the Beeches Road HAA in Sandwell (Thomas, 
1979). The LHA did not use compulsory improvement powers because it 
wanted to see a higher standard and did not want to do work on default. No 
landlord had improved in the first three years (most had only a few 
properties). 
Meanwhile public expenditure cuts had seriously undermined LHAs 
munic1palisation programmes and "buyout" strategies for the improvement 
of the private rented sector became almost exclusively dependent on 
housing associations, whose programmes, having expanded in real terms in 
1974, reached a plateau in the late 1970s with further expansion cut back. 
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But there were also "successes" in getting landlords to improve. In South 
Tyneside there was substantial improvement as builder landlords bought up 
unfurnished tenanted property for inves tment purposes (Bradley, 1980) • 
Their interest was principally in capital gain, since they incurred 
losses in the short term because rents alone did not give a competi ti ve 
return on acquisition and net of grant costs - unless they were able to 
switch to furnished letting. These new landlords were speculating on 
getting a capital gain when existing tenants moved on (and when resale 
conditions expired). This is what made it profitable. The scale of this 
voluntary take up by new landlords meant that the LHA made very little use 
of its statutory powers. 30 per cent of grants went to absentee 
landlords. This experience was shared by Newcastle and Gateshead where 
Bradley found half HAA grants had gone to landlords and concluded that 
improvement by these new landlords was profitable. They had access to 
capital and were prepared to wait for their returns. A study of 
Newcastle's HAAs confirmed Bradley's findings (Cameron 1978). New builder 
landlords were able to take a long term view of investment, they had 
organisational resources, could do work using "in house" labour, had 
access to capital and by remortgaging property could use gearing to build 
up large portfolios. When faced with repair notices landlords responded by 
applying for discretionary grants to improve to high standards. 
Although these circumstances were not confirmed to the North East (see 
below), other evidence showed how difficult it was to get all landlords to 
improve. Research by the Birmingham Inner Area Study Team had shown that 
even with a 75 per cent grant, only 30 per cent of landlords would be 
willing to improve, compared with 16 per cent on 50 per cent grants. 
Waiting until they got vacant possession and selling was a better 
investment. Lack of capital was a major constraint, but even where they 
had funds and where the future of an area was 
designations, landlords would still not improve 
secured by statutory 
because alternative 
investments were better. The research recommended a faster phasing in of 
post improvement rent increases, allowing landlords to sell within five 
years, providing 100 per cent grant aid for the first £400 of work, the 
rest at 75 per cent (Birmingham Inner Area Study Team, 1977a, 1977b). 
Clearly a major problem for some investors was the perception of a 
valuation gap i.e. any increase in value after improvement did not cover 
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costs. This "gap" was covered by grants, but if grants had to be repaid 
the gap was not covered. Landlords wanting to sell within 5 years were 
therefore deterred from applying since they got a better return (or less 
risk) by investing elsewhere. In these circumstances the Team considered 
that a substantial degree of compulsion and compulsory acquisition would 
be needed to get investment. They also considered that the removal of 
resale conditions (at the discretion of LHAs) could encourage more 
investment at a time when there was not an acute shortage of rented 
accommodation and where landlords were not in the same position as London 
speculators to make a substantial capital gain. 
The Sheffield study has not, by contrast, shown that the letting 
conditions have any deterrant effect. The first survey (already referred 
to above in respect of enforcement studies) has shown how the higher rate 
of grant in HAAs, together with the greater application of enforcement 
powers had resulted in a higher rate of improvement than elsewhere. It 
also showed that improvement was being carried out by new owners who 
deliberately sought to acquire unimproved property. Their aims were to 
make capital gains from property dealing by purchasing unimproved property 
at tenanted value, using improvement grants to subsidise the cost of 
upgrading property, realising the capital gain from the increased exchange 
value of the property when vacant possession arose - and being prepared to 
relet if this happened within five years of improvement so as not to repay 
the grant. (See Chapter 4, this volume). 
Half the unimproved properties had owners who wanted to, and would 
improve: they had bought recently. The rent had owners who foresaw 
financial difficulties. Nevertheless a further third had owners who would 
improve with a combination of 75 per cent grants and compulsion. Only 20 
per cent would not be improved under any circumstances. 
The Housing Act 1980 brought up many of the changes the Sheffield 
landlords wanted to see - especially the wider availability of 75 per cent 
and repairs grants; and the greater proportion of the discretionary 
improvement grant that can now be devoted to repairs. Not surprisingly 
therefore, the later follow up to the panel found that improvement 
activity had been sustained into the 1980s. There was continued acquisi-
tion of tenanted property by new landlords prepared to improve, and doing 
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so to higher standards than older landlords. Many of these new landlords 
were in the building trade. Not only were improvements being carried out 
in HAAs, but elsewhere too, given the wider availability of the highest 
grant rates. Moreover higher standards were being achieved than in the 
1970s as the greater grant aid for repairs enabled the LHA to press 
successfully for better standards. Not that area policy no longer had any 
effect - far from it, because the highest standards were to be found in 
these areas as a result of a combination of new investment and LHA action 
(This volume, Chapter 13). 
Martin had shown in an earlier piece of work in his study of 31 LHAs that 
these findings were not unique to Tyneside or South Yorkshire Investment 
by "new breed" landlords, with connections in the building industry was 
significant in three quarters of them, whilst the 1980 Act - both in terms 
of improvement grants, rent phasing and shorthold - had created a positive 
framework for upgrading, provided LHAs took action to persuade and cajole 
landlords to respond (Martin 1983, 1985). 
This is not meant to imply, of course, that this investment by property 
dealers heralds a revival of private renting. Far from it, if anything, 
it hastens its decline. Dealers are speculating in the gap between 
tenanted and vacant possession values, improving with subsidies to sustain 
the latter and taking their profit in capital gain upon vacancy. 
The House of Commons Select Committee on the Environment emphasised in 
1982 that the current policy and legislative framework did not provide 
landlords with competitive returns to improve and let accommodation. The 
dilemma was that rents would have to rise considerably (perhaps above 
market level) to give such returns, which could only happen with great 
hardship to tenants or greater subsidies from the State. Moreover it 
doubted if "the present extensive system of improvement grants can achieve 
the improvement in the quality of the private rented sector necessary to 
bring it up to acceptable standards" (HCEC, 1982, para 97). Certainly this 
is so if the property is to be improved for long term letting. "Only if 
rents rise substantially and are expected to remain at higher levels in 
the future is it likely that in the long term significant quantities of 
improved stock will be retained in the sector" (Ibid, para 98). Whilst 
some of the evidence to the Committee (drawn up in 1981 or amended in 
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1982) noted increased improvement activity consequent upon the 1980 Act 
(e.g. evidence by Manchester City Council, Ibid, Vol. II), the main thrust 
of the evidence was that landlords, because of a combination of inadequate 
rents, inadequate rent increases and tax burdens did not get competitive 
returns on improvement expenditure (see also SHAC, 1981). Indeed a later 
Commons Committee, examining the conditions in Welsh private sector 
housing also drew attention to the continuing inadequacy of incentives and 
to the difficulties of applying enforcement (House of Commons, 1987). 
Some Welsh LHAs reported successful use of enforcement powers. Cardiff for 
example found they had to do work in default on only 10 per cent of 
repair notices. Most, however, commented on the difficulties of 
enforcement, not the least because of inadequate staff numbers. 
Iaprovement Propensity and Landlord Type 
Nonetheless it is important to end this review of the eXisting evidence by 
reinforcing the message from the results of research in the North East and 
South Yorkshire: landlords responses are not homogeneous. Some are 
willing to improve, albeit for short term speculative gain, and others can 
be persuaded to do so. The activities of property dealers are not of 
course a new phenomenon as Chapter 2.6 has shown. Dealers have been 
buying portfolios of tenanted housing to "break up" and sellon to owner 
occupiers for many years. In his Lancaster study Cullingworth referred to 
"death speculators", investors who bought blocks of rented property with 
the intention of selling at greatly enhanced vacant possession prices when 
the sitting tenant died. (Cullingworth 1963, p.110). This was not 
without risk, especially if the Council tried to force the speculator to 
do repairs. But it was also profitable and the older the sitting teannt 
the greater the chance of capital gain if there were no relatives with 
succession rights. Evidence for property dealing in Birmingham showed that 
where Building Societies were reluctant to lend, speculators organized 
loans through links with secondary and merchant banks and insurance 
companies. In other words they created the conditions for their own 
capital gain and provided loans to purchasers at a much higher rate than 
they were getting from rent as a rate of return on capital value before 
disinvesting. (Stewart, 1980; see also for further evidence from 
Birmingham and Newcastle: Benwell CDP, 1978). What appears to be new, 
compared with this evidence, however, is the willingness of contemporary 
property dealers to invest in the fabric as well. 
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Landlords cannot, therefore, be considered homogeneous and much past 
research has shown how they respond in different ways to enforcement and 
grant incentives. In addition to the studies already reviewed above, a 
number of others have emphasised this diversity of response. Indeed one 
study in Cheltenham argued that "landlords are such a diverse group of 
individuals or institutions that any uniform response to legislation 
cannot be assumed" (Forrest and Murie, 1978). Nonetheless it concluded 
that lack of finance was one of the main reasons for their inability to 
carry out improvements. A companion study in Dudley argued that rising 
costs, relative to rents, meant that it was impossible to keep proper-
ties well repaired, especially for those who inherited property or were 
retired (Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, 1980). 
Indeed, as Chapter 2.6 illustrated, many studies from the very earliest 
have emphasised the distinction between individual and company ownership 
(and their access to capital) and distinguished between individuals in 
terms of their age and portfolio size (e.g. Cullingworth, 1963; Greve, 
1965). They showed that most property was owned by landlords who were 
elderly, traded as individuals and who owned only a handful of houses. 
This is still the case (Paley, 1978). There is little evidence today to 
show that these small individual landlords have either the resources or 
inclination to improve (e.g. Short 1979). This was also the case in the 
1960s when Greve found that a third of medium and large landlords had used 
grants compared with 6 per cent of small ones, whilst companies were twice 
as likely as all individuals to have taken them up (Greve, 1965). Greve 
pointed out, of course, that these well organised, business like 
companies, with extensive contacts with their LHAs, owned only a small 
share of the stock, albeit in better condition. Small individual 
landlords owning the majority of the stock were likely to be unresponsive 
to incentives and exhortation. Indeed Cullingworth showed that landlords 
only spent money on repairs when it was absolutely necessary - although 
some thought decoration was worthwhile if they expected to get vacant 
possession soon. They viewed rent as part of their personal income and the 
ideas of depreciation or replacement played no part in their thinking. 
Rents were not gross receipts from which maintenance was deducted. This 
was hardly surprising since few took the view that rented housing was a 
long term investment that should be maintained. There were exceptions of 
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course, including larger (often builder) landlords who could pool their 
rent income to repair their older, smaller properties with the rents of 
their younger, larger ones (Cullingworth, 1963). 
This analysis was broadly substantiated by later evidence. Paley found 
that half the lettings in densely rented areas were owned by individuals, 
most of whom owned less than five houses. Only a quarter were owned by 
companies, less than half by those with a hundred or more let tings. 
Properties owned by companies were, however, much more likely to have all 
amenities and such landlords were more likely to have done grant aided 
improvement, although landlords of all types considered their rent 
insufficient to give adequate returns and allow them to do repairs. Indeed 
half the let tings had landlords who limited what they spent on repairs. 
Although a third and a half of lettings had landlords who said they would 
do more if grants or rents, were increased, nearly half had owners who 
said neither increased rents nor grants would persuade them to do more 
(Paley, 1978). 
In view of this it is not surprising, therefore, to find that the mos t 
recent research has found that it is large companies, especially property 
dealers in the building indus try, with access to capital and with the 
organisational skills to undertake improvements, who seem, above all, to 
have responded to the interconnected pattern of enforcement and inducement 
established by legislation and LHA practice. There are few, if any, 
signs, however, that this investment is anything other than property 
speculation. True it has got property improved to a high standard, but it 
does not represent any turning of the tide in the decline of private 
renting. 
Conclusion 
It is evident from previous research that repair and improvement is 
dependent on all three areas reviewed above: enforcement, grant aid, and 
type of landlord. The next Chapter turns to examine contemporary LHA 
practice in respect of the former two areas and examines how far the 
success of these depends upon the exis tence of the type of property 
dealing identified in recent research. 
536 
CHAPTER 11 
LOCAL AUTHORITY POLICY AIID PRACTICE IN THE 
REPAIR AID IMPROVEMENT OF UNFUIUIISHED PRIVATELY RERTED HOUSES 
Problems in the Private Rented Sector 
Introduction 
Although this Chapter is principally concerned with LHAs' policies about 
the improvement and repair of private rented houses, this section of it 
briefly identifies all the problems about private renting in the sample 
LHAs which officers identified as important to their LHAs: that is, it 
includes the issues related to houses in multiple occupation (HMOs) and 
furnished rents examined in Chapter 19. It then moves on to look at 
policies, practices and experience about the repair and improvement of 
unfurnished private rented houses. 
Information about Private Rented Housing 
It is relevant to note that 80 per cent of LHAs thought their data base 
about private renting was inadequate for making, implementing and 
monitoring policy. As Table 17.1 shows, up to date knowledge about the 
condition of the housing stock generally, including private renting, was 
the one deficiency identified by the great majority of LHAs. Not knowing 
the location of private rented houses, especially HMOs, was seen as a 
problem for just over a third of them. Insufficient data about rent 
levels, harassment and other indicators of tenancy relations (like the 
service of notices to quit) were noted by rather fewer LHAs, particularly 
in partnership and programme LHAs. 
LHAs often distinguished between the knowledge they had about statutory 
improvement areas and elsewhere. Most LHAs had some data about tenure and 
physical conditions within these areas, albeit in many cases dating back 
to dec lara tion, backed up by limited monitoring from casework records, 
with only a few, rare, LHAs carrying out surveys on a cyclical basis. 
outside these areas LHAs had very little, if any, data about the private 
rented sector beyond census enumeration district data. Up until now this 
contrast between (relative) data richness within and without improvement 
areas reflects LHAs' recent priorities, with most resources being 
target ted at GIAs and HAAs. Outside such areas their policy has largely 
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Table 17.1 PROPORTION OF LHA s WHO SAID THEY HAD INADEQUATE INFORMATION ABOUT 
PRIVATE RENTED HOUSING 
Type of LHA Location of Location Stock Other Mentioning 
PRS generally of HMOs Conditions (eg Rents) at least 
one item 
of inform-
ation 
Part & Prog 24 38 52 14 76 
ODD & Other 45 40 75 30 85 
All LHAs 34 39 63 22 80 
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been one of reacting to complaints. Resources have permitted neither 
seeking out the private rented sector beyond improvement areas nor the 
declaration of additional statutory areas. In this sense, therefore, LHAs 
regard their data as adequate for implementing the job they have in hand 
at the moment, but insufficient for policy development. The one exception 
concerns the location of HMOs, most being located outside statutory 
improvement areas. The number of LHAs noting the paucity of their 
knowledge about HMOs reflects the growing concern about HMOs and the 
consequent development of more active enforcement policies. 
Evidently this impoverishment of knowledge of private renting threatens 
the strategic planning capability of LHAs to isolate problems and identity 
priorities both for further statutory area declarations and, crucially, 
for undertaking a co-ordinated attack on the poor standards of amenity, 
repair and management in HMOs. Indeed the more that LHAs' 
responsibilities for private rented housing were exercised comprehensively 
by one department, reporting to one committee, the more likely it was that 
data was thought to be inadequate for the task. Whilst this was true of 
both categories of LHAs, it was particularly the case in respect of 
partnership and programme LHAs which had developed a corporate strategy to 
deal with HMOs. Many of these had only the most cursory statistics on 
tenure and stock condition. 
staff shortages were the crucial problem. There were simply not enough 
people to go around to carry out statutory obligations in responding to 
complaints, service current strategies and to collect and assess 
informa tion so as to plan ahead. A number of LHAs took on additional, 
usually temporary, staff to cope with peaks in casework (such as the boom 
in demand led grant work in 1982/83 and 1983/84) but these staff were soon 
lost when the workload turned down and did not become available for survey 
and analytical work. As a result, LHAs were not only limited in their 
capacity to do surveys, but also in their capacity to examine the 
information they already held about private renting. It was apparent that 
very little monitoring or analysis of casework records was done, except to 
some extent in statutory improvement areas. As a result, and to quote two 
officers - in different LHAs - "we can't even part the water to see 
through it" and "we don't even know what we know". The pressures of 
casework dominated many LHAs. The two LHAs who carried out zonal house 
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condition surveys on a regular basis were exceptional, despite the fact 
that the great majority of LHAs acknowledged that the need to have 
up-to-date information, so as to ensure that investment is adequately 
targetted, is even more important at times of severe resource stringency. 
It is worth noting, therefore, that where surveys are planned, mos t 
involve sample house condition surveys to identify priorities for area 
renewal programmes and surveys of HMOs in areas acknowledged from census 
and other sources to contain a preponderance of a LHA's HMOs. 
Issues of tBportance to LBAs 
These data priorities are reflected in the private renting issues which 
the LHAs' officers said were important for their authority. Without any 
doubt the most important issue for LHAs is the physical condition of the 
housing stock. Many did not distinguish private rented houses from the 
rest of the private stock. Indeed half said they did not consider that 
the state of disrepair and need for improvement in private rented houses 
was a separate issue from the condition in the rest of the private sector. 
This was particularly so outside partnership and programme authorities. 
LHAs considered the problems in the older part of the housing stock were 
confronted equally severely by tenants, landlords and owner occupiers, 
that conditions were bad across all tenures, and posed the same issues in 
all tenures of the private cost of substandard housing to occupants and 
the wider social and neighbourhood costs of the negative externalities of 
rundown housing. By implication, no policies were addressed to 
substandard conditions in the private rented sector as such. Moreover, a 
number of LHAs did not give the private sector as a whole as high a 
priority in capital spending as modernisation of the public sector. 
Insofar as this put severe restraints on the availability of grants from 
limited allocations, this directly affected repairs enforcement practices 
in the private rented sector (see below). 
Where physical conditions in private renting were an issue, it was more 
likely to be a concern for conditions in HMOs rather than in single 
occupancy, terraced and other unfurnished housing. Where the latter was a 
matter of importance, LHAs remarked on the problems bad conditions posed 
for elderly tenants and the way in which neglected repairs undermined the 
potential success of their statutory improvement areas. Apart from (but 
also often, including) HMOs, officers commented that LHAs did not get many 
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Table 17.2 PROPORTION OF LHAs WHO SAID PHYSICAL CONDITIONS WERE AN ISSUE 
Speclfic Comments on Condi bans 
lype of LA Conditions Stock PRS PRS HMOs 
mentioned as per se houses houses + per se 
an issue (no ref prs) HMOs 
Part & Prog 100 43 29 38 33 
ODD & Other 90 60 10 25 15 
All LHAs 95 51 20 32 24 
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Table 17.3 PROPORTION OF LHAs IIJHO SAID IHF SUPPLY OF PRIV/\l[ RENIED I-lOUSING WAS AN ISSUE 
SpeCl flC COllllllellls 011 Supply 
Supply 
lIIellt i oned Youny Couples 01 vOl'cedl Kcyworkers Ulleillployed 
Type of LHA CIS cHI ] ssue Sinyles SepCll'Clled 
PClrt & Proy 29 ...,. L4 5 
ODD & Olher 30 15 10 10 5 10 
All LHAs 29 20 7 5 2 5 
LClrye All 
Fallljlies 
5 
5 
2 2 
V1 
~ 
\.N 
Table 17.4 PROPORllON OF LHAs WHO SAID lHl MANACEMENl OF PRLVATE HEN1ED I-lOUSING WAS AN ISSUE 
Malloyellleflt Renls 01' HMO IluL'usslllelll Olher 
fIIel It i 01 led Housi I Iy Mal18YPillenl 
8S WI lssue Benefil 
Part & Pray 57 43 43 33 14 
ODD & Olher 55 30 20 15 16 
All l HAs 56 37 32 40 15 
complaints from tenants about physical conditions. Insofar as (see below) 
programmes of declaring statutory improvement areas (with their detailed 
pre-declaration surveys) are on the wane, LHAs' capacity to seek out 
substandard private rented housing has been commensurately hindered. (See 
Table 17.2). 
Whereas stock condition is a major issue, the quantity of private rented 
housing is, by contrast, as Table 17.3 shows, only of minor importance. 
This was so irrespective of type and location of LHA. Insofar as it was 
an issue, it was related to the shortage of rented housing for "young 
singles". Indeed many LHAs said that the supply of local authority rented 
housing for other groups was such that waiting times were short and demand 
for private rented was low. 
Much more important were issues related to the standards of management in 
the private rented sector, which were mentioned by just over half of all 
LHAs. (See Table 17.4) Indeed in many respects it is the 'management' 
side of private renting which is the distinctive tenure related policy 
question for LHAs, rather than physical conditions and supply. Three 
specific points were raised, especially in inner areas. First, the level 
of rents in the furnished sector and its impact on the level of Housing 
Benefit payments, including the potential for abuse of the benefit system 
by landlords and the forseeable loss, after April 1988, of subsidy to the 
LHA where benefit was paid out on high rents. Second, the standards of 
HMO management. Third, the harassment of tenants by landlords, especially 
where this was as a consequence of LHA enforcing standards or restricting 
benefit payment. Other issues raised included the growing evidence of 
rental purchase, the problem of voids, and the disturbance and worry 
endured by elderly longstanding tenants when improvements were carried out 
and rents raised after their landlords had sold up to a new landlord. 
Differences in the importance attached to issues were mainly related to 
the status of the LHAs, as between partnership and programme authorities 
on the one hand, and all other authorities on the other. Differences in 
party political control were not a factor as such. Thus whilst fewer 
Conservative controlled, than other councils, identified issues in the 
private rented sector as important to them, this is largely because 
Conservatives were more likely to be in control of LHAs which were not 
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partnership nor programme districts. In these other districts, all LHAs, 
including those controlled by Labour and (the then) Alliance majorities, 
as well as the Conservatives, were less likely to identify private renting 
as posing significant issues for the authority. There were two exceptions 
to this - one relates to physical conditions in private renting per se 
where proportionally fewer Conservative and Alliance than Labour con-
trolled authorities of all types identified this as an issue; the other 
relates to rented housing for young singles, an issue which no 
Conservative controlled authority identified. As far as HMOs and 
management questions are concerned, there were no party political 
differences in the apparent importance attached to the issues. 
The issues about private renting which are important to LHAs are less to 
do with the physical condition of the unfurnished sector, which contains 
most private rented houses, than with the condition and management of the 
furnished sector, including HMOs. Nonetheless over half of them regarded 
work which dealt with all of these problems as having a high priority 
compared with the other activity of the authority. This was particularly 
the case in partnership and programme LHAs, two-thirds of whom gave the 
work a high priority, including 40 per cent who were giving a higher 
priori ty compared with 1980. Only 30 per cent, however, of other LHAs 
gave work in the private rented sector a high priority, although in all 
the cases the priority was greater than in 1980. The issues which were 
being given a continuing high priority were connected with the physical 
state of private rented housing, including that of HMOs, whilst it was the 
issues related to management, including rents, and harassment which were 
receiving greater attention in the 1980s, especially in the inner areas. 
policies about Private Rented Housing 
Formally adopted policy 
Despite this, the councils of only half the LHAs had formally adopted a 
policy, or a set of policies, to deal with the problems of private renting 
in their areas. There were, however, differences between partnership and 
programme authorities and other LHAs with roughly twice the proportion of 
the former having formally adopted pOlicies, compared with the latter. 
None of the Conservative controlled LHAs, wherever located, had formally 
adopted policies, compared with over half Labour, Alliance and 'hung' 
LHAs. In all LHAs, most of the adopted policies were about remedying 
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Table 17 5 PROPORllON OF LHAs WITH FORMALLY ADOPllD POL_IClES ABDUl PRIVA1E RENTING 
lype of Pollcy PorLnership 
& P rU!JI'olllfile 
U' 
,0 
ReloLed Lo UII furlli shed houses 24 
Related Lo HMO slandards 52 
Reloled Lo 'rnanayemelll' issues 33 
AL lec:sL 01 Ie pob cy* 62 
No FUI'IlIally 8dopLed pollcies 38 
OLher 
LHA 
0' 
,0 
5 
30 
5 
35 
65 
All LHAs 
0' 
,0 
15 
41 
19 
48 
52 
* Percelilayes above du nol add up to Lhis row becCiuse SOllie LHAs had Illore LhCin one policy. 
substandard physical conditions. In 'other' LHAs this was almost 
exclusively a concern for standards in HMOs, whereas nearly a quarter of 
partnership and programme LHAs had formal policies related to the improve-
ment and repair of unfurnished single occupancy property. Moreover not 
only had half these latter LHAs got formal resolutions on HMO physical 
standards, but a third had policies related to 'management' issues, 
including rents and harassment. In these LHAs therefore the issues about 
private renting confronting them were being tacked on a more comprehensive 
and co-ordinated basis. (see Table 11.5). 
eom.ittee and Depart.ental Responsibility 
Some LHAs have interdepartmental working parties on the private rented 
sector, reporting to a private sector sub-committee of the Housing 
committee. Although such arrangements are rare outside those few LHAs 
with a corporate comprehensive approach to private renting problems, most, 
85 per cent, of LHAs, (including those without formally adopted policies) 
do have only one committee responsible for matters to do with private 
renting, usually the Housing Committee. In just over a third of LHAs all 
the LHAs' responsibilities were carried out by one department and this was 
much more likely to be the case in 'other' LHAs than in partnership and 
programme authorities, nearly 60 per cent of whom exercised their 
responsibilities through more than one department. In the latter areas 
this usually involved the Housing Department being responsible for 
improvement areas and improvement grants and (sometimes) benefit admini-
stration, whilst Environmental Health departments bore responsibility for 
enforcement action under the Housing and Public Health Act, as well as 
improvement grant inspection. In the limited cases, (usually the biggest 
LHAs) , where only one department is involved, this was typically a 
department combining housing and environmental health functions in 
partnership and programme districts or technical services departments in 
other districts, and, in the latter, reporting as often to an 
Environmental Health as to a Housing Committee. 
The more co-ordinated and comprehensive the policy was, the more likely an 
authority was to have a single committee, plus single or (at most) two 
department structure, with delegated powers to Chief Officers to serve 
enforcement notices, carry out default action and pay grants. There was 
significantly less delegation outside partnership and programme 
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Table 17.6 COMMITTEE AND DEPARTMENTAL STRUCIURE AND DELEGATION ARRANGEMENTS 
Percentaye of LHAs Mean Size of LHAs* 
Arrangement Part & Proy Other Part & Proy Other 
0' 0' ( 1000) ( 1000) ,0 ,0 
1 Committee + 1 Dept 29 45 187 63 
1 COlllmi t tee + > 1 Dept 57 40 109 62 
Other 14 15 90 100 
*Total private households 1981 Census 
Percentoye of LHAs 
where all powers deleyaled 
Port & Pruy Other 
0' 0' 
,0 ,0 
50 22 
67 37 
35 31 
authorities, regardless of 
responsibilities were structured. 
the way committee and departmental 
Only 30 per cent of other LHAs had all 
powers in respect of enforcement action delegated to officers, compared 
with 52 per cent of partnership and programme authorities. In all LHAs, 
however, delegation was at its greatest in the "one committee and two 
reporting departments" structure, there being somewhat less delegation 
where only one department was involved. 
The relevant statistics are summarised in Table 11.6. 
Policy content 
Where LHAs had no formal policies about private renting, officers observed 
that de facto policy was to meet their statutory obligations, in particu-
lar to use negotiation and enforcement action under the Housing and Public 
Health Acts to deal with complaints from private rented tenants or to use 
these powers to achieve objectives related to area improvement policy. It 
is interesting to note that officer delegation to serve notices and 
enforce them is just as great in LHAs with no formal policies as in those 
with adopted policies. 
Moreover most of the formally adopted policies are about HMOs and about 
rents and harassment in furnished let tings generally. Few are directly 
concerned with the quantity, quality and management of unfurnished houses 
and in this respect there are few differences in the objectives of 
authorities, whether or not these are formally adopted. A programme 
authority in Yorkshire and Humberside and a non-designated district in the 
North West provide illustrations of de facto policies. In the former 
officers observed, in answering the question about whether the council had 
formally adopted policies to deal with problems of private rented housing, 
that "no, we react to complaints, though I personally feel we should be 
doing it different (sic), our involvement in priority areas is curtailed 
by political thinking • • • we mop up (by enforcement action) the private 
rented sector that does not voluntarily take up grants". In the latter 
officers answered "no, we try to ensure as quick a take up of improvement 
grants as possible through talking to landlords and starting the statutory 
powers as soon as possible because of the time an improvement notice can 
take to get through • a mul ti-discipl1nary programme group with 
principal officers from various departments formulates the line we should 
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take ••• ". Clearly then these LHAs are not without policies relevant to 
resolving private renting issues, since, by implication, priority improve-
ment area policies inherently address poor physical conditions in this 
sector. Indeed, officers tended to suggest that the worst private renting 
was concentrated in these areas. The stance for tackling physical 
conditions, however, was a matter left to officer judgement. Indeed time 
and time again in interviews officers argued that policy was about 
physical conditions per se, irrespective of tenure. 
Even in LHAs with de jure policies, few of these were related to 
unfurnished housing. For example, the programme authority in the North 
West whose written policy it was to extinguish private rented housing 
through clearance and transfer to housing associations was rare. So too 
was the programme authority in Yorkshire and Humberside, whose annual 
housing policy statement incorporates issues in the private rented sector 
related to unfurnished houses and sets out a co-ordinated approach to the 
problems, drawing on as wide a range of departments as possible to deal 
comprehensively with the sector. This LHA recognised that a social rented 
'buyout' of private renting was unfeasible and that, as a consequence, it 
was necessary for the LHA to make the maximum use of its powers to ensure 
that "if landlords wish to have a major role in private renting, then they 
have to understand that the quality of accommodation offered must be good 
standards, secure for tenants, with rent books etcetera." Rare too, were 
the two authorities whose councils were opposed in principle to giving 
landlords improvement grants, and who therefore had resolutions requiring 
officers not to serve enforcement notices carrying mandatory grant 
enti tlement, unless the health, welfare or safety of tenants was endan-
gered. 
Whatever the degree of formality of the policy, it is evident that 
conditions in the unfurnished rented sector are not a key policy issue in 
terms of that tenure per se. Nonetheless all LHAs regarded it as 
important to attain the highest possible standards for tenants, consistent 
with the legal and financial framework for cajoling and persuading 
landlords. By complete contrast there is a greater articulation and 
formality in policy making for HMOs and furnished lettings. The remainder 
of this paper however now turns to look at the more "low key" policies for 
the repair and improvement of unfurnished housing. 
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Proactive and reactive policy 
LHAs were asked if, when dealing with unsatisfactory private rented hoses, 
it was their practice to take the initiative, seek out unsatisfactory 
conditions and deal with them comprehensively (or selectively) or to 
respond only to evidence of unsatisfactory conditions when tenants 
complained and/or they received grant applications from landlords and 
their agents. Outside statutory improvement areas almost all, 81 per cent 
of LHAs were reactive. Even though many LHAs had urban renewal policies 
about priority areas drawn up on the basis of borough wide evidence, this 
was not at a fine enough geographical scale to allow them to seek out 
individual properties for inspection (even if they had the staff and 
capital to carry through such a policy). 
A few LHAs did have the information base to be proactive. But it is very 
rare to have a borough-wide survey team, like one north west programme 
LHA, regularly seeking out dangerous structures, voids and public health 
nuisances. It was also rare to use existing data bases to seek out 
unsatisfactory conditions. One Yorkshire and Humberside non-designated 
district, however, sent let ters to all occupants of houses below the 
rateable value level which earlier survey evidence had suggested contained 
most houses without basic amenities. Occupants, including private tenants 
were asked to contact the LHA if they lacked amenities. A programme LHA 
in the northern region used its waiting list for council houses to 
identify substandard private rented properties. The records contained 
information on the state of repair of applicants' houses which was used 
to "point up" the application. Tenants in private rented properties with 
high repair points were visited. (Points were not lost if the property 
was subsequently repaired.) Two Midlands LHAs flagged the register of 
land charges so that they visited any inner area property with a rateable 
value of under £115 which had been subject to a search on the register. 
This normally meant visiting new owner occupiers but also identified 
changes in ownership of private rented houses. 
These examples were isolated ones. Indeed many LHAs commented that it was 
their inadequate HIP allocation as much as their impoverished data base 
which prevented them taking initiatives. 
551 
Table 17.7 PROPORTION OF LHAs WHICH TAKE INITIATIVE IN DEALING WITH 
UNSATISFACTORY CONDITIONS IN PRIVATE RENTED HOUSES I~ 
STATUTORY IMPROVEMENT AREAS 
Partnership Otner All 
& Programme LHAs LHAs 
0' 0' 0' 
,0 ,0 ,0 
Take initiative 
-
deal comprehensively 67 35 52 
- deal selectively 14 25 19 
React to complaints/demand 19 40 29 
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But in renewal areas (statutory GIAs and HAAs and non statutory priority 
areas), 71 per cent of LHAs were proactive, taking the initiative to seek 
out poor private rented houses and dealing with them - in 52 per cent 
cases doing so comprehensively. As Table 17.7 shows, partnership and 
programme LHAs were not only more 'proactive' than other LHAs they were 
also more likely to deal with substandard conditions on a more 
comprehensive basis. There were no regional differences in their policy 
stances. Being a proactive LHA does not necessarily mean, however, that 
policies were explicitly proactive with respect to private renting per se. 
It was just that within urban renewal areas most LHAs sought to get all 
properties up to scratch - and in 1981, for example 24 per cent of 
dwellings in declared HAAs were privately rented (DoE, 1983). Unless 
private rented houses were in a particularly bad shape they did not get 
priority treatment. In many LHAs a combined house condition and occupancy 
survey will have preceded, or followed, declaration and owners informed by 
letter and other publicity about the renewal area declaration and the 
availability of grants. "Carrots" precede "sticks" because most LHAs want 
to wait and see if landlords come forward with grant applications before 
taking enforcement action (although tenants will also be informed in 
publicity that LHAs will take enforcement if their landlords don't 
voluntarily apply). The time lag between declaration and using 
enforcement procedures to "mop up" (a favourite phrase used by 
interviewees) the unimproved remnant varies and some LHAs wait 3 to 4 
years before targetting unimproved houses with notices - unless enveloping 
is being done. In practice LHAs will be trying to "mop up" all of the 
unimproved remnants, not just private rented houses. 
Area Renewal Progru.es 
LHAs policies about declaring statutory improvement and other forms of 
priority renewal areas are closely connected to the repair and improvement 
of the private rented sector because these are the areas where LHAs take 
the initiative rather than engage in complaint-based action and they are 
also the bases of much of the rationing of house improvement grants in the 
light of resource constraints. Consequently the scale of activity is 
important because, if the rate of declaration is curtailed, LHAs are 
neither dealing with nor even identifying substandard private rented 
housing. For example in 1981 only 6 per cent of privately rented dwell-
ings were in declared GlAs and HAAs. A further 2 per cent were in 
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Table 17.8 STATUTORY IMPROVEMENT AREA DECLARATIONS 
Declaration Programme Partnership &: Other Northern Midlands All 
Programme 
0' 0' 0' 0' 0' 
,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0 
Priority Programllle - Continues 33 33 26 50 33 
Priority Programme - Curtailed 52 28 48 25 41 
Other - Continues 5 22 15 8 13 
Other - Curtailed 9 17 11 17 13 
Number 21 18 27 12 39+ 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mean nUlllber of areas 
~ean number of dwellings in* 
areas in LHA in 1984/85 
30 
9,356 
14 
4,036 
24 21 
7,673 4,849 
Note * Source: Oepartnlent of the Environment Local Housing Statistics, London, HMSO 
Other sources: Survey 
+ Two LHAs had no delcaration. 
23 
7,009 
proposed areas, but as many as 21 per cent were in potential areas (DoE, 
1983). By 1986 14 per cent of the (by then much smaller) private rented 
sector was in GIAs or HAAs in existence between 1981 and 1986 (DoE 
1988a) • 
Table 17.8 shows that in only under half of all the LHAs were declarations 
continuing and that it was in northern and in partnership and programme 
authorities that declarations were least likely to be occurring. In these 
cases LHAs had curtailed or suspended priority rolling programmes of GIA 
and HAA declarations. It was partnership and programme authorities who 
were most likely to have drawn these programmes up on the basis of survey 
data, combined with priority ranking based upon census deprivation 
indices, and to have been progressively working their way through these 
lists. Other districts were more likely to have made some of their 
declarations on an 'ad hoc' basis and these, together with priority 
ranking declarations, continued. 
The cessation in area declarations has occurred since 1979. Whilst 
implementation in existing areas continues, the cut in HIP allocations was 
the primary reason for the fall in declarations, because LHAs have 
insufficient capital to fund grants and environmental improvements in 
existing and new areas, given other claims upon resources. Most area 
programmes are based upon statutory GIAs and HAAs, but a number of LHAs 
have other non-statutory areas defined in order to ration limited urban 
renewal capital into priority areas. There are two approaches to this. 
First the large area approach, used to define areas for preferential 
treatment in capital programmes and proactive enforcement activity which 
can incorporate GIAs and HAAs as well as other, non statutory areas 
within them (for examples see Leeds City Council, 1985; Rochdale Metro-
politan Borough Council, 1986). Second the small area approach, often 
used outside partnership and programme authorities to identify small 
blocks, say of a dozen dwellings, to be treated together and receive 
favoured status for promoting grants and taking enforcement activity. 
Where area declarations continued it was often at the cost of severely 
limiting activity elsewhere (for example see Leicester City Council, 
1987). Where area declarations were curtailed, LHAs acknowledged the long 
term consequences of their inability to act now. One LHA argued that "our 
inability to act now means that many of these (10,000 dwellings in their 
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Table 17. 9 USE OF COMPULSORY PURCHASE AND CLOSING AND DEMOLITION ORDERS 
Type of LHA CPOs COs and DOs 
Clearance Unfit Unfit Rare/ Unfit Other Rare/ 
Prog plus i'lever ~o 
voids 
Part &: Prog ?o 19 26. L!.S 20 0' 62 29 9 ,0 
\J'I 
\J'I Other 0' 20 6.0 15 25 0' SO 10 10 0'\ ,0 ,0 
All 0' 19 32 32 17 0' 7l 19 10 ,0 ,0 
forward programme) will have deteriorated to such an extent that improve-
ment will be no longer practical and economic" (Bolton Metropolitan 
Borough Council, 1987). Another observed that "the success of these must 
now be in doubt because of the restrictions on funds for renovation 
grants" (Manchester City Council, 1986). Yet others were concerned that 
the falloff in declaration would undermine its policy to buyout private 
renting since it would inhibit investment by housing associations, in the 
light of the Housing Corporation's caution about sanctioning purchases 
outside declared areas. 
Enforcing Standards: the use of Statutory Repair and laprova.ent Povers 
eompulsory Purchase, Demolition and Closing Orders 
LHAs were asked about the circumstances under which they used a number of 
statutory procedures to deal with unsatisfactory physical conditions in 
private rented property. 
As Table 17.9 reveals, only in one in five used compulsory purchase orders 
in a continuing clearance programme, albeit at a low and declining level. 
Few had a planned programme of continuing clearance and most were 
finishing off. On the other hand, only 15 per cent did not use 'cpos' at 
all. Clearly it is not widely used for acquiring fit properties because 
Secretaries of State have made it clear that they will not sanction 
municipalisation strategies by LHAs. Nevertheless two-thirds use cpo's to 
deal with isolated (or small groups of) unfit properties and one-third to 
deal with long term voids as well, especially in northern partnership and 
programme authorities in statutory improvement areas, in order to 
eradicate the "bad apples" threatening successful strategies and to get 
long term "empties" back into use where no one accepts responsibility. 
The voids are almost always sold on to Housing Associations or to private 
developers. CPOs are also served by some LHAs in preference to closing or 
demolition orders in cases where, because unfit houses cannot be retained 
at reasonable expense, use can not be made of repair notices. 
Again closing (and on occasions demolition) orders are used by nearly all 
LHAs but on a very limited scale. Demolition orders are only used in 
cases of end-of -terraced or detached houses. In other circumstances, 
closing orders are used by 70 per cent of LHAs, especially in the north, 
to deal with unfit houses where S.189 repair notices cannot be served, 
557 
where bad houses are found in 'good' areas and as a way of breaking up 
poor landlord/tenant relationships. It was evident that the use of 
demolition and closing orders was seen as a "last resort" after negotia-
tion has failed and where the reasonable expense criterion attached to 
S.189 repair notices on unfit houses does not allow the LHA to compel and 
effectively enforce repairs. This is a particular problem in northern 
LHAs because of the high cost of repairs in relation to the low valuation 
of post-improvement works. As a result many LHAs will try to get an unfit 
house fully repaired or improved by negotiation before resorting to 
repairs notices and falling back on closing/demolition orders as a result 
of the application of the reasonable expense criterion. Compulsory (or 
negotiated) purchase is not widely used as an alternative except, as shown 
above, in renewal areas. 
There appeared to be little political resistance to the use of closing 
orders that rehoused tenants at the cost of the LHA and left private 
landlords with vacant possession. Very few LHAs will offer a grant on a 
property with a closing order - even to new owners - and will only lift 
the order when work has been done to eliminate unfitness. LHAs regretted 
that this meant work was done to only a minimum standard compared to that 
which could be achieved with full grant aid after negotiation. 
Thus closing orders are used when unfit houses can not be repaired at 
reasonable expense and negotiation fails, and LHAs' willingness to 
negotiate is itself likely to be less where there is evidence of poor 
landlord-tenant relationships (and thus closing orders effectively prevent 
landlords reletting) and where previous negotiation with the same 
landlords over different properties has been unfruitful. There was no 
clear evidence about who bought up closing order property, but LHAs 
Suggested it was mostly builders doing them up speculatively for sale. 
Table 17.10 provides some comparative data for different LHAs and years. 
Allowing for caution (since not all LHAs were able to furnish relevant 
data - but there is no bias in the LHAs returning and not returning data) 
the Table shows that the number of orders is quite small; that cpo 
activity increased from 1975 to 1980 and has fallen since (reflecting the 
pace of activity in HAAs in the mid to late 1970s and the fall-off since); 
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Table 17.10 COMPULSORY PURCHASE (CPO), DEMOLITION (DO) AND CLOSING ORDERS (CD) (a) NUMBERS (b) PER fHOUSAND UNFURNISHED 
PRIVATE RENTED HOUSES* 
AVERAGE PER LHA (SAMPLE NOS IN BRACKETS) 
Type of LHA CPO (a) DO CO 
1975 1980 1985 1975 1980 1985 1975 1980 1985 
Part & Pray 39 (9) 119 (9) 72 (8) 36 (14) 7 (15) 2 (15) 15 (14) 15 (15) 11 (15) 
Other 26 (6) 43 (6) 6 (6) 11 (9) 4 (8) 2 (8) 12 (9) 9 (10) 6 (10) 
All 34 (15) 88 (15) 44 (14) 26 (23) 9 (23) 2 (23) 14 (25) 13 (25) 9 (25) 
(b) 
Part & Pray 1.9 6.5 5.8 5.1 1.2 0.6 1.6 2.1 2.2 
Other 4.9 10.4 1.3 3.1 3.1 1.3 2.9 2.6 5.6 
All 3.1 8.1 3.9 4.3 1.9 D.9 2.1 2.3 3.6 
* Note Base (a) 1980: 1981 Census Number of Private Households Rentiny Unfurnished houses privately 
(b) 1975 = 1980 x 1.3 
(e) 1985 = 1980 x 0.7 
NB 1975 and 1985 Adjustment made to allow for decline in base over decade. 
the fall in demolition orders (especially in partnership and programme 
authorities) and the commensurate proportionate increase in closing 
orders. 
eoapulsory Improvement and Repair Notices 
Whereas the previous section dealt with procedures which effectively deal 
with substandard conditions by removing them from private renting, 
compulsory improvement and repair procedures enable LHAs to get dwellings 
up to standard, but still leave them let to private tenants. 
The use of compulsory improvement procedures under Part VIII of the 1985 
Housing Act has fallen off over the last ten years from a relatively low 
level of use. To use this procedure, a house has to lack amenities and be 
capable of improvement at reasonable expense to the full (or failing that 
the reduced) standard. A LHA can take the initiative in GIAs and HAAs in 
serving a notice, but elsewhere may do so following the written 
representation of tenants. 
LHAs noted four reasons for the low and declining use of compulsory 
improvement. First, the number of eligible properties was falling. 
Second, a growing proportion of tenants in the few eligible properties 
were elderly and were reluctant to confront the disturbance surrounding 
improvements, if not actually disinterested in change. Third, LHAs faced 
a financial disincentive insofar as they are obliged to provide 
intermediate grants where applications are duly made following the service 
of notices. They are also required to offer loans to assist landlords to 
meet costs. Moreover landlords do not have to certify that they will let 
such properties for a period of five years (seven in HAAs) as a condition 
of receiving grant. As a consequence they are not obliged to repay the 
grant if they are able to sell with vacant possession within five (or 
seven) years. Many LHAs regard this as obliging them to subsidise capital 
gains - particularly in view of the age of tenants and the probability 
that property will become vacant in the time period. Fourth, landlords 
can serve a counter purchase notice requiring the LHA to acquire the 
property. 
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Tabl~ 17.11 USE OF HOUSING AND PUBLIC HEALTH ACT ~OTICES 
Compulsory Improvement Repair* Notice Abatement Negotiate+ 
Notice Notice 
Type of LHA (a) (b) Rare/ (a) (b) Rare/ Yes Rare/ Rare/ Yes A 
LHA On No LHA On No No No but will Lot 
InitiatIve Complaint Initiative Complaint enforce 
in SIAs (only in SIAs (only) 
+ (b) + (b) 
Part & Prog 0' 29 19 52 43 33 24 48 52 43 38 19 ,0 
Other 0' 35 20 45 10 60 30 40 60 10 20 70 ,0 
All 0' 32 19 49 27 46 27 46 56 27 29 46. ,0 
\..r1 
CJ' 
* Chi Square 5.8 DF2 Sig 0.05 
+ Chi Square 11.3 DF2 Siy 0.003 
As a consequence the use of compulsory improvement is now rare. Indeed as 
Table 17.11 reveals, only a third of LHAs take the initiative and serve 
them in statutory improvement areas (SIAs), and only a further fifth who 
do not take the initiative find they get requests via complaints from 
tenants on anything other than a rare and irregular basis. As the Table 
shows, half the LHA hardly ever or never serve notices and Table 17. 12 
also shows: first, the significant fall in activity since 1980 (after a 
higher level in 1975 and 1980 as HAAs were ushered in); second, the very 
low level of activity outside partnership and programme authorities, and 
third, the apparent paradox that complaint based policies led to more 
enforcement in 1975 and 1985. This paradox is explained by the fact that 
LHAs only take the initiative and serve notices towards the end of the 
'life' of an improvement area when persuasion and negotiation has proved 
abortive. LHAs positively prefer to negotiate because statutory procedures 
are regarded as cumbersome, with lots of scope for delay, in order to 
avoid a compulsory counter purchase notice, and in order to avoid awarding 
mandatory grants that do not carry repayment conditions where letting 
certificates are breached. Some LHAs will use notices as threats, and 
expect a provisional notice to be 'converted', through negotiation, to a 
full standard discretionary improvement (i.e. not just intermediate) 
grant, or to sale to a housing association or to another landlord (who 
will take up a full grant). Others however fear that too many notices 
will "blow our HIP programme". 
LHAs make much greater use of repair than improvement notices under the 
Housing Acts and, allowing for the fall in the numbers of unfurnished 
rented houses, the numbers served have remained steady at around 60 per 
thousand even though the absolute number of notices has fallen as Table 
7.13 shows. Much the greatest use in relation to the size of private 
renting is made by partnership and programme LHAs, especially in the three 
northern regions, with enforcement notices of 9 per cent of the stock 
compared with 2 per cent in other LHAs. 
LHAs make less use of notices under S.189 of the Housing Act 1985 (where 
they have a duty to serve notices where properties are unfit and 
repairable at reasonable expenses) than under S.190 where their power is 
discretionary. S.189s are procedurally complex with uncertain outcomes. 
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If the notice is successfully challenged on the grounds that the expense 
is not reasonable (a particular problem on northern authorities where the 
full cost (net of grant) of remedying unfitness may not be "recouped" in 
an increase in value) the outcome may be a purchase by the LHA or a 
closing/demolition order. Even if the notice goes unchallenged, the 
landlord may neglect to comply whilst the LHA may be reluctant to do the 
works in default. If the LHA does not serve a S.189 notice it must serve 
a "time and place notice" to determine the future of the unfit property -
which may lead to equally unsatisfactory results of, inter alia, closing 
or demolition orders. 
As a result LHAs prefer to use S.190(1)(a) and S.190(1)(b) notices. They 
have discretion to act themselves under 190(1)(a) where they are 
satisfied that a house, whilst not unfit, is disrepaired and that 
substantial repairs are needed to bring it up to reasonable standard in 
relation to its age, character and locality. They can also act upon 
complaint by tenants under S.190(1)(b) if the state of repair materially 
interferes with their comfort. The intention of section 190 is to enable 
LHAs to take action to prevent disrepaired houses becoming unfit and 
remove any incentive landlords might have to neglect repairs so that their 
properties become unfit and, ultimately enable them to secure vacant 
possession. Whilst the requirement to use S.189 rather than S.190 on 
unfit houses is absolute, the question of unfitness is a matter of 
judgement, and the wide interpretation of unfitness enables LHAs to choose 
which instrument to use. S.190s are popular because the criterion of 
reasonable expense does not expressly have to be considered at the outset, 
although courts may well consider it on appeal (Arden, 1985), and because 
of the flexibility of the term "substantial disrepair". 
Only a quarter of the LHAs made little or no use of repair notices whilst 
another quarter serve them on their own initiative in statutory 
improvement areas, including 40 per cent of partnership and programme 
authorities. Half, however, serve them on complaint only and this is 
particularly the case outside partnership and programme LHAs. The 
greatest use is made in the northern, Labour controlled, inner cities. 
Indeed there is some evidence that they have, to some extent, replaced 
S.93 notices to abate nuisances served under the Public Health Act 1936, 
(see also Hawke and Taylor, 1984). 
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Repair notices are therefore widely used and there was not, at least so 
far as the ten year statistics can show, any diminution in their use in 
relation to the size of the private rented sector. They are used to deal 
with a wide range of disrepair and often, especially in the context of 
statutory improvement areas, they are employed to encourage landlords to 
take up full improvement grants and thus to repair to a much higher 
standard than specified in a notice. They are therefore very much the 
stick, as much in front of, as behind, the carrot of grant aid. 
Nonetheless, S.190s are not unproblematic. Not the least because they 
carry the mandatory right to a repairs grant for the works specified where 
applications are duly made. There are indications, therefore, that 
capital restrictions may lead to deliberate limitations in some LHAs in 
the number of S.190s notices that can be served. Indeed this had already 
happened as a blanket ban in two LHAs (save for disrepair threatening the 
heal th or safety of tenants) and in others annual capital avallabil1 ty 
determined the (fluctuating) number of notices which LHAs served on their 
own initiative. Moreover, if LHAs are unsuccessful in using the threat of 
s.190s to persuade landlords to improve with a full discretionary improve-
ment grant to a higher standard than specified in the notice (and aided by 
way of mandatory grant), then the LHA may have to put up, either with a 
lower level of repair than it set out to achieve, or having to carry out 
work in default. Moreover, holders of mandatory grants are exempt from 
certificates of letting and do not have to repay grants if they sell 
within the five (or seven) years statutory period. 
strategies to restrict grants by limiting the service of notices were not 
always successful. Officers in a number of LHAs observed that some 
landlords were encouraging tenants to complain as a way of "provoking" a 
repairs notice - and a mandatory grant. Indeed some LHas remarked that 
one risk of the system was that it "encouraged" landlords to neglect 
repairs in the expectation that this would ultimately lead to enforcement 
and subsidised repairs. The two LHAs which had blanket bans on notices 
shared this view. 
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The fact that the financial climate effectively determines whether or not 
LHAs take action to secure a reduction in disrepair and unfitness arises 
because LHAs have discretion about serving S.190 notices, whilst the 
standards about unfitness and disrepair are not unambiguously defined. 
They are both open to interpretation both in their compass and in their 
application to individual properties. Hence there is effective discretion 
in serving S.189 as well as S.190 notices. This degree of discretion can 
result in financial led use of enforcement, as is clearly the case in a 
number of LHAs. 
The growing "popularity" of S.190s is reflected in the fact that only 46 
per cent of LHAs now make regular use of nuisance abatement notices under 
the 1936 Public Health Act. Because of the inadequacy of standards, many 
LHAs preferred to use repair notices, subject to political attitudes to 
grant and financial limitations. Abatement notices were not without their 
champions however and were used to deal with dampness, instability and 
risks of accidents. They were regarded, by contrast with Housing Act 
notices, as simple, straightforward and could be pressed to a conclusion 
fairly quickly. Officers tended to reckon that magistrates courts found 
more in LHAs' favour in cases of disputed abatement notices than County 
Courts did in cases of disputed repair notices. Moreover, the possibility 
of quasi criminal penalties for landlords who fail to comply increased the 
likelihood of work being carried out. 
Conclusion on enforce.ant policies 
It is evident that there are significant variations in LHAs' practices of 
using statutory enforcement powers and that many prefer to concentrate on 
informal persuasion and negotiation right from the outset, using statutory 
procedures as a threat to aid negotiation or as a last resort when this 
fails. Indeed as Table 17.11 confirms, only a quarter of LHAs rarely or 
never used informal methods whilst 44 per cent relied on them a lot. 
However, there are significant differences between authorities, with only 
19 per cent of partnership and programme authorities using informal 
methods a lot, compared with 70 per cent of all others. This pattern 
holds good in the northern as well as the midlands regions and in Labour 
controlled as well as in other LHAs. In other words partnership and 
programme LHAs pursue interventionist approaches to a great extent and 
others use negotiation to a high degree. For example, where the 
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declaration of statutory improvement areas has been curtailed and grant 
availabi lity is restricted (see below), greater use is made of informal 
approaches in all types of authority, whereas in LHAs where declarations 
continue partnership and programme LHAs act in an interventionist manner, 
but others follow negotiatory approaches 
As one officer in a programme authority in the northern region put it, 
"messing around with letters, is just, it's a waste of time and its more 
work". Another in a Yorkshire and Humberside programme authority 
explained "too much (negotiation) - quite a lot of that in the past and 
we've now tightened up • • • I dislike informal action. It adds two to 
three months to the process." Not all partnership and programme LHAs take 
a hard line, however, and for some their stance depends on previous 
experience in dealing with particular landlords. Where landlords are 
prepared to comply, negotiation tied to grants will be pursued 
successfully. If not, LHAs do not waste time risking abortive negotia-
tions and get on with statutory procedures straight away. Moreover there 
are also indications that well informed landlords often wait until 
statutory notices are served because they know they carry mandatory grants 
without conditions as to future letting attached to them. Table 17.14 
summarises the statistical evidence about the relationship between policy 
about negotiation and the number of notices actually served. 
In conclusion therefore there is an important distinction between two 
types of LHAs. Partnership and programme LHAs with numerically large 
numbers of unfurnished houses make much greater use of enforcement 
procedures - and their delegation arrangements are so arranged to enable 
officers to act in this way. Other LHAs follow a negotiatory rather than 
enforcement model relying more heavily on grants to persuade landlords to 
carry out repairs and improvements. The findings here echo other recent 
work which has also emphasised the role that grant availability and the 
effective discretion LHAs have to define standards of unfitness and repair 
both play in reducing enforcement or coercive practices and strengthening 
negotiatory or informal practices. This work has also emphasised the 
fluid nature of practices and how coercive modes can switch to negotiatory 
ones in the same LHA, depending on grant availability (Burridge, 1987). 
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Effectiveness of Enforcement 
Local authorities considered enforcement was effective if they were able, 
either to negotiate with landlords and get them to carry out works to a 
high specification with a discretionary improvement grant to full 
standard, or to persuade them to sell to other landlords, including 
housing associations, who would do work to this requirement. In other 
words enforcement and negotiation was designed to get work done, to a 
higher standard than can be specified in a statutory notice. Local 
authorities considered enforcement unsuccessful where work was done either 
by landlords to the standard specified by notices (using a mandatory 
intermediate or repair grant), or carried out by local authorities in 
default (and therefore again doing only the work specified in the notice). 
Thus whilst statute restricts what can be specified in notices to works 
which will eliminate unfitness or substantial disrepair, the local 
authorities will attempt to persuade landlords to go beyond this minimum. 
The availability of grants and the interaction of the enforcement and 
grants system in influencing outcomes must, once more, be emphasised both 
in broad terms i. e. negotiation or enforcement is seen as a necessary 
precursor or threat enlisting applications for grant to assist landlords 
to do work required, as well as in detailed terms. For example, notices 
carry entitlement to grants. Where mandatory grants are awarded following 
service of notices, landlords do not have to provide certificates of 
availability for letting, provided grants are paid only for works to 
comply with the requirements of the notice. If the local authority is 
successful in persuading landlords to exceed the standard laid down in a 
notice and awards a grant for this work, then conditions attached to 
certificates of letting apply and grant can be reclaimed if landlords 
subsequently sell properties within five years (seven in HAAs). But where 
work is done with grant aid only for the standard prescribed in the notice 
there is no obligation to repay grants. There is thus an incentive in 
terms of costs and of fewer restrictions on use of assets for landlords to 
restrict work to those specified in notices, whilst local authorities 
seek, subject to capital restrictions, to persuade landlords to exceed 
this. 
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1able 17.15 EFFEC11~ENESS OF ENFORCEMEN1 DU1lES 
Enforcement Practice 
Negotiate a Negotiate 
Lot & Enforce 
Effective: work done 72 50 
Ineffective (to some extent) 28 50 
Type of LHA All 
Enforce Inner City Other 
36 38 70 53 
64 62 30 47 
Generally speaking, however, most local authorities considered that the 
1980 Housing Act had made it easier, both for negotiating authorities to 
persuade landlords to carry out improvement without the need for 
enforcement, and for enforcing authorities to get notices complied with 
without resorting to default action. This was because the legislation and 
accompanying orders had increased cost limits, extended the highest (75 
per cent) percentage of grant aid beyond HAAs to all unfit properties, 
those without amenities or in substantial and structural disrepair, 
increased to 70 per cent the proportion of a discretionary grant which 
could be devoted for repair work of a substantial and structural kind, 
enabled repair grants to be given on discretion outside as well as within 
HAAs and on a mandatory basis whenever statutory enforcement action was 
taken. LHAs considered that these measures increased effective demand by 
reducing landlords costs and made it easier to take enforcement without 
having to work in default. Mandatory grants were an essential part, LHAs 
argued, of a successful enforcement strategy and enforcement would 
appear to be more successful now in getting landlords to do work than in 
the mid 1970s. In the latter period Hadden reckoned only a third of 
notices were complied with (Hadden 1978). LHAs in this sample thought 
they got work done in 80 to 90 per cent of cases, albeit on occasions with 
difficulty, to low standards and on default. 
Generally speaking, as Table 17.15 shows, just over half LHAs consider 
their enforcement action to be effective in getting work done to the 
standard they want. Effectiveness is particularly marked amongst those 
pursuing a negotiatory model and therefore amongst most, except inner city 
partnership and programme areas. These former authorities rarely resort 
to the full use of statutory procedures and find that their threatened -
or limited actual use - is successful. Given the limited use they make of 
statutory enforcement they do not often confront procedural and other 
difficulties. 
Thus the negotiating LHAs are those who concentrate their efforts on 
persuading landlords to improve with discretionary grants to a full 
standard, rarely experiencing the problems that enforcing LHAs face when 
they use statutory enforcement procedures. These latter, usually inner 
city authorities, use full statutory powers much more often hoping, 
however, to turn the consequent right to mandatory grants into 
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applications for discretionary grants or to see the notice result in sales 
to other landlords, which many actively encouraged, using notices as a 
means of securing such sales. For these authorities, ineffective 
enforcement includes paying a mandatory grant attached to a notice because 
of the low standard achieved, having to do work in default (or accept a 
counter purchase notice) to the same low standard, and difficulties over 
reasonable expense or the amount of work specified in relation to the 
character and location of the dwelling on appeals against notices. It 
should be noted that 45 per cent of LHAs who served compulsory improvement 
or repair notices on their own initiative encountered the need to do work 
in default and less than a third found them totally effective procedures. 
The evidence from LHAs shows that the more they are enforcing rather than 
negotiating authorities the greater the proportion of grants awarded are 
mandatory. 
Whilst enforcing LHAs find statutory powers least effective, all types of 
authorities experience some procedural difficulties with enforcement, 
although it should be emphasised that only half identified problems with 
enforcement. 
The most important problem was that of delay in getting work carried out. 
59 per cent considered this a problem, especially the active enforcers 
with proactive policies in HAAs and partnership and programme LHAs. LHAs 
were particularly concerned about the time taken up by each of the stages 
of statutory procedures, especially if in the end work has to be done in 
defaul t. Nevertheless, there was a recognition that landlords had been 
gi ven righ t to appeal and, in complaining about delay, LHAs were not 
suggesting rescinding such rights, rather speeding up procedures (not 
least because of continuing hardship to tenants). They also recognised 
that, when landlords had applied for grants, the grant approval and 
implementation timetable often meant long delays in doing the work through 
no fault of the landlords, since LHAs could not press for work to be done 
to the statutory timetable in these circumstances. However there were 
occasions when landlords deliberately used this to delay things, with no 
intention of doing the work, with or without grants. Delay was also a 
problem when properties were sold on to other landlords. There were 
positive and negative aspects to this. On the positive side the proper-
ties were sometimes bought by property dealers actively acquiring for 
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improvement and capital gain (see below); delays in applying for grants 
and organising work were acceptable in these situations. On the negative 
side company owners sometimes hid behind their "corporate" veil, switching 
the ownership of properties between constituent companies to avoid 
responsibility. 
The second major source of complaint about enforcement was standards, 
especially where LHAs were actively serving improvement and repair notices 
on their own initiative and where there was little active pUrchasing by 
property dealers, who were builders looking to improve their acquisitions. 
LHAs were concerned that they could not specify the higher standard they 
wanted in statutory notices, and that too low a standard was achieved 
where they could not persuade landlords to apply for discretionary grants 
and comply with higher standards. Connected with this is the problem of 
the effective lowering of standards on appeal, on the grounds of 
reasonable expense and of the way the criteria of age, character and 
location of the property also affected this on appeal. LHAs found this a 
hindrance in the worst areas where they wanted to see increased standards 
yet were thwarted because of a combination of high costs, low post 
improvement values and a surrounding area of poor standard houses and 
environmental quality. Ironically this meant they could press for less to 
be done on appeal cases in such areas than in other areas of bet tel' 
standards and higher house prices. Thus standards are influenced as much 
by the determination of house prices and environmental character in the 
local housing market as by desirable environmental health criteria. 
Whilst few LHAs were regularly doing work in default (most hoping to 
persuade recalcitrant and reluctant landlords to sell to property dealers 
or housing associations) active enforcers reckoned they potentially had to 
consider doing so for between 10 and 20 per cent of cases. Organising the 
practical side of default work is a major problem for these LHAs. Two 
specific problems were mentioned most. First the internal administrative 
procedures to authorise and carry out the work were cumbersome and this in 
itself was a disincentive to embark on enforcement. Second, the 
difficulty of recovering the expenditure upon completion, not the least 
the low rate of recovery when it is taken from low rents. Consequently 
many LHAs rely on putting a charge on property, so that they recover upon 
sale. Because of these difficulties, LHAs want to be able to prosecute 
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for failure to comply with statutory Housing Act notices as well as to do 
work in default. In other words, the advantages of operating under Public 
Health Act procedures is that defaulting landlords can be prosecuted but 
with the attendant disadvantage of remedying only immediate nuisances. 
The advantage of Housing Act procedures is that higher standards (though 
not high enough) can be specified and work done in default, but 
defaulters cannot be fined for failure to comply. Many LHAs would like to 
be able to prosecute, taking the view that mandatory grants overcome the 
reluctance of most landlords and that the threat of high scale fines would 
persuade all but the most reluctant of the rest to do the work, 
particularly if they also have to pay for default work without the benefit 
of grant. It should be noted that a number of LHas commented on the 
effectiveness of the threat of default. If sufficient publicity ("word 
getting about") is given to cases of default costs being recovered, with 
bills being sent out without the benefit of grant, many landlords will 
carry out works. 
EnforCeJl8nt: Reforming Powers and Procedures 
Only 22 per cent of all LHAs wanted ~ changes. Not surprisingly most of 
these were the LHAs who made little active use of procedures, relying 
instead on threat and the enticement of grants. Nonetheless 10 per cent 
of LHAs who used negotiations extensively wanted some changes. 
The two changes mentioned most often (by one-third of all LHAs) were about 
standards and about compulsory procedures. As for the former, local 
authorities referred generally to the need to reach something higher than 
the current fitness standard, a number explicitly referring to the AHA's 
proposed habitation standard (AMA, 1986). Many compared this with what 
they saw as a reduced standard proposed by DoE in the 1985 Green Paper 
(DoE, 1985). They also referred to explicit items which they wanted 
incorporating, such as safe electrical installation. Finally they also 
wanted the power to specify this higher standard in statutory notices. 
Nearly half the LHAs who served repair notices on their own initiative in 
improvement areas wanted these reforms. 
The other most popularly expressed reform concerned compulsory improvement 
and repair powers, especially those serving notices on their own initia-
tive in statutory areas. Many were concerned about delays inherent in 
each system and, subject to preserving landlords' rights to appeal, wanted 
to speed up the process, particularly if, in the end, the LHA were going 
to have to do work in default. Two particular changes were identified. 
First to remove the power of landlords to serve counter purchase notices 
in cases where dwellings, subject to improvement notices, were capable of 
renovation at reasonable expense. In many ways this was as much a 
reflection of the impact financial restrictions had on the willingness of 
LHAs to serve notices as on anything else. Not all LHAs would go along 
with this, and a few explicitly endorsed the AMA's proposals that owners 
should retain the right of requiring LHAs to buy dwellings below standard 
(with options for tenants to do so) including those where dwellings were 
not capable of renovation at reasonable expense. The other change noted 
included the elimination of provisional notices and the speeding up (often 
unspecified) or eliminating the "time and place" meeting procedures for 
compulsory improvement notices. All these were designed to reduce the 
amount of time landlords could potentially delay enforcement. 
By contrast a number of LHAs agreed with the AMA's proposals to introduce 
time and place meetings to consider proposals for improving and repairing 
ill houses below the habitation standard not just houses subject to 
provisional improvement notices and unfit houses incapable of repair at 
reasonable expense i.e. any house defective on the element of the 
standard. If the habitation standard could be achieved at reasonable 
expense the LHA would seek the views of owner and tenant and either take 
no further action if the tenants so wished, serve a compulsory order, if 
the tenants asked, accept voluntary undertakings to do the work, or agree 
to a sale to the local authority or housing association, if the tenants 
consent. 
A number of other changes were identified by 15 per cent of LHAs. First 
the need to increase staffing. Whilst not about procedural reform the 
LHAs who mentioned this insisted that the procedures were adequate: what 
they needed were the staff to carry them out. Not surprisingly it was the 
authorities making the least use of enforcement who were most likely to 
mention this. Other authorities wanted to "toughen up" procedures. These 
included: a duty to carry out work in default upon non-compliance, the 
ablli ty to fine landlords for non-compliance as well as doing work in 
default, and the right to compulsorily acquire as an alternative to 
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default and/or fines. Other changes were designed to clarify procedures, 
particularly when determining reasonable expense in relation to 
improvement and repair notices, especially in respect of valuation on the 
open market as to vacant possession or sitting tenant valuation. 
policies about Improvement Grants 
Many of these enforcement procedures depend on the grant system for their 
effectiveness. It is important therefore to review LHAs policies and 
experiences in this area, as well as to consider their proposals for the 
reform of this system, too. 
Rumber of grants 
Tables 17.16 and 17.17, which show the increase in the number of grants 
paid to private landlords over the ten year period, do not fully reflect 
the impact of the most recent restrictions LHAs have placed on the award 
of grants as a result of reduced HIP allocations. What they do show is 
the significant impact that both the 1980 Housing Act and the 1982/83 
budget measures have had on increasing grants to private landlords. The 
former increased eligible expense limits for discretionary, intermediate 
and repairs grants, increased to 75 per cent the rate of grant for all 
priority cases (dwellings in HAAs, without all amenities, in substantial 
and structure disrepair, for the disabled, or pursuant to a mandatory 
repairs notice), increased to 70 per cent the proportion of the discre-
tionary grant which could be used for repairs of a substantial and 
structural nature, extended repairs grants on a discretionary basis to all 
qualifying dwellings (not just in HAAs) and made their award mandatory 
when repair notices were served. The 1982/83 budget increased the grant 
rate to 90 per cent for intermediate and repair grants where applications 
were duly made within two years. 
The combined impact of these measures led to grants increasing from under 
1 per cent of the private rented stock in 1975 and 1980 to 3 per cent in 
1985. This increase occurred in all types of authority, and whilst it 
occurred in both mandatory grants (those paid where amenities were lacking 
or repairs notices served) and discretionary grants, the biggest 
proportionate increase was in mandatory awards especially in partnership 
and programme LHAs, although throughout the period the majority of grants 
were discretionary (either discretionary improvement or repairs grants). 
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1985 
79 (12) 
2!J (12) 
50 (24) 
15.8 
10.0 
12.9 
156 (13 ) 
32 (12 ) 
96 (25) 
26.4 
20.8 
23.7 
If comparisons between the years are made only for LHAs which were able to 
provide data for all years the same pattern of change emerges, although 
there is a bigger proportionate increase in grants in partnership and 
programme than in other LHAs between 1980 and 1985 in absolute and ratio 
terms. 
Grant Rationing Policies 
It is clear however from the evidence collected in this survey that LHAs 
have had to impose substantial restrictions on grants in recent years 
because of reduced HIP allocations. This has affected all of them since 
1983/84 and almost all are using various rationing devices to steer 
limi ted funds to priority areas and properties and, with the limited 
exceptions of two LHAs, no distinctions were made between tenures in 
drawing up and applying these restrictions. 
Until 1980 it was evident that grants were freely available (where 
applications were duly made) and a "first come, first served" policy 
determined who got grants, with discretionary grants being widely 
available within and without statutory improvement areas, subject to 
statutory requirements. 
Between 1980 and 1983/84, however, rationing devices were gradually 
introduced in response to the increasingly severe HIP restrictions. Many 
LHAs restricted discretionary grants to statutory improvement areas but 
these policies were "blown apart" by the 1982/83 budget measures when for 
two years many felt they were being asked to adopt an "open cheque book" 
approach to grants. They were swamped with applications and inspections 
throughout their areas and demand-led pepperpotting overtook attempts to 
prioritise the most important work, not the least to persuade and cajole 
reluctant landlords to apply for grants, in order to ensure that 
applications stimulated by the budget incentives were serviced. 
Since then increasingly severe restrictions have been introduced involving 
a mixture, in most cases, of area rationing with some applicant and/or 
property rationing. There are three types of main policy. Firs t, as 
Table 17.18 reveals, the main policy in half the LHAs is that discretion-
ary grants are available only in statutory improvement areas (and 
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sometimes only within defined blocks within these or only in support of 
enveloping schemes). Outside these areas grants are only available for 
adaptations for the disabled, as well as mandatory intermediate and repair 
grants. Because the latter are mandatory upon notices, the private rented 
sector gets some priority outside improvement areas. 
The second main policy, in 15 pel" cent of LHAs, is that only mandatory 
grants were available throughout the authority's area. In many 
authorities, moreover, (not just these 15 per cent) it was evident that 
enforcement action was being restricted, if not actually suspended, to 
reduce the demand for mandatory grants, given financial limitations. 
Although it was rare for LHAs to explicitly restrict grants to private 
landlords there were two who considered property dealers were distorting 
priorities by activating Housing Act enforcement procedures through tenant 
complaints following deliberate failure to carry out repairs in 
circumstances where they had adequate funds to carry out the works. In 
these cases no discretionary grants were given to private landlords and 
enforcement action was confined to cases where dwellings were structurally 
dangerous or presented dangers to heal th and safety i. e. ac tion under 
Public Health and Building Acts which do not carry entitlement to grant. 
The third main policy, in 29 per cent of LHAs, is to be more selective 
about discretionary grants both inside and outside statutory improvement 
areas. A few examples will clarify this. A non designated authority in 
Yorkshire and Humberside was using rateable value limits to ration 
discretionary grants outside improvement areas on the basis of survey 
evidence about the correlation between rateable value and physical 
condition. The limits were adjusted according to the severity of 
financial constraints on a yearly basis, including the exclusion of 
private rented properties from any restrictions. A programme authority in 
the north west opened up discretionary grants outside improvement areas 
when cash was available and pushed through the backlog of applications 
from the 1982/83 Doom. Another in the north west used a points system 
based jointly on condition and applicant need to determine priorities, 
whilst a partnership/programme authority in the Midlands restricted grants 
to certain kinds of work. Yet other authorities used variations in 
percentage grants to ration cash, varying the percentage on an annual 
basis to clear the budget, sometimes incorporating minimum spending limits 
before discretionary repair grants would be approved - on occasions 
varying this according to the financial status of applicant (including 
individual landlords) - e.g. full grant at 90 per cent if receiving SB or 
FIS. 
Evidently the growing financial restrictions create problems for the 
enforcement of standards in the private rented sector. Some local 
authorities are confining enforcement activity to limit the number of 
mandatory awards they must make whilst others are restricting what will be 
funded in discretionary grants, if not restricting them entirely to 
improvement areas, thereby hindering the use of enforcement as a step to 
persuading landlords to apply for discretionary grants. Increasingly as a 
resul t grants are confined to improvement areas, whose dec lara tion is 
itself being restricted. The greater the number of restrictions on grants 
the more likely it is that repair notices are only served upon the 
complaint of a tenant and the greater the reliance on negotiation than on 
enforcement action. 
Grant standards and conditions 
Each LHA was asked about the standards it required when a private rented 
house had an improvement grant. This was done by finding out what was 
acquired for six elements of the building fabric: roofs, window frames, 
damp proofing, internal plasterwork, staircases and external doors. Local 
authorities were also asked whether they were prepared to negotiate with 
private landlords or their agents about standards and whether, and in what 
way, standards had changed since 1980. To simplify comparisons between 
authori ties, the cost of achieving the six elements of each authorities' 
standard was estimated from tendered prices for carrying out such work to 
a two storey, 4 room mid terraced nineteenth century house, with attic, in 
Sheffield in 1987. In this way it was possible to compare the total cost 
of achieving each LHA's standard, although no allowance has been made for 
regional variations in building costs. 
Nevertheless Table 17.19 shows that, with the exception of internal 
plasterwork and the resiting/rebuilding of steep staircases, at least half 
of LHAs are requiring landlords to renew crucial elements of the building 
fabric. Whilst the differences between partnership and programme and all 
other authorities are not statistically significant it should be noted 
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Table 17. 19 IMPROVEMENT GRANT STANDARDS 
Rer~ew Renew 
Roof Windows 
Part & Prog 01 67 57 10 
Other LHAs 0 1 65 65 ,0 
All LHAs 0 1 66 61 10 
Full 
DPC 
48 
60 
54 
New Resite Renew Average Standard 
Plaster Steep External Cost Deviation 
Stairs Doors 
43 24 57 £4,472 £2,371 
35 50 65 £4,784 £2,438 
39 37 61 £4,624 £2,378 
that there is a tendency for more of the latter to have higher standards, 
especially in relation to dealing with rising dampness and steep internal 
staircases. This is reflected in the slightly higher cost of rectifying 
problems. 
Standards have risen in many LHAs since 1980, especially in inner city 
(i.e. partnership and programme) LHAs, over half of whom have raised them 
compared with just less than a third of other authorities, over half of 
whom had the same, or lower standards. In most cases the improvement in 
standards arises from the requirement to replace rather than repair. This 
is particularly so in the case of roofs. In 1980 half inner city 
authorities were prepared to allow roofs to be patched and repaired when 
awarding grants. Now two-thirds of LHAs insist on the existing roof 
covering being replaced with felt covering, new battens and new slates. 
Similarly a quarter of them now require new windows whereas in the past 
splicing in new wood to replace rotted members would have been accepted. 
Indeed some authorities specify upvc windows and condensation channels. 
The fact that standards have risen in inner areas does not mean standards 
are lower in other LHAs - far from it, standards were higher, on average. 
in 1980 in these areas, and it is inner city authorities who have raised 
standards to match them. In all types of area, those who have raised 
standards require landlords to spend on average 40 per cent more (assuming 
that ~ the elements need attention) than those who have maintained 1980 
standards. Because more inner city partnership and programme authorities 
than others have raised standards they have faced landlords with bigger 
increases in the costs of improvement, than LHAs elsewhere because those 
of the latter who raised standards already had higher than average 
standards. 
Having said that standards have risen, it is also true that some LHAs are 
prepared to negotiate about standards and to make concessions to ensure 
that at least some work is carried out in circumstances where landlords 
would be deterred by the high costs of fulfilling all the LHAs standards. 
However, LHAs who took the initiative to enforce standards did not pursue 
lower ones than others. Nevertheless over half LHAs were prepared to 
waive some standards if this got essential work done. Paradoxically it is 
those who set out to achieve the lowest standards who are most prepared to 
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Table 17.20 PROPORTION OF LHAs PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT STANDARDS BY PRACTICE IN SERVIN6 REPAIR NOTICES 
Percentage of LHAs 
who negotiate on Average Costs (£) 
Inner City LHAs standards N All No negotiation Negotiation 
On initiative in SIAs 67 9 4658 5250 43(,3 
On complaint only 57 7 5507 6r)16 512fi 
Rarely 50 4 3356 4fl37 2675 
Other LHAs 
V1 On initiative in SIAs 100 2 4775 4775 
CD 
V1 
On complaint only 50 12 3968 5862 2075 
Rarely 33 6 6416 7237 4775 
waive them, although this is much less the case amongst active users of 
statutory enforcement. Thus inner city LHAs who take statutory 
initiatives to get repairs and improvements done do not do so at the cost 
of standards. Indeed they were the ones who have raised them in recent 
years. In other LHAs there is a somewhat opposite tendency - far fewer 
take the initiative but many more who do so waive standards while the 
standards they are prepared to sacrifice are much lower, few having 
changed in recent years. (See Table 17.20). 
Conditions on Grants 
As well as having effective discretion in determining standards, LHAs also 
have some discretion in imposing conditions on grants. Some conditions 
are however mandatory. Landlords must provide a certificate of 
availability for letting for five years (unless the application is for an 
intermediate grant following a compulsory improvement notice or a repairs 
grant following a repairs notice). In addition, LHAs may require 
landlords to let on regulated tenancies at registered Fair Rents for five 
years (though see current advice in DoE, 1988b). In HAAs and GIAs they 
are obliged to make these conditions where they run for seven years. If 
any of these conditions are breached, the LHA can reclaim the grant with 
interest. 
Once again partnership and programme LHAs stand out as "tough" LHAs, more 
of them requiring Fair Rents to be registered than other authorities, 
carrying out surveys to identify breaches of all conditions (including 
certificates of letting) and reclaiming grant with interest upon 
establishing breaches. Nevertheless it should be noted that these inner 
city authorities were not only the "toughest" as far as conditions were 
concerned, but also the "laxest" as far as monitoring potential breaches. 
As might be expected, LHAs using statutory enforcement to achieve 
standards were the same authorities making greatest proportionate use of 
Fair Rent and other conditions - although it should also be noted how few 
LHAs imposed any other conditions at all. (See Table 17.21). 
Enforcement, Costs and Grants 
Not unexpectedly, LHAs award more grants per thousand private rented 
properties where they are actively using statutory enforcement powers. As 
Table 17.22 shows, the number of grants in proportion to the number of 
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Table 17.21 CONDITIONS ON GRANTS 
(a) 
Type of LHA 
Irnoosing 
Fair Rents 
Part & Proy 8m~ 
Other LHAs 55~~ 
All '_HAs 67?~ 
(b) 
IrnDosina 
Other Conditions 
1m~ 0' ,0 
15~~ 0' ,0 
12?~ 0' ,0 
Percent 0 f LHAs 
(c) ( d) 
Means of Identifying Reclairlilng 
Breaches with interest 
Surveys Searches Other None 
29 5 24 43 8m~ 
15 50 10 25 65~~ 
22 27 17 34 72% 
Table 17.22 IMPROVFMENI GRANIS PfR LOUD UNfUHNISHLD PRI\/ATE RENIED 
HOUS[S I3Y (cJ) POLlCY IN SII{VING REPAIR NOIIC[S 
(b) LNf()RrMrFNI PRI\CI Tn (r) NlJMl3rn or NOIICE~; SFR\lFD 
1975 
(a) On LilA illi LiaLive 011 SIAs 7 
On cornplainl 9 
Rare/Never HJ 
(b) Negotiale a lot 6 
Negol:iale and enfurcernenl 7 
Enforce 12 
(c) NuUces al/below Jllcdian 6 (6) 
NoLices abuve lIIediclII 10 (3) 
Noles 
* Djfference sign:ificant at 0.06 level 
n Dj fFerence sigJlificaflL al 0.07 level 
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1980 1985 
11 42 
8 32 
6 26 
7 34 
9 29 
11 42 
6* (0) 
12 (')) 44 (8) 
unfurnished properties is greater where LHAs serve repair notices on their 
own initiative in statutory improvement areas, where they rarely 
negotiate, and where more notices are served than in other LHAs. These 
differences were particularly marked, in partnership and programme LHAs in 
both 1980 and 1985, but not in other LHAs. In other words the higher rate 
of enforcement activity in partnership and programme authorities is 
translated into the higher levels of improvements found in these than in 
other areas. 
Nevertheless improvement grants have increased markedly in all types of 
authority, even though the scale of enforcement activity has not. Table 
17.23 sheds more light on the factors behind activity and lists the 
correlation coefficient of notices and grant costs, on the one hand, with 
grants on the other hand. It shows that in both 1980 and 1985, but 
especially in 1980, the number of grants was closely correlated with the 
number of notices and only weakly or inversely correlated with the cost of 
improving. In both 1980 and 1985 the number of grants in partnership and 
programme areas was correlated with the number of notices and inversely 
but not significantly with total (not net of grants) costs, indicating the 
"tough" enforcement strategies pursued in these (comparatively low cost) 
LHAs bore fruit, overcoming any residual resistance interposed by the 
costs of compliance, especially in 1980. In other LHAs however grants in 
1980 were not only positively correlated with enforcement activity but, 
crucially, negatively correlated with costs - at a time when these 
authorities costs were much higher than partnership and programme 
authorities' costs and when the grant percentage outside improvement areas 
was 50 per cent. At the same time, enforcement activity in these other 
LHAs was itself inversely correlated with costs. Thus in 1980 these low 
cost authorities were able to pursue improvement both by negotiation and 
enforcement. In 1985 however the scale of activity in these other 
authorities was correlated with neither enforcement nor costs, indicating 
the extent to which the higher grant percentage paid after 1980 on works 
carried out on all priority cases had enabled LHAs to successfully 
implement the strategy of negotiation and persuasion with which they have 
been identified, at the same time as maintaining the high standards they 
require owners to meet. Nevertheless, gi ven the negotiating stance of 
these LHAs, it was not surprising to find that enforcement activity itself 
was still correlated with costs in 1985. 
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Table 17.23 PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS: GRANTS WITH ENFORCEMENT: NOTICES AND COSTS 
(a) 
ALL LHAS 
(b) 
Partnership & Programme LHAs 
(c) 
Other LHAs 
LAGNT80(a) LAGNT85(a) LAGNT80 LAGNT85 LAGNT80 LAGNT85 
LANOT80(b) .72** .79** .65* 
LANOT85(b) .48** .52** 
COST 80(c) 
-.38* -.22 -.93** 
COST 85(c) -.03 
-.26 
Notes 
(a) Discretionary and mandatory grants in 1980 and 1985 per thcusand unfurnished properties. 
(b) Compulsory improvement and repair notices in 1980 and 1985 per thousand unfurnished properties. 
(c) Costs of achieviny 1985 and 1980 standard (at 1987 prices) 
** Signif.icant at~ 0.05 
* Significant at"/ 0.05 "'- 0.1 
-.35 
.13 
The data also confirms other findings about enforcement strategy. First, 
in partnership and programme authorities notices were positively 
correlated with the number of discretionary grants in 1980 "t in 1985 
they were related with mandatory and not discretionary grants, reflecting 
the growth in mandatory grants over the periods and the success in 1980 of 
getting recipients of enforcement notices to apply for discretionary 
grants by negotiating about standards. In 1980, in other LHAs, both 
mandatory and discretionary grants were correlated with the number of 
notices but by 1985 notices were inversely correlated with discretionary 
grants, suggesting" that the LHAs adopting very negotiative modes of 
achieving repair and improvement were succeeding to getting improvement 
without an enforcement approach, as a result of changes to improvement 
grants which reduced landlords' net of grant costs. 
The evidence suggests therefore that negotiation succeeds outside 
partnership and programme areas in getting repairs and improvements done 
but only if the costs are bearable. In partnership and programme areas 
costs are less important in determining the amount of work, because of 
LHAs willingness to undertake enforcement action, but the success of this 
is dependent on grants covering costs to an extent adequate to get 
landlords to do the work (particularly important as costs rose in these 
areas) and, as the next section shows, a supply of speculative investors 
prepared to buy up property subject to enforcement for short term capital 
gain. Indeed in all areas the increase in grants between 1980 and 1985 was 
correlated not only with an increase in the number of enforcement notices 
served but also with the cost of complying with standards, the latter 
because it was in these high cost areas that the changes to the grant 
system had the biggest proportionate impact on reducing landlords' costs. 
Property Speculation, Enforcement and Grants 
Property Speculators 
The extent to which private rented houses are brought up to contemporary 
standards depends, not only on a LHA' s enforcement strategy and its 
interaction with the improvement grant system, but also on the extent to 
which property dealers are actively buying up tenanted property and 
improving for ultimate sale with vacant possession. 
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Table 17.24 PROPORTION OF UNFURNISHED PRIVATE RENTED SECTOR 
WITH SITTING TENANTS ACQUIRED BY NEW LANDLORDS 
Unweighted Data 
Proportion Nurth* Midlandi Partnership Other All & Programme 
0 1 0 1 01 0 1 01 
10 10 10 10 10 
~ 5 per cent 32 15 38 15 27 
<- 5 per cent 29 62 33 45 39 
None 39 23 28 40 34 
Numbers 28 13 21 20 41 
Weighted Data 
01 01 0 1 01 0 1 
10 10 10 10 10 
"4 5 per cent 35 41 47 13 36 
L.. 5 per cent 25 44 23 45 30 
None 39 15 30 41 33 
Numbers 171,934 54,376 155,144 71,166 226,310 
~ 
* North = standard regions of North, North West and Yorkshire and Humberside 
t Midlands = standard regions of East and West Midlands 
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This has been shown to be the case in Sheffield where nearly 40 per cent 
of the 1985 unfurnished private rented stock had changed hands in the 
previous decade, much of it acquired tenanted by large companies and 
builders (many of whom were new to landlordism), with the intention of 
improving it with grant aid from the city council and ultimately selling 
with vacant possession. This speculative activity in combination with an 
active enforcement policy by the LHA had led to significant improvement 
and repair in the private rented stock. Martin found that this Sheffield 
experience was not an isolated phenomenon but was replicated in other 
authorities, especially those with active enforcement strategies, where a 
"new breed" of landlords was acquiring run down tenanted property with a 
view to getting improvement grants to bring them up to standard (Martin 
1983, 1985 
able 17.24 is based on the evidence available to the LHA officers 
interviewed - including improvement grant and housing benefit records -and 
further confirms that the Sheffield experience is, indeed, replicated 
elsewhere. There was evidence of landlords buying up tenanted property in 
two-thirds of LHAs. In a quarter, this was regarded as a significant 
feature, with at least 5 per cent (and often up to 20 per cent) of the 
unfurnished stock having changed hands in this way since 1980 in these 
authorities. When the data is weighted by the size of the unfurnished 
private rented sector in 1981, one-third of the private rented sector 
lives in LHAs where buying has been significant. Whilst there is 
significant buying in a greater proportion of northern than Midlands LHAs, 
a greater proportion of the private rented sector in the Midlands is in 
LHAs with significant buying. Finally it is in partnership and programme 
LHAs where buying by property dealers is at its most active, with nearly 
half the unfurnished rented sector living in LHAs where tenanted property 
was being brought up on a significant scale. 
The evidence LHAs in the sample had about the types of landlords who were 
buying, and their motives, also confirmed previous research. First, some 
illustrative evidence from five of the LHAs: 
In a partnership and programme authority in Yorkshire and Humberside 
buyers from within the LHA and from outside were actively buying up houses 
in HAAs and other grant priority areas. Although they were prepared to 
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buy throughout the LHA, they concentrated on these restricted areas 
because discretionary grants were available to them. The LHA noted that 
they picked up property on which notices had been served, including 
improvement notices. Indeed officers observed that, if existing landlords 
did not want to improve, they would be better off financially selling to 
another landlord because they would get a better price than selling to the 
LHA through a purchase notice. The buyers were new to landlordism, were 
large builders keeping work going during the recession, minimising bad 
debts by doing 'grant work' for themselves and had each acquired several 
hundred properties very quickly, often advertising for properties in the 
local press. Some 10 to 20 per cent of the unfurnished stock had changed 
hands since 1980. 
Another partnership and programme LHA, this time in the north wes t, had 
found builders "homing in on particular areas" looking for properties 
without bathrooms and with sitting tenants: "the ones with double sash 
windows and net curtains, in disrepair. They stand out a mile." The 
builders made contacts with owners through a network of estate agents who 
act as brokers between old and new landlords. These new landlords rely 
heavily on the grant system, buying properties now let to pensioners to 
sell with vacant possession when they die or move elsewhere, meanwhile 
some using them as collateral to raise loans for their businesses. 
Significantly, housing associations found themselves unable to compete 
with the prices these new landlords were prepared to pay. About 15 per 
cent of the stock had been brought up by new landlords since 1980. 
The experience of yet another north west authority (this time a 
non-designated metropolitan district) confirmed that it was primarily the 
small, local landlords who were selling out to property development 
companies and pension funds. The small owners cannot afford to improve 
and when the local authority takes enforcement action, they sell up and 
the new landlords get the benefit of the grant. About 10 per cent had 
changed ownership in this way. 
The experience of a partnership and programme authority in the northern 
region is similar, where as much as 30 per cent was reckoned to have 
changed hands, with new landlords buying vacant as well as tenanted 
property. They were being very "choosy", buying only those properties 
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which were eligible for grant aid. Prices of tenanted property had gone 
up in these areas and zoned housing associations were finding it difficult 
to buy. Again the new landlords intention is to sell with vacant 
possession but reletting if a vacancy occurred before reletting conditions 
on grants expired, offering furnished tenancies to young singles, 
including those unemployed on (at that time) certificated housing benefit. 
It was also noted that the recent imposition of restrictions on grant 
availability appeared to have dampened down buying activity. 
These experiences were also shared by Midlands authorities and officers of 
one partnership and programme LHA thought that up to 10 per cent had 
changed hands, based on the evidence of grant casework and the auction 
market. New landlords were buying smaller terraced houses with pensioner 
tenants, preference being given to houses in improvement areas. The 
motives were much the same: to secure capital gain when vacant possession 
occurred, improving in the meantime, although with some evidence of 
harassment to get tenants to move on. This LHA' s experience also 
confirmed that these investors were new to landlordism. In particular it 
was noted that these "builder landlords" were actively committed to 
improving as part of their strategy - it provided them with building work, 
grant aid subsidised a large part of it and, in upgrading houses in 
improvement areas, they were acquiring saleable (and mortgageable) 
properties. The investment strategy of these contemporary investors was 
contrasted with that of investors in the 1960s and early 1970s: investment 
companies who had also bought up property for speculative gain but who had 
put no money into the fabric. The new investors were concentrating on 
inner city improvement areas, not only because grants were available but 
because area schemes, in transforming the houses and environment 
regenerated potential home owners' (and financial institutions') 
confidence in their long term future. Meanwhile, landlords who invest in 
property for rental income rather than simply capital gain are buying up 
vacant houses outside the inner area. As the LHA explained, "the people 
landlords want to let to (young singles) don't want to live in the inner 
city, whilst people who want to live there, want to buy." 
These case studies, therefore support the findings of earlier research. 
There is evidence of s1gnificant reinvestment in private rented housing as 
new landlords in the property business, especially builders, buy up 
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tenanted property for capital gain selling with vacant possession when 
existing tenants quit. Meanwhile the property provides building work and 
by buying houses in need of improvement and repair, new landlords can get 
their work subsidised by improvement grants. Not only does this give 
their bui lding firms a supply of work, it brings the property up to a 
saleable standard. Since the costs of doing this are considerable, grants 
are essential to the strategy and early repayment undermines the landlords 
investment. If therefore vacancies arise before the letting conditions or 
grants expire, landlords relet on a short term basis. 
This investment is not of course risk free. The risks that vacant 
possession will not be secured are minimised however by buying tenanted 
property with pensioners (especially single pensioners, avoiding 
succession rights) and by buying on a large scale to guarantee a regular 
turnover of properties. Where it is necessary to find short term tenants 
to replace elderly tenants before grant conditions have expired, 
investment is less at a risk in partnership and programme authorities than 
elsewhere, because of the demand for furnished accommodation from young 
singles. 
The policies of LHAs are also crucial to this investment strategy. Firstly 
landlords depend on a ready supply of improvement grants and on the 
environmental upgrading associated with statutory improvement areas. 
Secondly landlords require a ready supply of tenanted property. Policies 
about area declaration and grant restrictions relate to the first 
requirement. Policies about the enforcement of repairs and improvement 
relates to both requirements. Thus statutory notices both "flush out" 
property belonging to older, long established landlords unwilling to 
shoulder the burden of landlordism any longer and also carry the right to 
mandatory grants, in itself particularly important at times of 
restrictions on grants. 
Indeed there was evidence from a number of LHAs that new landlords were 
deliberately running property down to attract notices or "winding up" 
their tenants to complain, so that LHAs would serve notices in response. 
Two LHAs had decided to restrict the issue of notices (so as to limit the 
supply of capital to these landlords) by using legislation that did not 
carry the right of landlords to get grants to do the work required of 
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Table 17.25 WHAT LHAs SAID LANDLORDS WERE BUYING (AND MOTIVES) BY SCALE OF ACTIVITY 
(PER CENT OF LHAs MENTIONING EACH CATEGORY) 
Scale of buying No of TelT8ce Improvement Properties Bought for SInce 1980 LHA houses < f Areas c.; father with Capital 
other areas Enforcement Gain cf 
types Notices c..J 
not 
other 
~ 5 per cent 11 82~~ 36~~ 82~~ 64~~ 
~ 5 per cent 16 37~o 00 / /0 15~o 7 5~~ 
Chi Square 5.64 7.60 10.69 0.04 
Degrees of Freedom 3 2 2 1 
Significance 0.13 0.02 0.005 0.83 
Bought and Improved 
Improved with Grant 
~t not 
82~~ 91~~ 
62~o 62~~ 
1.86 2.98 
2 2 
0.39 0.22 
Table 17.26 WHO WAS BUYING TENANTED PROPERTY (PER CENT OF LHAs MENTIONING EACH CATEGORY) 
Scale of buying Number Individuals Large Builders or New or Dominant 
SInce 1980 of LHAs not Landlords Builders & New and Builders Builder 
Companies ( 20 props Others Existing Company Individual 
in all) 
~ 5 per cent 11 18% 9m.; 82~'; 10m.; 54~'; 18~'; 
< 5 per cent 16 5m.; 31~'; 4mo 77% 13~o 53~o 
~ 
Chi Square 3.61 8.11 4.88 3.43 9.2 
\.J1 Deyrees of Freedom 2 2 2 2 4 \D 
OJ 
Siynificance 0.16 0.02 0.09 0.33 0.05 
them. Tables 17.25 and 17.26 build on these representative case studies 
and show the evidence LHAs had of what these property dealers bought and 
who they were. First, Table 17.25 confirms the case study evidence for all 
the LHAs, in particular the significance of acquisition for capital gain 
assisted by grant aid in all LHAs where there was property dealing on any 
scale. It also shows the significance, in the areas of greatest activity, 
of improvement areas and of the practice of buying properties with 
enforcement notices. Table 17.26 confirms the importance of new, large 
builder companies in all LHAs where there is evidence of speculative 
buying up of tenanted property on a significant scale. 
Property Speculation and Local Authority Policy 
It is also possible to examine the association between the scale of buying 
and the policies being applied by LHAs. Table 17.27 lists seven policies 
and shows the proportion of local authorities where there was significant 
buying according to the type of authority and whether or not the policy 
was being applied in those authorities. As can be an ticipa ted from the 
preceding analysis buying is more significant in partnership and programme 
authorities than in all other authorities but it also shows that buying is 
most significant amongst those of the former LHAs still declaring statu-
tory improvement areas, with fewest grant restrictions, with "tough" 
enforcement policies and high standards. 
More detailed analysis of this data taking region as well as type of 
authority into account reveals that in the three northern regions 
significant speculative buying can be found in all types of authority 
though it is at its greatest in partnership and programme authorities 
carrying through the policies and practice listed in Table 17.27. In the 
two Midlands regions speculative buying is restricted to the partnership 
and programme authorities including those where "tough" policies are not 
being pursued, and there is no active buying outside these authorities. 
The evidence suggests, therefore, that speculative buying and improvement 
of tenanted property is happening in many LHAs but is at its most 
significant in the main inner city LHAs especially those that pursue 
active policies of enforcing repair and improvement standards. In other 
words a "proactive" high standards approach is closely associated, not 
only with a higher level of improvement activity (judged by grants 
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Table 17.27 PERCENTAGE OF LHAs WHO ESTIMATED THAT BUYING OF TENANTED PROPERTY WAS SIGNIFICANT,* BY TYPE OF POLICY 
Type of LHA/Did policy 
apply in the authorities 
Policy applies P & P+ 
Other 
Policy DNA P & P 
Other 
Notes 
eo Q) 
.... rJl 
<:( C 
0 
"'0 .~ 
Q)-+-l 
~ eo 
C .... 
.,.., eo 
-+J .-1 
C (.) 
o Q) 
uo 
62~6 (8/ 
10% (10) 
23% (13) 
25~6 (8) 
Q) 0'1 >. 
..-; C 0 (.) 
Ll .~ -+-l .~ 
>,CO C .-1 
.... ..-; .~ rJl 0 co·~ ct.--+-l CL 
c eo o c c 
o > .~ 0 eo cu 
. ,.., <:( 
-+-l-+J(.) .... > 
-+-l c (.) 0'1 .,.., rJl 
Q) rJl co .~ -+-l 
-+-l<:( 
.... -+-l ........ 0... (.)<:( (.) C 0'1 -+J Q) (.) rJl CO:::C 
rJl co rJl(')rJl<:( 0 
.,.., .... o Q) x .~ ...... 
.... C 
Or.!l z .... Q)"'OU'l CL .~ 
38% (13) 62% (8) 43% (14) 
Im6 (10) In6 (6) 28% (7) 
3 7~6 (8) 23~6 (13) 28?6 (7) 
20% (101) 14% (14) 8?6 (12) 
* i.e. More than 5 per cent estimated to have changed hands since 1980 
+ P & P = partnerhsip and programme LHAs 
t ( ) = Number of LHAs in category 
>. 0 ((J 
.-1-+-l"'O Q) .... 
rJl rJl .... C co -+-l 
Q) <:( cu 0"'0 rJl (.).....; > C -+-l'~ C 0 
.~ U1.~ 0 o -+-l co U 
-+-l -+-l ceo-+-l 
oCCOo(j-+-l .,.., rJl rJl 
z·,..,·,.., C rJl-+-l 
"2+ -+-l ((J.,.., Q) 0 III 
.... "'0 .,.., <:( co o 0'1 u eoo 
. ~ Q) C :::c rl "'0 III .... "'00 
co > .~ -l 0.. C 0 co 
0.. .... E <:( t.- eo 
'" Q)Q)ct.-o :::CCC -+-l .:j" 
Cl::rJlOO(') -l 0 III U14-6 
44% (16) 41% (17) 58~6 (12) 
21% (14) 1 7~6 (6) m6 (12) 
20% (5) 25~6 (4) 1l?6 (9) 
0?6 (6) 14?6 (14) 37?6 (8) 
awarded), but also by a thriving market in tenanted properties as property 
dealers buy them up for improvement. This confirms what Martin argued 
from his earlier evidence: that an enforcement led high standards policy 
can succeed, both by encouraging some existing landlords to take up 
grants, but also by encouraging other existing landlords to sell up to new 
investors whose whole strategy involves dealing in cheap tenanted prop-
erty, subsidised improvement, and subsequent capital gain upon vacant 
possession (Martin, 1983). 
Table 17.28 shows the relevant statistics on enforcement notices and 
grants according to the scale of speculative buying. It will be seen that 
there is greater enforcement and grant activity in areas where there is 
significant buying and detailed analysis revealed that these relationships 
were strongest amongst "northern" partnership and programme LHAs. That is 
not to say that high levels of enforcement are the cause of property 
speculation, nor vice versa, but that inner city areas of private rented 
housing offer conditions that are conducive to minimising the risks of 
property dealing and that active property dealing enables tough 
enforcement policies to be successfully implemented at high standards. Not 
surprising therefore that 70 per cent of LHAs considered that these 'new' 
landlords were more willing that eXisting ones to carry out repairs and 
improvements. 
Table 17.29, showing the correlation coefficients of the scale of 
speculative buying with policy inputs and outputs, confirms these 
relationships, particularly in inner city partnership and programme areas 
and especially in the northern regions, whereas for other LHAs the 
evidence suggests that (what little buying there is) is more associated 
with low than high standard LHAs and with high levels of improvement 
activity in 1980 than in 1985. The evidence in the table is confirmed by 
the partial correlation coefficients between grants activity and buying 
activity holding the number of notices constant. For all LHAs the 
coefficient is 0.01 in 1980 but 0.51 in 1985 reinforCing the impression 
that property dealing has become an increasing factor in improvement. 
Finally it should be noted that no statistical relationship was found 
between levels of buying or variations in improvement activity and rents, 
capital values, nor returns on investment. The latter was calculated with 
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Tahle 17.28 IMPROVEMENT AND REPAIRS NOTICES AND GRANTS 
PER 'ODD UNFURNISHED PRIVATE RENTED HOUSES 
Significant Buying 
Not Significant 
Significant Buying 
Not Significant 
1975 
123** 
27 
8 
9 
1980 
Notices Served 
135** 
29 
Grants Awarded 
13** 
6 
1985 
134** 
32 
48* 
27 
Notes ** Different significant at 0.05 level (2 tail 't' test) 
* Different significant at 0.1 level 
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Table 17.29 PEARSON CORREL~TION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN PROPORTION OF 1985 UNFURNISHED STOCK 
CHANGING HANDS AND LHA POLICY 
Partnership & - North 
Prograllime LHAs - All 
Other 
All 
Notes 
~Cost of LHAs standards 
(b) Grant per '000 stock 
COST85(a) GRNT80(b) 
.24 .61* 
.36** .52* 
.44** .56** 
.01 .52** 
(c) Repair + Improvement Notices per '000 stock 
(d) DUfllmy 1 = Notices served on Initiative/Complaint 
(e) DUfllmy 1 = NegotIation Rare/Combined with enforcement 
* Significant at 0.1 0.05 
** Signi ficant at ~ 0.05 
I- Dummy from LHA estimates: ~ 5~~ = 1 Others = 0 
GRNT85(b) NOT80(c) NOT85(c) 
.57** .50* .46* 
.61** .39* .37* 
.02 -.06 
.35** .47** .40** 
o = Rarely served 
o = Lots of negotiation 
ENFORCE~d) NEGOTIA-
MENT TlON 
.41* .18 
.21 .13 
.27 .03 
.24* .20 
Table 17.30 FAIR RENTS, CAPITAL VALUES, GROSS RENTAL RETURNS, 
AND RATES OF RETURN ON PROPERTY DEALING IN THE LHAs BY REGION 
Region 
Beacons Data North Yorkshire & North West East Midlands West Midlands All 
Hurnberside 
Rent £ ~ 
Unimproved 1981 300 292 240 297 327 280 
Unimproved 1986 455 444 373 440 473 425 
Improved 1981 617 617 527 563 630 579 
Improved 1986 924 949 804 907 972 896 
Vacant Possession 
~ltal Value £ 
cr- Urlilllproved 1981 3450 3845 4184 5725 5280 4456 0 
.t::- Unimproved 1986 10000 7114 5781 9170 7750 7451 
Improved 1981 9525 11563 12046 14562 1.2300 12193 
Improved 1986 15375 16023 15602 18640 :4400 16139 
Gross Returns* 
Unimproved 1981 8.92 8.22 5.72 5.78 6.33 6.78 
Unimproved 1986 4.83 6.76 6.48 5.68 6.91 6.29 
Improved 1981 6.49 5.49 4.46 4.10 5.22 4.96 
Improved 1986 6.08 6.12 5.17 5.01 6.80 5.68 
Return on Propertyi 
Dealing 307 456 411 316 393 392 
Notes 
* Annual Rent as a percentage of vacant possession capital value 
i Discounted rent and capital gain as a percentage of acquisition and improvement costs 
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Table 17.31 REGRESSION ANALYSIS: DEPENDENT VARIABLE GRANT PER 'ODD 
UNFURNISHED PRIVATE RENTED HOUSES 
All LHAs 
Beta (t) 
1. Grants in 1980 
LANOT80 . 72 (6. 12) ** 
BUY+ 
.05 (0.46) 
COST80 -.18 (-1.90)* 
R2 (adjusted) .63 
F 25.08** 
2. Grants in 1985 
LANOT 85 .26 (1.89)* 
3UY+ 
.53 (4.04)** 
COST 85 .09 (0.73) 
R2 (adjusted) .41 
F 10.35** 
Notes 
---
** Significant at 0.05 
* Significant at 0.05 0.1 
Partnership & 
Programme 
Beta (t) 
.78 (6.00)** 
.17 (1.32) 
-.01 (-0.03) 
.74 
22.57** 
.32 (1.50) 
.48 (2.51)** 
-.01 (0.14) 
.38 
5.16** 
+ Dummy: 1 = ~ 5~~ of unfurnished property changed 
since 1980; 0 = < 5% of unfurnished property changed 
Other LHAs 
Beta (t) 
.15 (3.70)** 
--89 (-22.7) ** 
.98 
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-.56 (-2.16) 
.29 (1.31) 
-.25 (-0.95) 
.38 
3.24** 
data from the 1981 and 1986 DoE Beacon's exercise where Rent Officers 
estimated Fair Rents and Capital Values of unimproved and improved 
property whose size, condition and location was specified. Statistics on 
rents and capital values, for each LHA were taken from the Beacon data for 
the rent registration area within which the LHA was located. Returns were 
calculated on the basis that a Beacon property was acquired in 1981, 
improved during 1983 and sold in 1986. The net present value of the 
gross returns was estimated using a 10 per cent discount rate on the 
annual rent stream and the 1986 capital value. The rate of return was 
calculated as a percentage that the gross returns were of the 1981 capital 
value and the discounted cost of improving to the LHA's standards in 1983. 
The averages for each region are listed in Table 17.30. 
To summarise this section, Table 17.31 lists the results of a regression 
analysis designed to identify the extent to which enforcement, property 
dealing and standards explained the amount of improvement, measured by the 
number of grants in relation to the size of the sector in each LHA. It 
confirms the conclusions reached earlier about the importance in 1980 of 
"tough" enforcement policies in partnership and programme areas and of 
standards in other areas. It also shows how speculative dealing had 
become more important in partnership and programme areas by 1985 compared 
with 1980. In other words where LHAs adopt a negotiatory stance their 
success will be a function of the costs landlords incur. Where grants 
reduce significant proportions of these costs, as happened after 1980, 
negotiations can work. Where LHAs are prepared to enforce standards they 
can be successful, but this success is partly associated with, if not 
dependent on new investors buying up property 'flushed out' from 
longstanding owners by the statutory enforcement of standards. 
r.provement Grants: Reforms to the Syste. 
Only 5 per cent of LHAs did not want any changes to the improvement grant 
system. The overwhelming impression given by the officers interviewed was 
that they wanted a reduction in complexity, an increase in capital 
alloca tions , and a grea ter sensi ti vi ty of the system of eligible cos t 
limits to house size and regional variations in costs. Interviewees were 
asked quite explicitly about the change which would be of most help to 
them in dealing with unsatisfactory physical conditions in private rented 
houses (i.e. not houses in multiple occupation). The replies suggested 
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that what was to be welcomed in relation to encouraging private landlords 
to improve was also to be welcomed in relation to owner occupiers and vice 
versa. With some limited exceptions the changes LHAs wanted involved 
"fine tuning" of the existing system rather than radical restructuring. 
There was for example almost universal disapproval of the Government's 
1985 proposal to introduce equity sharing loans, most LHAs arguing that-
since this would involve landlords sharing their capital gains with the 
LHA, it would undermine much of their investment strategy and, therefore, 
the success of the LHA policy to get disrepaired private rented houses 
improved. The great majority of LHAs wanted therefore to retain the 
system of grants that had developed since the war, whilst reducing its 
complexity - the latter considered to be particularly important in 
relation to persuading longstanding landlords with one or two properties 
to carry through grant aided work. 
The single most often mentioned reform was to increase but more 
particularly to index, eligible cost limits. This was identified by half 
the LHAs, and was raised more by partnership and programme authorities, 
that is those taking active steps to enforce high standards and with 
experience of property dealers engaged in reinvestment. Included in such 
a reform would be costs related to size and location of dwellings i.e. 
regionally indexed cost limits, and many LHAs considered that this would 
remove barriers preventing longer established landlords responding to 
notices on larger properties at times of building cost inflation. 
The second most often mentioned change was to scrap the different 
categories of grant, introducing a unitary grant in place of the eXisting 
improvement, intermediate and repairs grants. Whilst this was raised by 
at least a third every category of authority it was particularly mentioned 
by LHAs actively enforcing standards. LHAs observed that the system was 
unnecessarily complex and was especially confusing for small landlords to 
understand. Large landlords, especially property dealers, understood the 
system and indeed well advised ones knew how to exploit it. Officers gave 
examples of this, such as property dealers submitting applications in the 
names of low paid labourers on Family Income Supplement to enable them to 
get 90 per cent hardship grants. 
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Unitary grants, as conceived by many of the LHAs, would not confine 
expenditure on the repairs element of a grant to predetermined limits. A 
number of LHAs observed that the introduction of unitary grants might be 
detrimental to effective targetting at times when grants had to be 
rationed. To obviate this problem it was suggested that a unitary grant 
be available to aid work up to a standard higher than that at present 
specified for a (discretionary) improvement grant, but that payment of 
grant to install defined amenities for the first time and to remedy 
serious and structural disrepair would be mandatory. Payment for other 
work to achieve the full standard would be at the discretion of the LHA. 
Whilst not all LHAs were explicit about this, many suggested that LHAs 
would pay a higher percentage in grant for work to comply with the 
mandatory elements of the standard than they would pay on the 
discretionary elements. If this higher percentage were determined by the 
LHA it would enable the authority to pitch grant aid at whatever level was 
needed to get landlords (especially the more long standing ones with only 
a few properties and inadequate liquid capital) to improve to standards 
beyond the mandatory level. Some 15 per cent of LHAs explicitly endorsed 
the AMA proposals here - for 50 per cent (75 per cent in improvement 
areas) grant entitlement towards all elements of a revised standard with 
discretion for a LHA to increase this. (AMA, 1986). 
An essential ingredient of a unitary grant system must be to couple it to 
enforcement procedures. Most LHAs suggested that since a revised standard 
(a number explicitly endorsing the AMA' s proposed Habitation Standard) 
would have mandatory and discretionary elements, mandatory grant would be 
available for work to comply with improvement and repair notices. However 
a number of LHAs, almost all partnership and programme authorities, 
Suggested that grant be mandatory whenever the conditions of a house fell 
short of the elements specified as mandatory in the standard for a unitary 
grant, not solely when amenities were missing or enforcement notices 
served. By contrast a third of LHAs wanted mandatory grant removed, 
particularly those who considered it 'encouraged' landlords to neglect 
property in the anticipation of enforcement action and a mandatory grant. 
Behind all these proposals lies the need for more resources, including 
unlocking capital receipts. Indeed for some authorities this was the 
crucial change needed, given the manner in which grants - and therefore 
608 
discretionary enforcement action - had had to be rationed, especially 
since 1983/84. Nonetheless the introduction of higher standards and the 
right to grant aid whenever properties fell short of standards would 
increase demand and greater expenditure was needed. 
Most LHAs focussed their comments on indexing, unitary grants, mandatory 
elements of this and resources and took the view that assistance should 
take the form of grants. Only five LHAs wanted assistance to take the 
form of either subsidised loans or annuity grants, again endorsing the 
AMA's recommendations about the latter. It was also suggested that 
payment of loans to top up grants should be mandatory whenever grant aid 
was paid to cover the mandatory elements of a revised standard. All who 
mentioned these reforms actively pursued the enforcement of high 
standards. One LHA wanted to scrap all "one-off" grants, confining 
financial assistance to block repair and enveloping schemes on grounds of 
value for money. 
Very few (only 3 in all) wanted to remove the conditions which currently 
apply to grants given to private landlords. Those that did thought they 
reduced incentives to carry out work and in particular made it more 
difficult for LHAs to get landlords to do work to a higher standard with a 
discretionary grant than that which could be specified in notices with a 
mandatory grant. These views were outweighed by those who wanted 
conditions "tightened up", including those who wanted the imposition of 
conditions about terms of tenancies and rents to be made mandatory 
everywhere. Indeed a number offered the observation that removing 
conditions would be a 'speculators' charter'. 
A quarter of LHAs, especially those who were not partnership and programme 
authorities were keen to see clarification in the law about approved lists 
of builders and to include specific items of work in a revised standard, 
especially electrical wiring and central heating (in their own right). 
What is noticeable is that none of these authorities had experience of 
significant property dealing and curiously themselves (or rather their 
members) set low standards. This was much less of an issue in areas where 
property companies and builders were active, confirming the willingness of 
these "new landlords" to do work to a high standard. 
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CBlPTER 18 
REFORMING THE SYSTEM OF EHFORCEHEIIT AIID GJWIT AID 
Introduction 
This chapter describes various proposals for the reform of the system of 
enforcement and grant aid. It begins with a summary of the sample LHA's 
proposals. It then enumerates the current government's proposals, as well 
as the proposals of independent commentators, professional bodies and the 
local authority associations. 
Government's proposals. 
suamry of SimPle LBAs proposals 
It concludes with an evaluation of the 
The evidence from the 41 LHAs shows that, in the face of landlords' 
reluctance to invest because of rent regulation and the low incomes of 
their tenants, improvement and repair can be stimulated by enforcement and 
grant aid. Moreover new builder landlords are bringing significant 
proportions of the stock up to standard for speculative gain. However 
enforcement has an independent effect in its own right in getting 
landlords to improve. The correlation between enforcement and grant rates 
is high, even in LHAs without the experience of builder landlords. LHAs' 
ability to take action depends, however on the adequacy of their capital 
and staffing. In recent years, grants and the declaration of new statu-
tory improvement areas have had to be rationed, thereby undermining the 
success of enforcement strategies. There is, for example, a high 
correlation between the number of notices served, the number of statutory 
improvement areas, and the number of dwellings within them, especially in 
LHAs taking the initiative in enforcement. However there is also some 
evidence that LHAs are restricting the enforcement of standards to prevent 
demands for mandatory grants they cannot meet. Meanwhile, the curtailment 
of improvement area declarations cuts out the one important means all LHAs 
have for identifying substandard private rented houses. The 1981 English 
house condition survey noted, for example, that 21 per cent of private 
rented houses were in potential GIAs or HAAs that had been neither 
declared nor programmed, compared with 6 and 2 per cent respectively in 
declared and proposed areas (DoE, 1983, Table 74). 
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Whilst LHAs did not advocate major structural changes to the interrelated 
system of enforcement and grant aid, they did want to see significant 
amendments of the current framework. On enforcement they wanted an 
increase in the fitness standard, speedier procedures, duties to do work 
in default and fine non-complying landlords, powers to make notices 
mandatory on current owners (as a remedy for multi-company landlords 
switching ownership of their holdings to evade responsibility), 
clarification of the definition of reasonable expense and more powers to 
recover default costs. On grant aid they wanted a system of unitary 
grants with indexed eligible expense limits (related to region and to 
property type), and with mandatory and discretionary elements, LHA 
discretion to determine appropriate percentages (within limits) and 
tighter conditions. 
The level of activity revealed by official statistics and by this survey 
is inadequate in relation to the scale of the problem of substandard 
housing, albeit stimulated by the 1980 Act and by the speculative 
investment of builder landlords. What reforms therefore can achieve 
increased activity in the unfurnished long term subsector? Any proposals 
for reform must realistically recognise, first, that available resources 
will be limited and, second, that "buyout" (municipalisation or social 
ownership) strategies are unfeasible both in pOlitical as well as in 
resource terms (Maclennan, 1986). 
Current Government Proposals 
The Government have legislated for a partial deregulation of private 
renting (DoE, 1987a). The deregulation proposals and their likely impact 
are discussed in detail in Chapter 20. In general terms, deregulation, as 
such, will not affect the unfurnished long term subsector insofar as 
existing tenants will remain protected and stronger powers are being 
introduced to prevent their harassment. The Government are right to do 
this. Private renting does not have a permanent role to play in housing 
these long term tenants. Landlords who bought at sitting tenant value are 
earning good returns on this and deregulation in the interest of giving 
them competitive returns through increased market rents is not justified. 
Nonetheless, with the exception of those who are property dealers few 
landlords are prepared voluntarily to maintain, let alone improve their 
holdings. 
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Proposals for reform need to be evaluated in the light of the efficiency, 
and effectiveness with which they get conditions improved for eXisting 
tenants, whilst at the same time expecting that the sector will continue 
to decline. 
The Government's 1985 Green Paper had six proposals of direct relevance 
to this question (DoE, 1985). First, public investment was to be better 
target ted and used only to remedy subs tandard housing where government 
intervention was justified. 
revised (e.g. revising the 
incorporating an internal wc 
Second, the fitness standard was to be 
criteria about repair 
and fixed bath, but 
and dampness, and 
omitting internal 
arrangement as criteria) and applied on the lines of the Scottish tolera-
ble standard so that dwellings failing to comply with anyone criterion 
fail to meet the standard. A new "target" standard for discretionary 
assistance was to be defined. Third, LHAs would be required to deal with 
unfitness within twelve months of its determination. Fourth, the 
criterion of reasonable expenses was to be dispensed with. In its place 
LHAs would have to consider all the options open to them in improving or 
demolishing an unfit dwelling and owners would have rights to appeal. 
Fifth, there was to be no compulsory power other than in relation to 
unfitness. All existing enforcement powers would be combined on the lines 
of repair notice procedures and owners would be unable to serve purchased 
notices. Sixth, grant aid for landlords letting on regulated tenancies at 
Fair Rents would be mandatory for all dwellings which were below the 
fitness standard. Help to attain the higher target standard would be 
discretionary and in the form of equity sharing loans. Subsidy therefore 
was to be limited to cases where landlords owned dwellings below the 
fitness standard. These proposals came in for considerable criticism, 
particularly in respect of equity sharing loans and the perceived 
reduction in the fitness standard. There was, however, support for the 
principles of simplification and targetting of assistance. 
Revised proposals about standards and grant aid were issued in 1987 (DoE 
1987b). They contain further modification of the new fitness and target 
standards. (See Figure comparing standards.) The new fitness standard 
will be applied so that houses or flats falling below anyone of the 
criterion will be unfit. The long standing principle that unfitness could 
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SlANDARDS 
Current r i tness St"nuaru 
15.604 Housing Act 198~) 
In determining for allY of lhe purposes of this Acl 
h th'r premises 'He ullf,l fur human habItatIon 
w e de shall be had lo lheH ('ulldilion in respecl reyar 
uf the followi/ly ",,,tlers -
repair 
slabilily 
freedom frum damp 
inlernal arranyemenl 
natural lighting 
ventilatiun 
water supply 
drainage and sanitary conveniences, facilities 
for the prepfHalion and cuuking of food and for 
lhe disposal uf wasle waler. 
and the premises shall be deemed to. be unfil if, alld 
0I.1y if, lhey are so far defecllve Hl one or more of 
lhese mallers lh"l lhey are nol reasonably sUIlable 
for occupation In lhaL condlllOn. 
Current "10 pui lit sland1lrd" fur improvement wI'ant.s 
---r.J46!l HOUSJIIg-Acl l'JUJ alld Circular 21/80) 
(b) 
(c) 
A dwelling "llains lhe required standard if -
it is prOVIded wilh 1111 the slandard 1Imenities 
for the exclusive use of Its occupants; 
it is in reasollable repair; 
conforms wilh requiremellls with respect to 
construclioll alld physicLil cundllions and 
the provision of servIce's and amenilies as 
mlly for lhe lime being be specI fled by lhe 
Secretary of Stale. (lhese are thal the 
dwelling musl) 
(1) 
( 2) 
(3) 
be subslLlnlially free from damp; 
have Lldequale natural lIghtIng and 
venlIlalion in each habilable room; 
have adequat.e and safe provision 
throughoul for arll ficial liyhtinlj, and have 
suffiClelll eleclrlc sockel ouUels for lhe safe 
"/ld proper fUllcllun II.g 0 f domesl ic appliances; 
(d) 
(4) 
( ~) 
(6) 
(7) 
(B) 
(9) 
(10) 
be provided wilh adequate drainage 
f"cililies; 
be III a slable slruclural condition; 
have satisf"clory inlernal ' 
a r r anljCmen t 
have satisfactory f!!(,llilies for 
pI'eparJng alld cuukll'Y fuuu; 
be providcd with adequale facililies 
for healing; 
have proper proviSIOn for the storage 
of fuel (where Ilecessary) and for 
lhe sloraye of refuse; 
fulf i 1 defined requi remellts for 
thermal illsulaliun in a roof space 
't is likely lo provide satlsfaclory housing ~CcOflKllodallun for a period of 30 years. 
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\ 
Green Paper 1985 
(Cmnd 9513) 
A Fitness for Humall Habitalion 
A dwelling shall be reyarded as fit for hUlllan 
habitation if, in the opinioll of the local 
authority, il:-
i. is free from dangerous structural disrepair 
or instability; 
ii. is free from dampness so pervasive as lo be 
a threat to lhe health of lhe occupant; 
iii. has adequale natural lighting and 
ventilation in all lIIain rooms; 
iv. has an adequate piped supply of wholesome 
water available within the dwelling; 
v. has within lhe dwelling satisfaclury 
facilities for the preparalion Ilnd 
cooking of food including a sink wilh a 
supply of hot and cold waler; 
vi. has a wr, for lhe exclusive use of lhe 
occupanl, suilably localed wilhin lhe 
dwelliny; 
vii. 
viii. 
has a fixed balh or shower provided wilh a 
satisfaclory supply of hal and cold wHlcr; 
has an effective system for the drainage 
and disposal of foul, wasle and surface waLer. 
Targel SLandard 
A dwelling shall be held La meet Lhe six poinl 
standard if it 
i. 
Ii. 
iii. 
iv. 
v. 
vi. 
is fit for human hHbilation; 
is in reasonable repair; 
has a wash hand basin with an adequHte 
supply of hot and cold water; 
has satisfactory eleclric wiring and 
artificial lighting; 
has adequate facilities for heating; and 
is likely to have a useful life of at least 
30 years 
("""ul till IOn Pllper 19B7 
A Hev) "cd f i tnes" Stal,dllrd 
A huuse ur f Ilil "ha II be reYllcded as fit fOl' hUllllin 
to .. tJltullUlI if ill the opinion of the local aulhority, 
It: 
(v) 
( VII) 
is slcuclurlilly slilble; 
IS free from serious disrepair; 
IS free from damplless prejudicial to lhe 
hellllh 0 f the occupant; 
hilS IIdequllte nalurlll liyhliny and ventilalion; 
hm; 1111 IIdequllle piped survey of wholesome 
waleI' IIvailablej 
hilS salisfaclory facililies within il for the 
prcparlllion of food, incloding II sink wilh a 
"lIli"fllclory supply of hot lind cold Willer; 
hll" a suilably located we for the exclusive 
u"e of lhe occupllnl; 
hus II sui labl y located fixed bllth or ShOWel' 
lI11d WHeh hH"d bueill prov ided with II aal:i.sfuclory 
supply of hul and cold waler; 
hlHl 1111 effective system for the drainage of foul 
mId Wllste water. 
U I iJfgct Slandllrd 
A hUlJ~c 
II It: 
(J) 
( III 
(II J) 
( IV) 
(v) 
(v Il 
or fliit shllll be held lo meel the tsryel "llllldlird 
meel" the fillless stllndllrd; 
i" In rCllsollsble repair; 
hus slIlisfllclory eleclric wiring and artificial 
I I yhlllll)j 
tms IIdequule facililies for heating; 
hilS IIdequute thermal insuluUon; 
IS lIkely lo have a useful life of al lea"t 
30 yellrs. 
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Hllbi lulion Slllmllird (AHA 19B6) 
• I. Free fl'om sub"lonl.llIl or !lIlJlli ficllnl dlBI'Cpllil' 
(includiny electriclIl, yuu o'u. Willer Bupply 
facllilies); 
"2. is subulantially free from <lamp II.ICJ nul prall., 
lo condenallllon; 
"J. hSB adeQullte flalurlll lind artificilll I il,lhliny alld 
vlllltilulion in all roomo Itlll] circulllllUII al'cau; 
4. haa adeQuale splice helltlllYj 
"5. has un udeQuute piped uupply of wholesome wult!r 
wi lh ill the huuue I 
* 6. hilS wilhill the house sullfjlaclury fOClllllUs 
fol' the prepal'IIll01l lind cuuklllY uf fuud, 
illCludill'J II tHnk wllh u supply uf hut IIlIll 
cold wlltur; 
* 7. hall a we for lhu UBe of the occupanl, suilably 
locut ed III the 11' dwell illY j 
" B. 
" 9. 
"10. 
hoo S suilably loculed fixed balh 01' IIhowor, 
pI'uvided wllh II fjullofoclory lIupply ur hUl 
slld cold wollll'j 
hos a uuilobly loculud Wllllh hlllld bUol1I With UI' 
adeQUllle 1I11pply uf hol ulld eold wutel'l 
huo all uffeclivu syslilln for the druinaye olld 
disposul of foul wlIste ulld fj'JI'ful'u wul"r; 
"II. iuuo orrunyed Illterllully as loulluuru the surely 
of the occuplIlIl; 
*12. hus 1I0lillfoclory thermul I1luulutloll ulld Oil 
udequole ovurall elltlryy perfurmance; 
D. hilS uatiufllclory soulld insulutlOll; 
"14. is free from prllgresoivc lIIulolHllty; 
"15. IIhllll, whanuver pructlcuble, havll 8 liufe 
e I ecll' Icul uUPIi I y alld lIIulu 11 Ullllll; 
16. iu UQ lucllled that tho imltl",hlllu ellvirOl~lIlul 
rucloru are luleroblu; 
.. 
17. lhu habilable roolllu !lhllll rompriull u mlllinlum Sllu 
oa upec if lod by the OtlpUl'tlllellt uf lho (IlV II'lIll1l1elll; 
18. iB rruc from noxiouu or hUluroouli BublilanC'fJu. 
* mandulol'y yranl Illli I llenlont 
be due to a combination of several deficiencies, each minor in themselves, 
has been abandoned, in preference to an approach whereby unfitness depends 
on significant shortcomings on anyone criterion. In effect the standard 
in respect of some elements has been lowered, although in respect of 
amenities, the effect is to significantly strengthen the standard. 
It is evident that the aim of the proposals is to concentrate public 
expenditure on work where public intervention is justified and for which 
private finance is unavailable. A single unified grant (making no 
distinctions between repairs and improvement) will be available to bring 
houses up to the fitness standard. There will be no eligible expense 
limit for work to this standard. This will be a mandatory grant for owner 
occupiers but it will only be available to landlords on a discretionary 
basis, provided they let on regulated or on new style assured or shorthold 
tenancies. To ensure work is subsidised only where justified, detailed 
specification will be built into grants about the work needed to remedy 
unfitness. Grant aid will also be available for the higher target standard 
(including repair work, insulation, heating and rewiring). Grant aid will 
probably be subject to eligible expense limits only in the case of 
discretionary grants, whilst the amount of grant will be subject to a test 
of the resources available to landlords to do the work themselves. The 
intention is to assess how much of the cost can be recovered from 
increased rental income (ie in supporting a loan), the balance being given 
in grant. Grant will be repaid if dwellings are sold within five years. 
The 1987 proposals suggested that either the Rent Officer or LHA would 
determine how much rent is available for this. It was unclear whether 
the test was to be related only to the dwelling in question or to a wider 
test of the wider resources available to a landlord from other dwellings 
(if any) or assets. A further consultation paper on the test of resources 
was issued early in 1989 (DoE, 1989b). It is proposed that LHAs should 
have power to assess how far higher rents enable landlords to recoup 
repair and improvement costs. They will assess the shortfall and decide 
how much grant is needed. They will be able to consul t Rent Officers 
about prevailing rents and the extent to which these give satisfactory 
returns on investments. They will also be able to take landlords' other 
income from property and other assets into account. 
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These proposals, amended or otherwise, are to be incorporated in the Bill 
on Local Government and Housing to be introduced in 1989. In the 
meantime, the Government have issued a circular emphasising to LHAs the 
importance of targetting current grant aid so that scarce public funds are 
used in a justified way (DoE, 1988b). Although eligible expenditure 
limits have been increased, the priority category for eligible expense 
limits and the percentage of 75 per cent for discretionary grants has been 
withdrawn from houses without all amenities. The Government believes 
that scarce expenditure is being used to carry out "less essential" 
discretionary works on these dwellings to which higher cost limits and 
grant rates apply. Intermediate grant at the higher rate will continue to 
be available for this essential work. Alternatively landlords can do all 
the work including the "less essential items" at the non priority rate. 
Finally, it should be remembered that the Government has already modified 
LHAs powers to enforce repairs as a consequence of sustained pressure 
during the Committee stage of the 1988 Housing Bill from Commons members 
of all parties who wanted to ensure that LHAs could effectively "police" 
standards, not the least those in the new deregulated sector. The Govern-
ment announced that it would introduce new clauses to: make it an offence 
not to comply with a repair notice; allow LHAs to initiate all types of 
enforcement notice; provide that the costs of work done in default is the 
responsibility of whoever owned the dwelling at the time work was done; to 
enable LHAs to carry out default sooner after commencing enforcement than 
is now possible; and to target grants at regulated rather than deregulated 
tenancies (House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, 1988). These were 
incorpora ted in the 1988 Act (see Chapter 16 for details). Once the 
proposed new grant framework becomes law there will be no mandatory grants 
consequent upon enforcement action. 
As an interim measure the Government have limited grant aid on mandatory 
grants under the current regime to 20 per cent of eligible expense, 
extending a principle established earlier in the same year for mandatory 
special grants. The government want landlords of new style assured 
tenancies to be able to apply for grants so that empty and 
disrepaired/unimproved dwellings will be brought into use. Because rents 
will be higher, it will be inappropriate to give assured tenancy landlords 
the current level of grant aid. Since it will be difficult to decide when 
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approving a grant whether the letting will subsequently be regulated or 
assured, the Government intend to limit all mandatory grants to the same 
20 per cent. LHAs will still be able to pay 90 per cent in cases of 
hardship where landlords of regulated tenancies are unable to finance the 
work. (DoE, 1988c) 
other proposals: independent com.entators on enforce.ent 
In concluding his assessment of the effectiveness of enforcement in the 
late 1970s Hadden looked for ways of making it easier for LHAs to achieve 
the standards they wanted without having to buy up private rented houses 
(Hadden, 1978). In his view a number of minor amendments would help to do 
this. Enforcement of improvement could be speeded up by abolishing 
provisional notices, replacing time and place meetings by a duty to hear 
representations, and by reducing the time limit for a purchase notice to 
be served. It would also be easier to achieve desirable repair standards 
if the distinction between repairs and improvements in discretionary 
improvement grants was removed. He also recommended amending the 
criterion for reasonable expense, replacing it with a current income test 
to establish if increased income would service a loan for net of grant 
costs. He also thought LHAs should examine their internal procedures 
(especially delegated powers) for commissioning default works and that 
they should be permitted to reclaim the cost of work done in respect of 
improvement notices from rents. 
These modifications would leave untouched, however, the problems Hadden 
had identified of overlapping procedures and standards. In recommending 
structural changes he suggested that there should be three standards with 
clearly defined aims. First a closing standard at which dwellings were no 
longer suited for occupation because they were prejudicial to health. LHAs 
would acquire any that could not be dealt with at reasonable expense. If 
alternatively they were closed and landlords brought them above the 
closing standard LHAs would nominate tenants. In this way landlords would 
be unable to neglect their properties as a deliberate means of securing 
vacant possession. Second, there would be a standard at which regular 
repair and maintenance would be enforced involving a simple procedure 
based upon the Public Health Act for either tenants or LHAs to secure any 
repairs needed to maintain dwellings at a standard of "reasonable tenanted 
repairs" (less restrictive than statutory nuisance but less wide ranging 
617 
than that included in the rehabilitation standards). Thirdly, there would 
be a standard reasonable for longer term rehabilitation pitched at the 
level LHAs would want to do if they had to do it in default. Grants must, 
therefore, enable this to be achieved. Reasonable expense would apply and 
would be determined by calculating if additional rents following 
improvements would service the loan needed after taking grant into 
account. If the expense proved not to be reasonable the grant could be 
raised (and the property charged) or the standard dropped (or alternative-
ly the LHA could acquire the property). 
When Hawke and Taylor came to review enforcement six years later, hardly 
any of Hadden's recommendations had been taken on board. They emphasised, 
however, that changes in LHA practice rather than in the statutory 
framework were needed e.g. to ensure default work was done effectively and 
speedily. In their view the Housing Act 1980 had brought about major 
improvements in grant aid thereby relegating enforcement in importance. 
Nevertheless they recommended repealing the reasonable expense criteria on 
(what are now) S.189 notices and making (what, again, are now) S.190s 
mandatory upon LHAs (Hawke and Taylor, 1984). 
otber proposals: professional institutes 
The Institution of Environmental Health Officers has recommended that the 
fitness standard be modified to incorporate the standard amenities and 
that the 10 point standard (for discretionary grants) should be the basis 
for compulsory improvement in statutory improvement areas (IEHO, 1981). It 
favours a single house renovation grant with index-linked cost limits 
related to size and local building costs. If landlords' rights to serve 
'counter purchase notices' are preserved, either LHAs should have the 
right to improve for sale (whilst rehousing tenants) or tenants the right 
to buy. The Institution has suggested, as an alternative to grant aid, 
providing landlords with annual deficit grants, offsetting any loss of 
increased rental income over approved revenue expenditure on repair and 
improvement. In its response to the 1985 Green Paper the Institution 
emphasised an underlying concern about paying mandatory grants on notices 
because this was tantamount to subsidising the worst landlords who 
deliberately neglected their property. LHAs, they felt, were becoming 
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increasingly reluctant to take action because of mandatory grant aid. In 
any case grants to landlords should be the subject of some form of means 
tests and conditional on letting at Fair Rents (IEHO, 1985b). 
The Royal Town Planning Institute argue that complex enforcement 
procedures create a pervasive delay in getting work done (RTPI, 1981). 
Whilst the fitness standard should be retained for statutory action to 
clear property, enforcement of standards should be to the 10 point 
standard, widening (what are now) S.189 and S.190 procedures to 
incorporate standard amenities, and allowing landlords to serve purchase 
notices on LHAs. LHAs would be ob liged to do default work within a 
defined period if landlords did not comply. The RTPI favours a single 
"unitary grant", mandatory only where notices are served, with LHAs 
empowered to fix appropriate percentages within a range of 30 to 100 per 
cent. Cost limits would be index linked and related to property type and 
region. 
other proposals: the local authority associations 
In its 1981 proposals the Association of Metropolitan Authorities also 
recommended including amenities within the fitness standards, using repair 
notice procedures to enforce this standard at the intermediate grant 
"reasonable" repair standard, allowing landlords to serve purchase 
notices and tenants to be represented at time and place meetings (AMA, 
1981). It also asked for vacant possession value to be explicitly built 
into the reasonable expense criteria, landlords fined for non compliance, 
and unitary grants to be the basis for grant aid. 
In its 1986 proposals it commends an 18 point Habitation Standard, 13 of 
which would give mandatory entitlement to grant aid. It is unashamed in 
its endorsement of this high standard, saying that it is the duty of 
Government to help people achieve their aspirations, not simply avoid 
unhealthy and hazardous conditions (AMA, 1986). The current and various 
proposed fitness standards are listed in the Figure. 
Whenever dwellings fell short of this standard, revised enforcement 
procedures would come into play. A time and place meeting would be held, 
notices served to enforce the standard (or less if agreed), mandatory 
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grant and loan would be paid (mandatory even if notices not served), LHAs 
would do any work in default and landlords would be fined where failing to 
respond to notices. 
Whenever dwellings were so far short of the standard that they were not 
suitable for continued occupation, and were incapable of repair at 
reasonable expense, they would be acquired. If they were capable of 
repair the landlord would have the option of serving a purchase notice as 
an alternative of doing the necessary works to remedy the problems. In 
both cases tenants would have the right to buy. 
The AMA continued to endorse the concept of a unitary grant, which did not 
distinguish repair from improvement work and was based upon regionally 
indexed cases for properties of different sizes. There would be a basic 
entit lement to a 50 per cent grant (raised at the LHA' s discretion) on 
mandatory items of the Habitation Standard, whatever the applicants means 
or the property value, provided it was let at a registered rent. However, 
as an alternative to "one off cash grants", the AMA has proposed Annuity 
Grants for landlords paid after regular monitoring by LHAs. "It may well 
attract responsible long term investment back into private renting." (AMA, 
1986, p.19) By implication it would prevent landlords capitalising upon 
publicly subsidised improvements when selling after five or seven years 
are up. 
By contrast, the Association of District Councils has supported the 
concept of capital value rents, alongside tax allowances channe lled to 
landlords who adhere to standards which are subject to regular LHA 
monitoring (ADC, 1987). It too proposes raising the fitness standard but 
not to the Habitation Standard of the AMA. It recommends mandatory grant 
for this baseline fitness standard with discretionary grants for standards 
in excess of this, together with low interest rate loans. SHAC - the 
London Housing Aid Centre - also argued in 
against making them mandatory, preferring 
test for grants paid to private landlords. 
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favour of a unitary grant, but 
instead an (unspecified) means 
(SHAC, 1981) 
The Government's objectives 
The Government's proposals reject the long held view that the country as a 
whole has an interest in ensuring the housing stock is kept in good 
condition (e.g. to the ten point standard). Conventionally it has been 
argued that individuals take too short term a view and place too little 
value on improvements that will benefit future as well as current 
occupants and generations. It has also been argued that decisions about 
investment depend on the conditions of neighbouring dwellings and that 
such externalities can prevent improvements taking place which bring both 
private and social benefits. These both make dwelling subsidies 
appropriate. As Whitehead argues, in a critique of these proposals, the 
Government appears to have rejected this view (Whitehead, 1985). Public 
funds are to be used only to assist those who cannot find the means to 
fund a minimum tolerable standard from their own purse (or rental income). 
What, then, is likely to be the impact of the government's proposals on 
the state of the long term unfurnished subsector of private rented 
housing? The three subsections which follow compare the Governments 
proposals with others, evaluate the government's plans and put forward an 
alternative means of improving and repairing this stock. 
The Governments proposals compared with others 
There is a measure of agreement about the need to simplify the mechanisms 
of grant aid. Unitary grant, removing the distinction between repairs and 
improvement will be welcomed and, because eligible expensive limits are 
effectively abolish, the failure to adopt index linking related to 
regional variations in costs for different property types will be an 
irrelevance. Whilst many outside Governments would prefer to maintain the 
current system of one-off cash grants, there is a recognition, not only 
that better targetting is required, but also that some landlords may 
receive unnecessarily large subsidies in relation to their returns and 
that others are subsidised, having deliberately run down their property. 
Insofar as this prevents enforcement action being taken, it is proper to 
consider limiting mandatory grants and distributing subsidy in relation to 
landlords' income. Thus the Government's proposed method of relating 
grant to rental income has affinities to the IEHO and AMA proposals for 
annual deficit and annuity grants. Indeed, whilst the Government's 
proposal resembles the pre 1989 basis for paying grant on Housing 
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Associations' capital schemes (without recouping any future rent 
surpluses) the IEHO and AMA schemes resemble Housing Associations' revenue 
deficit grants. 
There is also a measure of agreement about enforcement procedures taking 
into account the modifications the Government has already made in the 
Housing Act, 1988. In particular LHAs, will welcome the introduction of 
fines, the extension of their duty to deal with substandard housing, to do 
work in default, to combat the practices of those corporate landlords who 
switch properties between companies, and the proposed replacement of 
reasonable expense with a new code. Some will welcome the repeal of 
purchase notice procedures and mandatory grants, since they remove 
financial risk when taking action in cases where LHAs do not have the 
back-up of adequate capital resources. However, these latter two changes 
will not be wholly without flaws. In particular LHAs may be forced into 
more default work, with all its organisational and other costs. 
There will be widespread disagreement with the proposed new fitness 
standards. Whilst many will welcome the inclusion of standard amenities 
they will argue that the standard in other respects is too restrictive. 
Many would want to be able to enforce to the target standard with a less 
restricted definition of disrepair. The difference here is a clash of 
philosophy since the proposed standard represents a judgement by 
Government about the level at which public intervention and public 
expenditure is justified. Problems may arise if LHAs prove reluctant to 
do work in default to what they will regard as an inadequate standard. 
Neither will all LHAs support the removal of mandatory grants. The 
reasoning for this proposal is unclear, unless it can be shown that LHAs 
are reluctant to take enforcement action where they believe subsidising 
repairs of a 'bad' landlord to the tune of 75 per cent is an unjustified 
use of public funds. In removing mandatory grants the Government will 
create greater uncertainty about grant availability amongst potential 
investors. 
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Equity, Efficiency and Effectiveness 
How well do the proposals fare under the above criteria? 
On equity grounds the proposed system has some flaws. There is no 
guarantee that tenants of landlords in different LHAs will receive the 
same benefits. The discretionary basis for grants means that they could 
be distributed in an arbitrary and capricious manner, according to 
political as well as other priorities, some LHAs exercising discretion to 
award them, but others not. The system is also inequitable as between 
tenants and owner occupiers of below fitness houses, since the latter have 
rights to grant aid but the landlords of the former do not. This is not 
to say, of course, that the existing system is wholly equitable in these 
respects. The proposal to determine grant aid in relation to the extent 
to which rent income will pay for the work rather than, as now, a fixed 
cash sum is attractive on equity ground since it should not, in 
principle, prevent landlords from improving on the grounds that increased 
rent cannot cover landlords' net of grant costs. Thus tenants in the 
worst houses needing the greatest investment should benefit (no limit on 
eligible costs to eliminate unfitness is proposed) and if they are 
eligible, Housing Benefit will defray their increased rent, all other 
things being equal. Equity also depends on whether the "test of resources" 
is applied only in relation to individual dwellings or to a landlords' 
other assets (if any) and on how these tests are applied. 
On efficiency grounds, the new system has something to commend it compared 
with the existing one. In the latter, grant aid is not subject (except in 
cases of hardship) to a means test to determine how far work can be funded 
from private funds or loans paid for out of rental income. LHAs can use 
their ability to pay below the maximum for discretionary grants, but not 
on mandatory grant. There has always been the possibility therefore that 
public expenditure has been used to do work that could be done privately, 
and therefore less has been achieved overall for a given level of expendi-
ture. The proposed system will remove this possibility. It will also be 
more efficient if the Government's view that "non essential" work is 
currently being subsidised is correct. It is unlikely however that grants 
will be less under the new than the old system because of the test of 
resources. Prior to September 1988, a priority case for discretionary 
grant would get 75 per cent of £10,200 ie £7,650. On the assumption that 
the same costs were incurred rents might rise in net terms by £300 p.a. 
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(see Table 17.30). On a ten-year purchase this might service a £3,000 
loan from a LHA over 20 years thus requiring £7,200 in grant. Any savings 
must arise therefore from lowering costs through the redrafted fitness 
standard, administrative codes to ensure that grant aid is paid out only 
on specification items to eliminate unfitness, and bigger post improvement 
rent increases. It is assumed, in any case, that there will always be a 
budget constraint so rationing devices will continue to be needed (e.g. 
see DoE, 1988bh 
On effectiveness grounds, there must be doubts about the new system and a 
real risk that investment in eliminating bad conditions in private rented 
housing will fall rather than increase. Grant aid should be simple, 
easily understood, cheap and easy to administer, predictable to investors 
and provide an adequate incentive (given the risks and uncertainties of 
being a landlord) to get things done. It is evident from the research on 
LHAs reported in this paper that the current system does provide builder 
landlords or property dealers with incentives and that, combined with 
enforcement, more long standing landlords can be persuaded to improve. The 
current system meets many of the effectiveness criteria set out above. The 
new system meets fewer, but in providing a front end capital subsidy (with 
no obligation to repay except under reasonably predictable circumstances) 
it does at least provide greater incentives than a system of revenue 
subsidies whose continued existence cannot be guaranteed. 
It is simpler, with respect to combining all existing grants into one and 
effectively abolishing the distinction between repairs and improvement 
spending within eligible expense limits. It is however, less simple with 
respect to the amount of grant, the calculation of which will not be 
easily understood and will be harder to administer. Small, elderly 
landlords will find it less easy to comprehend. Already they lack access 
to capital and organisational skills. LHAs will require much more 
information (e.g. about rent) upon which to base decisions and a code of 
guidance to calculate grants. Different systems will be needed for 
individual, company and mul ti ownership landlords - unless the test of 
resources is applied only to the case in question. 
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It will also be less predictable in the sense that landlords can currently 
find out with relative ease what they are entitled to. This is especially 
relevant where property dealers are investigating potential purchases and 
appraising investments. It will be less predictable because grant aid 
will be discretionary and, because the amount of grant will be dependent 
on the test of resources, not on known appropriate percentages. This will 
create greater uncertainty. On the other hand the new system will also 
remove some of the risk, insofar as on the eligible costs of removing 
defined unfitness that cannot be funded from rent increases will be 
carried by local and central government. 
Much of the most recent reinvestment has been made by property dealers for 
speculative gain. Grant has shielded them from any residual valuation 
gaps between unimproved sitting tenant and improved vacant possession 
value. They appear to have gained good returns and LHAs reckon they are 
prepared to improve to higher standards than traditional landlords. 
Ul timately this stock will be transferred to owner occupation. In the 
meantime it is important, both for elderly tenants and for inner city 
neighbourhoods, that this investment dynamic is sustained. Whether the 
test of resources will do so depends in part on how allowance is made for 
risk (e.g. rent arrears, voids), management and maintenance costs, and 
uncertainty in calculating how much private finance can be raised for a 
given rent increase. It also depends upon whether any allowance is made 
for real rent increases and capital appreciation in determining this and 
at what rate of interest and terms landlords are able to borrow. The less 
is allowed for risk, management and uncertainty and the more account 1s 
taken of capital appreciation the lower will be the grant and the less the 
incentive to invest. 
Conclusions: A partnership tor iaprovement 
The following nine point plan is suggested as one alternative means of 
enlisting private sector finance to improve this long term subsector 
whilst it remains in the private rented sector, whilst accepting that it 
will continue to decline as landlords sell vacant units to owner 
occupiers. 
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1. The proposed fitness standard should be revised to incorporate less 
restrictive definitions of repairs, incorporate internal arrangements 
and thermal insulation. 
2. The code of guidance on renewal options proposed in the 1985 Green 
Paper should replace the reasonable expense criterion in determining 
how unfit housing should be dealt with. (DoE, 1985) This code 
should incorporate consideration of neighbourhood benefits. 
3. If current owners are prepared to meet the fitness standard, mandatory 
grant will be paid to cover the net cost of meeting the standard that 
cannot be serviced by loan taking increased rent and due allowance for 
risk, uncertainty, management and maintenance costs and capi tal 
appreciation into account. LHAs to advance the balance by way of 
interest only loan with principal as a charge on property where owners 
cannot raise the funds. 
4. Where owners cannot (or fail to) meet the fitness standard wi thin 
twelve months, the tenant will have the right to buy (and mandatory 
grant) or failing that, the LHA will, have the power to compulsorily 
acquire the property at sitting tenant value and sell it on at the 
same price either to a locally approved independent landlord or to a 
housing association, recouping its legal and other costs in the 
process. Where the latter are un wi lling to take on any of this 
property it will pass into the LHAs own housing stock. Tenants should 
be consulted at all stages (also in (3) above). 
5. LHAs will have a power to establish a register of independent private 
landlords for the purpose of transfers under (4) above. The intention 
is that these landlords will carry out a strategy of "buying out" 
existing landlords whose properties fall below the fitness standards 
and who are unable to improve them. Approval will be dependent, inter 
alia, on willingness to comply with a code of conduct about 
management, maintenance and letting policies. Regulation will be by 
LHA monitoring paid by licence fees. Approval will depend upon 
agreements about the temporary or permanent rehousing of eXisting 
tenants and about modernising the transferred stock. 
626 
6. Only approved landlords will be eligible for mandatory grants on 
tenanted dwellings, newly acquired after the relevant legislation is 
passed. Mandatory grant will be calculated as the cost of complying 
with the fitness standard net of loans which can be serviced by rent 
taking into account factors listed similarly at (3) above. LHAs will 
agree annual capital programmes with approved landlords and will be 
able to recycle 100 per cent of annual capital receipts into these 
programmes. Approved landlords will be able to claim tax allowances 
on loans raised for improving to the fitness standard. Any assistance 
paid by the LHA on improvement in excess of that needed to meet the 
fitness standard by the LHA will take the form of any equity sharing 
loan. This assistance by the LHA will not be eligible for Exchequer 
subsidy. Preferential grant rates and tax allowances could be made 
available in statutory improvement areas. 
7. Approved landlords will also acquire property with sitting tenant 
voluntarily from existing landlords and these dwellings will also be 
eligible for assistance outUned in (5) and (6) above. When any 
property improved with mandatory grant becomes vacant approved 
landlords will be under no obligation to relet unless this occurs 
within 7 years of grant. In those circumstances they will be obliged 
to relet it either as a new assured tenancy with tenants nominated by 
the LHA in accordance with agreements under (5) above. 
8. LHAs should counsel continuing landlords about their taxation 
position. Legislation should allow improvements as well as repairs to 
be tax deductable and any losses incurred in a year through major 
repairs to be spread over 5 years. 
9. For continuing regulated tenancies formulae for Fair Rents should 
ensure rents reflect maintenance and thus provide incentives for 
regular repair work to be done. Consideration should also be given to 
providing tenants with rights to repair, deducting costs from rent 
where landlords fail to carry out necessary repairs within a defined 
period. 
10. This plan requires that LHAs have adequate resources for the capital 
programme of grants involved. 
627 
The intention of these proposals is to harness the potential that property 
dealers provide their LHAs for improving the residual of the long term 
private rented sector. They do so by making front loaded producer 
subsidies available to enable approved property dealers to ensure that the 
stock is improved for the benefit of its, largely elderly, tenants, their 
neighbourhoods and future generations. Such subsidies are entirely 
appropriate when encouraging investment in the long term future of older 
housing in blighted inner city neighbourhoods. Without them the future is 
bleak not only for retired citizens in the remains of the private rented 
sector, but particularly for the future of inner areas where so many of 
these houses can be found. In other words the arguments for this rest 
less on the interests of existing tenants (many of whom have been shown to 
be comparatively satisfied with their standards (and rents) than on the 
need to maintain the quality of the housing stock in the long run. 
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CHAPTER 19 
HMO STAIIDARDS: 
THE APPLICATION OF DISCRETIONARY POWERS BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
Introduction 
There has been increased concern in the 1980s about the use and 
effecti veness LHAs' powers to inspect and improve conditions in HMOs. 
This concern dates back at least to the 1960s and has grown with a 
recogni tion of the importance of rela ti vely low cos t, immediate access, 
rented housing for young single people, including students. The 
conversion of older, often inner city dwellings, into shared houses can 
meet this need effectively. However, LHA casework and statistical evidence 
from sample surveys shows the condi tions of repair, amenity, means of 
escape from fire and management in HMOs falling well short of basic 
standards, not the least in respect of fire safety. 
As a result, attention has been focused on the use LHAs make of their 
largely discretionary powers to inspect HMOs and enforce standards. It 
has been argued that these inadequate and, indeed, unsafe conditions arise 
in part because LHAs make very little use of these powers (see for example 
HMO Group, no date). Accordingly campaigns have been mounted by voluntary 
and professional bodies, including support for private members Bills in 
the House of Lords and the House of Commons to secure legislation to 
translate discretionary powers into mandatory duties. The campaign has 
broadened from an initial preoccupation by voluntary housing pressure 
groupS about the standards of hostels for the single homless to a much 
wider focus for all shared housing and has drawn into the campaign not 
only professional bodies, especially the Institution of Environmental 
Health Officers (IEHO), but also the local authority associations. As a 
result the campaign incorporates LHAs who have been asking Parliament to 
give them extra and mandatory duties. 
This Chapter has four aims. First, to review evidence about the growing 
acceptance that HMOs have a valid place in housing provision. Second, to 
examine the debate between the proponents and opponents of mandatory 
duties. Third, to look at recent evidence on the increasing and planned 
use of HMO powers by LHAs in the North and Midlands. Fourth, to discuss 
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the call for mandatory duties in the light of the evidence that discre-
tionary powers are being more widely used and the academic debate about 
fettering administrative discretion. 
Attitudes to HMOs: Their Place in the Housing Market 
Evidence about the number of HMOs and their standards was reviewed in 
Chapter 2 and the specific case study evidence from Sheffield has been 
discussed in Parts 2 and 3 of this thesis. From all this it is easy to 
understand why some of the earliest attitudes to HMOs and official advice 
to LHAs called for their elimination. In the early 1960s they were social 
evils to be eradicated at a time when severe housing shortages forced 
families as well as single people to share facilities in overcrowded rooms 
and flat lets (Committee on Housing in Greater London, 1965). Offical 
advice exhorted LHAs to make 'a determined attack on squalor' - and to aim 
at 'thoroughgoing' conversions to self-contained flats. They were to 
eliminate HMOs, curbing the worst excesses of inadequate amenities and 
poor and unscrupulous management through new regulatory powers where 
elimination was impractical. (See MoHLG 1962, 1964, and Hadden, 1978). 
This was at a 
contained flats, 
end of the 1960s 
time when there were grants for conversions to self 
but not to improve shared facilities in HMOs. By the 
however, LHAs had been given discretion to provide 
'special grants' for amenities, but not for repair or fire escapes, and 
could require registration of HMOs as a pre-condition of setting them up 
(MoHLG 1969a, 1969b). 
In the mid- and late-1970s, however, official attitudes changed. It was 
argued that HMOs could provide adequate - and cheap - accommodation for 
young single people whose needs were not catered for elsewhere. Although 
HMOs were totally unsuited for family life, they could provide some social 
advantages for young singles (Hole and Taylor, 1978). Whilst the number 
of multiperson households sharing has fallen, the number of single person 
households has risen and will continue to do so up to the 1990s (Holmans, 
1986). A study of HMOs in Manchester showed how slum clearance programmes 
in inner wards had removed much of the multi occupied housing occupied by 
families and rehoused many of their occupants and that, whilst new HMOs 
had developed in other areas, 
single people (Elliott, 1978). 
their occupants were almost exclusively 
A1 though not all are young singles, 
630 
those that are, including students and others who are transient and mobile 
at an early stage in the life cycle, require ready access accommodation 
wi th low transactions cos ts. This is also needed by those who have 
experienced crises or misfortunes in their personal life - for example 
separation from their partner - and require accommodation urgently. These 
households are unlikely to have - or want - their own furniture, and are 
looking for cheap housing. Characteristically they have low incomes 
because of their stage in the life cycle - for example as students 
dependent on grants and parental contributions or because of 
unemployment or personal crisis. The emphasis for all of them will be on 
readily available, centrally located, furnished and cheap housing. HMOs, 
involving as they do, sharing of facHi ties, meet this need for cheap 
accommodation more effectively than self-contained flats. 
By the late 1970s and into the 1980s, this had been recognised. Indeed, 
'most of those directly concerned now accept that HMOs meet a housing need 
which is not met adequately, or in some cases at all, by the public 
sector, and that for the foreseeable future there will continue to be a 
need for special policies and powers to control abuses in HMOs and to help 
ensure that reasonable standards in the provision of facilities are 
maintained' (Hadden, 1978). 
Changed attitudes were reflected in advice 
strategies following the Housing Act 1974. 
to LHAs about renewal 
'Though the objective of 
providing wherever needed, decent self-contained accommodation (especially 
for families with children) must never be lost from sight ••• other 
neighbourhoods where mul tiple occupation is prevalent often perform a 
different function, that of providing a pool of cheap rented accommodation 
for single people of all ages. An action programme for such an area must 
recognise this function and ensure the continuance of a supply of 
accommodation suitable for single people. Most single people want 
self-contained accommodation but there is also a considerable demand for 
'digs' ••• for 'bedsitters' or flats in which facilities are also shared; 
and for hostel accommodation. Multi-occupied properties can lend 
themselves very well to all these purposes', (DoE, 1975). Changed 
attitudes were also reflected in advice given to LHAs about making better 
use of the existing housing stock: 
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"Multiple occupation is to be discouraged, if not eliminated 
where the households concerned are families with children. 
However, for other groups, particularly in areas where there are 
large numbers of small households, the sharing of dwellings can 
be a valuable means of improving the match between demand and 
the available stock as long as adequate amenities are provided 
and the property is properly managed. Local authorities should 
not, therefore, insist that dwellings should never be shared by 
persons who are not members of the same household. Whilst it is 
important that standards imposed are adequate to ensure health 
and safety, they should not be unreasonably high." (DoE 1977b) 
Changes in attitudes were also shaped by the way housing policy in the 
1970s was first given direction and then thrown off course by the public 
expenditure cuts which stemmed from the economic crises of the mid-1970s 
and which have continued throughout the last decade and a half. Three 
related responses to the crises and to the cuts were relevant to HMOs. 
First, the switch in housing renewal policy from redevelopment to 
reha biU ta tion, wi th Housing Action Areas being used to ration limited 
resources. Although HMOs would not be eliminated by clearance, it was 
expected that Housing Action Areas would concentrate improvement resources 
on the very housing stress areas where HMOs were disproportionately to be 
found (DoE, 1975). Second, these areas were to be the focus of 
municipalisation programmes bringing private rented houses into the 
ownership of local authorities and housing associations. Steps were also 
taken in 1974 to give furnished tenants of non-resident landlords the same 
degree of Rent Act protection afforded to unfurnished tenants in respect 
of security and rent regulation. 
Third, the subsequent public expenditure cuts meant that municipalisation 
programmes, which would have brought many HMOs into social renting, were 
virtually abandoned upon inception, at the same time as new building for 
rent steadily declined throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s. The 
extension of Rent Act protection to furnished tenants meant that few 
landlords were prepared to let furnished accommodation within the legal 
framework and adopted a range of devices for letting outside the Rent Act, 
particularly non-exclusive occupation licences for sharers, and minimised 
their risks of being locked into long term investments by restricting 
lettings to 'mobile' singles. Offsetting this, the Homeless Persons Act 
of 1977, and the adaptation of social renting agencies' allocation 
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policies, giving access to vulnerable non family households, effectively 
reduced some of the pressure of demand of family and other non single 
households on the HMO sector. 
Nevertheless the cuts in public expenditure were combined with a 
continuing decline in private rented accommodation. Even in areas of 
pressure, where landlords used devices to avoid Rent Acts, de facto 
deregula ted rents were insufficient to provide competi ti ve returns. At 
the same time the numbers of households whose head was aged under 30 were 
increasing. But by no means all of the non family households in this 
group looked to private renting for their accommodation and throughout the 
1970s more and more married couples and never married singles in this age 
group with access to credit bought their own homes. Aided by tax relief 
on mortgage interest payments, the inflationary climate of the 1970s meant 
that they were paying negative real rates of interest to acquire an 
appreciating asset. For those who could buy, renting was just not a 
competitive option. As Chapter 2 has shown, subsidies favoured buying and 
discriminated against private renting in both subsidy and taxation terms. 
The net result of these changes in the 1970s was that households entering 
the market without access to owner occupation or social rented housing 
were increasingly dependent on HMO accommodation. The demand for lettings 
was restricted to low income groups since the demand from those with high 
rent paying ability (which would, potentially, have made the letting of 
self contained furnished flats a profitable business) had been drawn off 
into owner occupation. Potential landlords were faced with a demand from 
groupS with only low rent paying capacity. Profits were made therefore 
only by let ting poorly managed, badly repaired and overcrowded HMOs on 
insecure terms outside the Rent Acts and at unregulated rents which took 
large proportions of tenants' and licencees' incomes (see Greater London 
Council, 1986; House of Commons Select Committee on the Environment, 
1982). The fact that landlords needed to exploit tenants in order to make 
profits contributed to the poor reputation and unsavoury image of 
landlordism. 
The development of HMOs in the 1970s was an economic response, therefore, 
to the needs of low income tenants in the context of a wider restructuring 
of the housing market and a period of fiscal austerity. Attempts to secure 
633 
better standards by municipalisation were thwarted by programme cuts and 
successful ameliorative measures depended on a mixture of enforcement and 
grant led action which did not eliminate the homes of those for whom the 
action was designed. Unfortunately the grant structure undermined action 
to improve HMOs whilst maintaining their presence. Special grants did not 
cover fire escapes and repairs, and owners could both lose rent if numbers 
were reduced to combat overoccupancy and incur substantial costs, mostly 
unaided by grant (Monck and Lomas,1980). Discretionary grants provided 
more help - but only for conversions to self-contained flats or single 
dwellings. 
The grant system has now changed. The change was in part due to the 
emphasis placed on private housing and the private rented sector in 
particular by the 1979 to 1983 Conservative Government for the housing of 
the 'mobile' (House of Commons Select Committee on the Environment, 1982). 
It was also partly because of evidence about the risk from fire of 
living in HMOs. Special grants for HMOs now cover the provision of means 
of escape from fire and also repairs, when either amenities or means of 
fire escape are being installed. The Government stressed that 'HMOs can 
provide a useful service for single people, particularly those who are 
young and mobile ••• (the Secretary of State) hopes that local authorities 
will make full use of the grant, allied where necessary with their 
regulatory powers to help improve the standards of accommodation and 
safety ••• ' (DoE, 1980). 
It is important that this concern by Government about the needs of young 
singles should hide neither the diversity amongst occupants in HMOs which 
Chapter 2 has shown, nor their aspiration for greater privacy, in the form 
of self-contained housing. Indeed, although 80 per cent are single person 
households, only 66 per cent of the households in the 1985 survey were 
headed by someone under 35 (Thomas, with Hedges, 1986). It is evident 
that HMOs play a particular role in housing those who have experienced 
personal crises and need somewhere to live in a hurry. However, this role 
does not extend to the housing of children - virtually none of whom were 
in the sampled households. Their unifying characteristic was that 'most 
tended to be hard up' (Thomas, with Hedges 1986) and only 40 per cent had 
full-time jobs. They were dependent on student grants, welfare benefits or 
loW paid jobs. Thus HMOs house those whose vulnerability (through personal 
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crises) and low income deny them effective choice in the housing markets. 
A combination of transience, mobility, vulnerability and poverty leads to 
sharing. Sharing however, can have problems in the form of the lack of 
privacy, noisy neighbours, security, the cleanliness of common parts, the 
hygiene of shared WCs and baths and the availability of hot water from 
shared geysers. That is not to say that it is always a disaster, 
sometimes sharing is beneficial both in terms of friendship and of 
reducing the costs of meals. Nevertheless, as Chapter 2 stressed, bad 
conditions are inimical to these potential social benefits. 
Thomas concluded that most people do not choose HMOs. Some, like 
students, might actively seek shared housing. For most, it is all that is 
available at prices that can be afforded. Whilst they accepted sharing as 
inevitable, they did not consciously choose it. The Sharers follow-up to 
the 1978 National Dwelling and Housing Survey found that 75 per cent 
preferred self-contained accommodation, half 'strongly preferring'. They 
wanted independence and privacy - at the time 50 per cent shared with 
people who were strangers when they moved in. Even half those who knew 
each other before they moved together to a shared dwelling preferred self 
contained accommodation. In other words, people still want privacy even if 
sharing is not inconvenient. As many as a third of households who 
strongly preferred self-contained accommodation said they would pay more 
to get it, though their incomes were no higher than others.(Rauta, 1986). 
Thomas found that 90 per cent of his 1985 sample preferred self-contained 
accommodation, but only 20 per cent were on a LHA or housing association 
waiting list. (Thomas with Hedges, 1986). 
Few people therefore actually like sharing. It cannot be assumed, 
however, that there is - or is likely to be - an adequate supply of cheap, 
ready-access self-contained flats to meet these aspirations, either in the 
private or social rented sector. Indeed, only 16 per cent of all private 
rented sharers in the 1978 sharers survey expected to leave HMOs within a 
year for self contained accommodation. This implies that action to 
improve HMO standards and replace some with self-contained flats has to be 
set against possible consequences in the forms of increased rents and 
reduced supply. 
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In this context it needs to be stressed that the measures introduced by 
the Government in 1980 to stimulate the supply of private rented housing 
(such as introducing shorthold and assured tenancies), failed to do so 
because of the contradictions between its private rented policy and its 
desire to promote owner occupation (and maintain 'as of right' subsidies 
to do so), cut public spending and transfer social rented housing into 
owner occupation. The expansion of owner occupation has continued into 
the 1980s, not just through the discounted sale of council houses, but by 
the increase in 'conventional' ownership down the income and age scale 
(Kleinman and Whitehead, 1988; Maclennan and Munro,l986). 
More and more who want to buy have been able to do so, with the result 
that those who could have afforded to pay rent for tolerable standards in 
the private rented sector now own their homes. As this thesis has already 
emphasized, the private rented sector is left with those who cannot buy, 
and it increasingly houses only those outside the labour market and those 
whose personal circumstances make them vulnerable (Whitehead and Kleinman, 
1986). They have little bargaining power and the option for non family 
households of entering the social rented sector has diminished because of 
the combined effect of the fall in building programmes and of the sale of 
council houses on new lettings. Meanwhile municipalisation programmes have 
been stopped since they are inconsistent with privatization objectives. 
Although the HMOs which provide them with shelter are de facto 
deregulated, being let outside the Rent Acts, tenants cannot afford to pay 
the kind of rents out of their incomes or benefit which would enable 
landlords to provide tolerable standards on relatively secure terms and 
make competitive returns. If they could, they could also afford to buy. 
The 1980 measures failed to tackle therefore the underlying problem of 
HMOs - the low incomes and rent paying capaCity of the tenants. Fiscal 
austerity, on conventionally defined housing expenditure has not allowed 
rent allowance (Housing Benefit) to provide the level of subsidies to 
tenants comparable with those given to buyers and necessary to support 
rents giving competitive returns or, alternatively, to provide adequate 
capital subsidies to landlords. Meanwhile tax relief on mortgage 
interest has risen since 1980 and in crude terms young singles and 
partners in work get more by way of subsidy if they buy than if they rent. 
The continued discrimination in tax and subsidy terms against private 
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renting and in favour of owner occupation deflects demand for good quality 
rented housing into owner occupation and does not allow private landlords 
to compete with alternative tenures. 
Unless Government is prepared to tackle this contradiction (with its 
ideological underpinnings) it is hard to see how local authority 
enforcement of standards can succeed in raising the housing quality of low 
income HMO residents. The Government is now going much further than their 
1980 measure and partially deregulating all new let tings to stimulate 
supply. The likely impact of this on HMOs and on local authorities' 
abilities to regulate their standards in the future will be considerd at 
the end of the chapter. Meanwhile, local authorities' current power and 
duties and their use must be examined. 
Local Authority Povers and Duties 
This chapter is confined to procedures and practice in English LHAs 
although the level of concern and call for mandatory duties is of equal 
importance in Scotland (Currie and Miller, 1981). 
The only duty currently placed on LHAs is to ensure that means of escape 
from fire are provided (or closure of parts of the premises) where there 
are three storeys with a combined area of at least 500 square metres. In 
other cases LHAs have the power to require means of escape or partial 
closure, in consultation with the fire authority. 
Al though LHAs are not under a duty to regularly inspect HMOs, they are 
obliged to inspect their district from 'time to time' to determine what 
action to take in persuance of their Housing Act powers but, in cases 
where LHAs do not carry out such inspections, it is not certain that 
judicial review would be a successful means of ensuring that HMOs were 
regularly inspected (see Arden, 1985). They can, with DoE consent, set up 
registration schemes which can also control, with exceptions, the use of 
an unregistered house as a HMO or limit its use to a specified number of 
occupants. They can require works to make HMOs suited for given numbers 
of occupants or households. They may limit occupation in relation to the 
amenities available and can also serve notices to prevent overcrowding. 
Where conditions are the result of bad management, LHAs can invoke 
631 
Regulations, set out in 1962, by serving a notice applying them to the HMO 
in question and requiring works to make good neglect in areas where the 
Regulations apply. Where LHAs have required works to be done they can do 
them in default and recover costs and landlords can be fined on conviction 
for knowing failure to comply with notices. In the worst excesses of bad 
conditions and mismanagement which threaten residents' safety, health or 
welfare, LHAs can take over management by means of a control order which 
may be a prelude to compulsory purchase (see Arden, 1986 and DoE, 1986). 
Where LHAs serve notices requiring works to install amenities or means of 
escape from fire, an award of SpeCial Grant for these (and associated 
repairs) becomes mandatory, where applications are duly made. At the time 
of the authors' survey the rate of grant was 75 per cent. This was 
subsequently reduced to 20 per cent from September 1988 for cases of 
mandatory grant, but LHAs continue to have the power to provide discre-
tionary special grants at a maximum rate of 75 per cent (or 90 per cent 
in cases of undue financial hardship). The Government considered that 
paying mandatory grant at 75 per cent takes no account of the means 
landlords have to finance the work themselves. It also felt it encouraged 
landlords to postpone works so as to attract the biggest rate of grant and 
that this, in itself, discouraged LHAs from taking enforcement action. 
Local authorities may also control multiple occupation through the 
planning legislation. The physical conversion of a single dwelling house 
to two or more separate dwellings is defined as development by Statute and 
requires planning permission. There is however no clear distinction 
between single household occupancy and multiple occupancy. The 1987 Use 
Classes Order eliminates some uncertainty by incorporating use of a 
dwellinghouse by no more than six people living together as a single 
household with use by a single person or any number of people living 
together as a family (DoE, 1987c). Any change of use going beyond these 
limits could constitute development and although the Courts, before the 
1987 Order, have held that change from single to multiple occupancy can be 
material and subject to control it is always a matter of fact and degree. 
Enforcement against unauthorized physical conversion is possible within 4 
years and at any time in respect of changes of use (without the creation 
of separate dwellings) which occurred after 1964. Nevertheless much is a 
'grey area'. The Courts have held, for example, that a house shared by a 
group of people sharing amenities and housekeeping does not constitute 
development whilst the same house used as rooms each with a cooker and the 
sharing of WC and bathroom would need planning permission. 
These 'technical' planning issues are very pertinent to a LHA's strategy 
to regulate and improve HMOs. Not only are mos t HMOs un regis tered with 
the LHA, but most, too, are unauthorized developments. 
City Council, 1987). Housing Act enforcement 
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must therefore be 
co-ordinated with any necessary enforcement, or regularisation, of the 
planning status of substandard HMOs. 
Local Authority Powers: Discretionary or Mandatory? 
The co-existence of substandard HMO conditions with LHA powers to inspect 
them and enforce standards has led to calls to turn these largely 
discretionary powers into mandatory duties on the grounds that the 
conditions can be attributed to LHAs' failure to use their powers. 
These calls are relatively recent and there is little evidence, at least 
from Parliamentary Debates, that there were major demands for the HMO 
powers given to LHAs in the 1961, 1964 and 1969 Housing Acts to be made 
mandatory. The principal reservations were that the measures would be 
ineffective without adequate security of tenure for tenants and rehousing 
for those displaced by enforcement. These concerns have a contemporary 
ring. (House of Commons, 1961, 1963, 1969). 
In the late 1970s and the 1980s there has, in contrast, been a build up of 
pressure for mandatory duties from backbench MPs in constituencies with 
significant numbers of HMOs, voluntary bodies like CHAR - the campaign for 
the single homeless - trade unions like the Fire Brigade Union, and 
professional ins ti tu tions, like the IEHO. Much of the campaigning has 
been organised by an umbrella HMO Group with a wide membership. This 
single issue 'policy community' has also been influential in increasing 
the salience of HMOs within individual local authorities and the local 
authority associations. It is significant that the campaign did not 
consist of voluntary groups alone. The backing of professional bodies and 
other organisations has been crucial in widening it from an initial 
concern by voluntary groups about hostels for the single homeless to a 
639 
broader campaign committed to the eradication of bad conditions in 
bedsit tel'S and the like generally. Because the campaign has drawn in 
professional institutions it has also gained in credibility. It is less 
easy to write it off as yet another campaign by a well intentioned but 
misguided voluntary pressure group when it is supported by responsible 
professional institutions. 
In part the campaign's genesis can be ascribed to reactions to a series of 
tragic deaths from fire in HMOs in the late 1970s which exposed the extent 
to which unsafe, insanitary and overcrowded conditions continued to 
persist in HMOs, despite two decades of legislation designed to see their 
elimination. The Government was called on to make powers mandatory (House 
of Commons, 1919, 1980). The Government did amend the 1980 Housing Bill 
to widen the provision of special grants and to place the limited 
mandatory duties on LHAs in respect of means of escape from fire referred 
to above. It declined to extend mandatory duties further, arguing 
against placing onerous duties about registration on LHAs and about 
complying with national standards on landlords. 
There has been no cessation of the calls for mandatory duties. These have 
included three private members Bills introduced by Jim Marshall MP (House 
of Commons, 1983), by Baroness Vickers (House of Lords, 1986) and by 
Donald Anderson, MP (House of Commons, 1981). None reached the statute 
book, and although Marshall's B111 got a second reading in the face of 
Government opposition, the Bill fell with the 1983 General Election 
(Holmes, 1983). There has been strong support from the voluntary sector 
(HMO Group no date), professional organisations (IEHO, 1985), the local 
authority associations (ADC, 1988; AMA, 1981) and a Select Committee of 
the House of Commons (House of Commons Welsh Affairs Committee, 1987). 
Although the proposals put forward for mandatory legislation vary in 
detail, most incorporate the following: 
(1) Clarify definitions e.g. to make it clear that all IEHO 
categories are HMOs 
(ii) Provide for legislation about national standards for each 
HMO category 
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(iii) Place a duty of care upon HMO landlords to protect the 
health, safety and welfare of tenants 
(iv) Place a duty on LHAs to inspect their district and locate 
and inspect all HMOs (with exceptions) on a regular (e.g. 2-3 
yearly) basis 
(v) Place a duty on LHAs to enforce minimum standards 
(vi) Streamline enforcement legislation 
(vii) Place obligations upon LHAs to rehouse HMO occupants 
displaced by enforcement 
The aims of the proponents were well illustrated by the arguments employed 
during the Commons second reading of Marshall's Bill. Conditions in HMOs 
fall below standard - the term 'Dickensian' was used to describe some of 
them. Whilst some LHAs use their discretionary powers, others do not. The 
present laws are weak and cumbersome as well as discretionary and give 
tenants no right to initiate their use. Too many LHAs have ignored their 
existing powers and given HMOs too low a priority for far too long. The 
laws should be mandatory because HMO occupants have a right to a basic 
minimum irrespective of where they live (House of Commons, 1983). 
These remarks were echoed in the second reading debate on Anderson's 1981 
Bill. The problems, he argued, were due to the discretionary nature of 
the legislation, the present framework gives HMO tenants virtually no 
right to initiate action. The great majority of HMO tenants are unlikely 
to complain about their lot for fear of harassment or eviction. 'Yet one 
of the most shocking facts revealed in the Department's (DoE) postal 
survey was that 86 per cent of all local authorities said that their 
policies for dealing with HMO conditions were based on reacting to 
individual complaints. By definition a large proportion of tenants are 
unlikely to initiate such complaints because of fear' (House of Commons, 
1981, at Col. 613). 
It is not just the fear of harassment. It is also a matter of HMO 
tenants' knowledge of rights and procedures. Thomas showed that only 8 
per cent of the households in the 1985 sample survey of HMOs had ever 
contacted their LHA about problems with their accommodation (Thomas and 
with Hedges, 1986). Most had only a vague awareness about LHA powers and 
exhibited a fear of officialdom as well as landlord harassment. They were 
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as likely to put up with substandard housing as to risk harassment, 
because they acknowledged the shortage of good housing at affordable 
prices. 
Nonetheless, the Government has rejected demands for mandatory duties. 
Ministers explained in 1983 that they were worried about the extra costs 
of the legislation, not so much on the capital side since, at that time, 
they were urging LHAs to increase improvement grant expenditure. Rather 
it was the extra staff, since LHAs were being exhorted to curtail current 
spending. At a time of stringency there was the risk that staff would be 
diverted from the urgent task of chasing the worst HMOs to the less urgent 
job of locating and inspecting all HMOs, irrespective of conditions. Local 
discretion would be eroded by imposing national in place of locally 
determined standards and by eliminating LHAs' freedom to determine their 
own priorities and choose between HMO and other housing programmes. 
Moreover, the proposals would dry up the supply of accommodation for the 
very group whose interests the Bill's sponsors were trying to protect. 
When confronted with extra costs landlords would give up whilst LHAs 
closed down HMOs which offended national standards. At the same time 
neither LHAs nor housing associations would match this fall with low cost 
shared housing. Despite acknowledging that 'the need for better standards 
is clear', the 'Times' Leader writer argued ' insis t too much on higher 
standards and the landlord may go out of business. Some supporters of the 
Bill would be glad to see all such accommodation publicly provided, and 
that is indeed often the best solution. But if admittedly squalid 
accommodation is regulated out of existence without the assurance of an 
equal provision of better lodging, then many more in search of shelter may 
find it only under railway arches and the best will once more have been 
made the enemy of the tolerable' (The Times, 1983). 
To confront arguments such as this the Bill's supporters explained that 
since LHAs already had the powers, the risk that supply would dry up 
already existed. It was a matter of removing LHA discretion to regulate 
HMO standards at a time when the extension in the scope and value of 
special grants had significantly reduced the risk because the cost of 
decent standards could fall substantially on the public purse, not just 
on the landlords' and tenants'. 
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Ministers were not moved by such appeals and similarly rejected the 1986 
and 1987 Bills. In refuting the basis of the Vickers Bill it was argued 
that ' ••• any local authority that is determined to secure improved 
conditions in HMOs can do so under existing legislation, and many do so. 
The Government believe that discretionary powers are the most appropriate 
because each authority is best placed to know the need of its own area and 
to assess priorities for the best use of available resources' (House of 
Lords, 1986 at Col. 1434). Anderson's Bill was similarly criticised by 
Ministers. Much of what was proposed 'already exists in current 
legislation, albeit in discretionary form. It is not in the Government's 
view the existing legislation that is at fault. It is wide ranging and 
capable in one form or another of meeting most, if not every situation. 
The powers are there for local authorities to use. In the Government's 
view the approach should be to concentrate effort on encouraging the wider 
application and knowledge of existing powers, not just among local 
authorities but among landlords and tenants, many of whom remain unaware 
of their individual rights. In the Government's view, local authorities 
remain best placed to consider the use of discretionary powers in the 
context of their knowledge of the housing situation in their area' (House 
of Commons 1987 at Col. 624). The Government were also alarmed at the 
impact of national standards on LHA resources and on supply, arguing that 
'imposition of rigid standards ••• are too detailed to be practical and 
might serve only to produce (a) deterrent effect'. 
The debates have been described at some length because they reveal a deep 
divide between those who would secure the right that poor and vulnerable 
citizens have to decent housing by imposing duties on LHAs and those who 
argue that LHAs are best placed to judge what action to take in the light 
of local needs, resources and other priorities. This sort of debate 
surrounds other areas of social policy. At its heart lies the appropriate 
balance between rules and discretion. The paper returns to this theme 
after next describing LHAs' current HMO policies. Before passing on, 
however, it is worth noting that the HMO campaigners have not only - or 
even mainly - been directing their attention at getting new legislation. 
Rather it is a multi-pronged approach and attention has also been given to 
urging LHAs to take up and use the powers they have (see e.g. HMO group 
1983, and AHA, 1987). 
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Use of Powers by Urban LBAs in the North and Midlands 
Th1s sect10n analyses the results of the author's survey of LHAs in 1987. 
Supply trends 
It 1s pert1nent to report that LHAs est1mated an upward trend 1n HMOs 
s1nce 1980. Although not based on survey data, two th1rds of LHAs noted 
that self conta1ned flats had 1ncreased, especially where they were 
pursuing a planned and active 1ntervent1on 1n the HMO field. In contrast 
whilst half LHAs said 'traditional', Category A, HMOs had increased, this 
was the only category of HMOs where some LHAs reported declines, 
especially 1n areas where a planned approach was taken. Category D was, 
unsurpris1ngly up in two-thirds of LHAs, an increase attributed by LHAs 
to, amongst others, the discharge of mental health patients by Health 
Authorities, and the greater economic attract1veness to letting via bed 
and breakfast than v1a 'traditional' bedsits. Half of the LHAs who had 
experienced an increase in Category B sugges ted that this was where the 
'smart money' was going, especially 1n inner city 'partnership' and 
'programme' local authorities. Landlords were buying up terraced houses 
(including suburban areas) and putting in a 'few kitchen units' for young 
singles, including students and professionals as well as the unemployed. 
Category B was seen to have many attractions in the form of 'fewer 
controls', lower overheads and a greater chance of capital gain than 
trad1tional bedsits. They were also attractive because they suited 
student sharers to whom houses could be let at higher occupancy rates than 
to other groups (see this volume, and Carver and Martin, 1987). Indeed 
some officers reported having people ringing them up asking what they had 
'to do to get one of these houses started'. 
Almost all the local authorities 1n the sample had confronted an increase 
1n HMOs. Not all these new HMOs were in traditional 1nner urban 
localities and as one LHA off1cer explained: 'the people some landlords 
want to let to don't want to live in inner areas'. 
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Policy: reactive or proactive? 
In the recent past the great majority of LHAs did not pursue planned 
strategies to seek out and inspect HMOs. The 1984 DoE survey found that 
responding to individual tenants' complaints was the main policy for 86 
per cent of LHAs. There were, however, signs that things were changing. 
30 per cent also said they tried to actively seek out HMOs before any 
complaints were made. Many stated that they were reappraising priorities 
and that an increased level of activity on HMOs was planned (Kirby and 
Sopp, 1986). 
By 1987 the results of these plans could be seen. LHAs were asked whether 
they sought out HMOs for inspection and enforcement action ('proactive') 
or if they only reacted to tenants' complaints ('reactive'). 55 per cent 
of LHAs were 'proactive' authorities, covering 76 per cent of households 
living in furnished accommodation in the whole sample. These proactive 
authorities not only have more HMOs than others (1,800 on average compared 
with 400 on the DoE postal survey evidence) but they estimated a higher 
proportion to be below standard (64 per cent compared with 39 per cent). 
Not all, by any means, were inner city authorities since half the LHAs 
without designated inner area status were 'proactive' authorities. 
As well as seeking out HMOs to improve standards by enforcement and 
negotiation, rather than solely responding to tenants' complaints, many 
proactive authorities took the view that a wider and co-ordinated 
approach, involving questions of security, tenancy relations and rents 
were essential if enforcement of physical standards was to succeed. (See, 
for example, Manchester City Council, 1985). See also Birmingham's 
Housing Action Team (City of Birmingham, 1986a; Thomas, 1986). Proactive 
policy can lead to landlords harassing tenants in order to empty a HMO as 
a way of avoiding compliance. Tenancy relations work is carried out to 
protect tenants at risk. At the same time tenants can be advised about 
rents and benefits. Co-ordinated approaches to the questions of physical 
standards and tenants welfare are, however, seen as worthwhile in their 
own right, not just a response to protect tenants from unscrupulous 
landlords trying to get rid of tenants when local authorities enforce 
standards. 
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Most, but not all, of these proactive authorities are seeking to 
maintain HMOs, not eliminate them by conversion to self contained flats. 
Despite a recognition by authorities about the role of HMOs in meeting 
needs, and problems relating to the affordability of converted flats, as 
many as a third of proactive LHAs are seeking conversions. In some cases 
this is because of unresolved conflicts between housing need and 
environmental planning perspectives on the question, housing officials 
emphasising the way bedsitters and the like can meet needs, whilst 
planners point to their bad neighbour characteristics. Nevertheless, in 
the majority of cases proactive LHAs wanted to retain - even extend - the 
number of private rented HMOs, whilst encouraging housing associations to 
provide converted flats, and bring the HMOs up to standard. In particular 
it was recognised that the present limited availability of funds for home 
improvement grants could support few conversions of HMOs into 
self-contained flats but a greater number of upgraded HMOs through special 
grants - albeit to a more limited standard. For this and other reasons 
therefore most LHAs recognised the importance of HMOs. Birmingham's view 
was typical of many. The "City recognises that HMOs have a significant 
part to play in providing a range of housing accommodation. Provided 
planning considerations are met, a controlled growth of multiple 
occupation is thought desirable". (City of Birmingham, 1986b). 
Enforcement and grant aid 
Not surprisingly, as Table 19.1 shows, by 1985 proactive LHAs were more 
active than others in serving enforcement notices. The results do not show 
the number of HMOs where enforcement action was taken since several 
notices can be served on anyone HMO. Moreover the base numbers of HMOs 
are an estimate and use estimates for only one year for all years. 
Nevertheless the results do point to two things. First the overall level 
of activity fell from 1975 to 1980 and then rose by 1985. This is 
entirely consistent with what LHA officers said in interviews: that 
enforcement activity fell during the increase in home improvement grant 
work associated with improvement area declaration after 1914 and the grant 
'boom' of the early 1980s. Since then the fall-off in grant work has seen 
a recovery of enforcement activity in HMOs, especially for notices in 
respect of amenities and the reduction of occupancy, which more than 
trebled, whilst notices about means of escape from fire 'merely' doubled. 
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Table 19.1: Average number 
estimated by LHAsb 
of HMO noticesa served by LHAs per 1000 HMO 
1975 (N) 1980 (N) 1985** (N) 
Proactive LHAs Mean 28 (14) 21 (15) 136 (18) 
Reactive LHAs Mean 42 (12) 32 (12) 28 (12) 
All LHAs Mean 34 (26) 26 (27) 92 (30) 
All LHAs Median 0 0 42 
Notes a Total notices served requiring works to be carried out or 
numbers of occupants reduced 
b Total HMOs estimated for DoE postal survey 
** Difference significant at 0.05 level using 1 tail t-test 
N = No of LHAs returning statistical data. 
NB no bias in those returning from sample of 41 interviews 
Table 19.2: Average Number of Special Grants paid by LHAs per 1000 HMOs 
estimated by LHAs 
1980* (N) 1985** (N) 
Proactive LHAs Mean 0.01 (17) 31.1 (18) 
Reactive LHAs Mean 2.32 (11 ) 4.8 (.14 ) 
All LHAs - Mean 0.95 (28) 19.6 (32) 
All LHAs - Median 0 0.7 
Notes * Difference significant at 0.1 level (1 tail t-test) 
** Difference significant at 0.05 level (ditto) 
N - no. of LHAs returning statistical data 
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Second, there is a difference between proactive and reactive LHAs but this 
difference only emerges after 1980 and is particularly pronounced in the 
case of notices about means of escape from fire. 
The same increase in activity cannot be found in respect of management, 
closing and control orders, nor do proactive authorities seem to be more 
active than other LHAs. What seems to have happened is that the number of 
orders in force increased between 1975 and 1980 but have not increased in 
number since. There were only 50 such orders per 1000 HMOs in the whole 
sample. Proactive LHAs had only 48 management orders in force on average 
in 1985, although there were big variations between authorities, a few 
having a hundred or more and most significantly less. There were only 2 
who had any control orders at all. 
LHAs have been in the business, it would seem therefore, of trying to 
achieve physical standards of amenity and safety through their enforcement 
acti vi ty rather than dealing wi th the acknolwedged problems of 
mismanagement. This is reflected in the growth in the number of special 
grants paid between 1980 and 1985. As Table 19.2 shows, the payment of 
grants has risen everywhere from a very small base, but especially so in 
proactive LHAs who are more willing than reactive ones to pay special 
grants on a discretionary as well as mandatory basis and are seeking the 
improvement of HMOs as they stand, rather than conversion to 
self-contained flats. Over half proactive LHAs award discretionary 
special grants whereas 70 per cent of reactive authorities only award 
mandatory ones. Much of this work was being done to achieve the standards 
recommended by the IEHO, for three-quarters of all LHAs had adopted these 
_ half without modification and a quarter with modification to suit local 
circumstances. 
ChaDSed priorities 
It is evident that the increase shown in Tables 19.1 and 19.2 is of very 
recent origin. It was clear from interviews conducted with the LHAs that 
the changes have only come about in the last two or three years and that 
they are not confined to the proactive LHAs. Whilst 90 per cent of 
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proactive LHAs have given HMOs greater priority, so too have 60 per cent 
of reactive authorities - many are planning to take greater action and are 
more willing to take enforcement and give grant aid. 
There were several reason for this increased priority. The national 
publicity given to conditions in HMOs as a result of the promotion of 
private members Bills, the professional and campaigning activity of the 
IEHO and HMO Group respectively, have been influential in persuading both 
officers and members, but particularly officers, to give HMOs greater 
attention. Half the LHAs mentioned this as a main cause of changed 
priorities. The influence of the IEHO on its members who work for the 
sample cannot be underestimated. Not only have the Institution's reports 
influenced its members but prompted them to take the recommendations to 
their Committee as bases for local action. The publication of the IEHO's 
recommended standards is a case in point. 
At the same time LHA officers were becoming increasingly aware of the 
growing HMO problem in their district and of the gradual concentration of 
the marginalised and young poor in HMOs. In other words HMOs had come to 
be recognised as containing the worst conditions in the private sector, as 
the traditional private rented sector disappeared. Committee papers of the 
time make many references to these issues, citing the dramatic increase in 
single person accommodation and the inferior circumstances of their 
housing. Officers in half the LHAs referred to the growing concern they 
had about these conditions, not the least their professional worry about 
the hazards and lack of means of escape in HMOs. It was particularly 
significant amongst officers in all proactive and the larger reactive 
LHAs. 
Member pressure was less important overall, being mentioned by just over a 
third of all LHAs, but it was more significant in the larger proac ti ve 
ones. It was often associated with a change in party political control or 
changes in the leadership of the majority party, particularly upon the 
installation of new chairs. In many cases there had been 'manifesto' 
commitments to the needs of young single people and the single homeless, 
whilst new members often had direct experience or involvement with local 
'grass roots' organisations which were actively engaged in these issues. 
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These changes in the political climate made it much easier for the 
growing officer concerns about HMO conditions 
policy changes. 
to be translated into 
A third of LHAs had been subject to external pressure. There were two 
kinds. First, neighbourhood groups of owner occupiers adjoining HMOs 
complained about houses in their area becoming HMOs (especially the growth 
of Category B HMOs) with attendant problems of noise, untidy gardens and 
dustbins and car parking. Others, like the local CHAR groups, were 
pressing LHAs to extend their provision for young single people and 
improve conditions in the worst HMOs, especially hostels. 
Significant too, had been changes in the demands on LHAs' resources. In a 
third of LHAs the fall-off in improvement grant work, especially after the 
1982/4 'boom' was an important factor. This had two influences. First, 
'grant work' squeezed out HMO work. HMO inspection and enforcement tended 
to be unpopular and unproductive in comparison with 'demand led' grant 
work which was easier to service. Where LHAs gave their officers 
discretion about inspecting HMOs, there was a tendency for them to favour 
grant work at the expense of HMOs. The fall-off in grant work enables 
this displacement effect to be reversed and greater priority given to 
HMOs. This is not simply a question of the attitudes of officers. Rather 
it is the changing pressure on LHAs to service grant applications, which 
is itself a factor of central as much as of local government policy. The 
second influence of the increase in 'grant work' is indirect, insofar as 
it is associated with the deliberate concentration of capital and staff 
resources in Housing Action Areas and other renewal priority areas. Only 
a small proportion of HMOs are in such areas. LHAs in the DoE pos tal 
survey estimated that only 7 per cent were located within area schemes, 
although the 1985 physical and social survey suggested that 26 per cent 
were potentially in area schemes (Kirby and Sopp, 1986; Thomas with 
Hedges, 1986). If they are not in area schemes they are unlikely to have 
been the subject of inspection or benefited from grant aid, given the 
concentration of staff and capital expenditure in area schemes. In other 
words they have missed out. 
programmes will rectify this. 
The recent reductions in area declaration 
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Other pressures on LHA resources have been important, particularly in 
reactive ones. First the growth in Housing Benefit claims led council 
members to question the distributional effects of public funds. Where 
landlords had been receiving the direct payment of certificated housing 
benefit paid on high rent levels, members were anxious that the LHAs 
obtained value for money by taking enforcement action on unsatisfactory 
conditions. This attitude also led to attempts to restrict benefit 
payments (see prescriptive conclusions, below). In like manner members 
have also raised questions about the value for money obtained from the 
payment of mandatory special grants following upon enforcement action. In 
raising such questions members appear to have made a distinction between 
grants for houses and for HMOs. The former are a justified subsidy in 
relation to housing stock and area improvement policy objectives, whereas 
special grants may be unwarranted subsidies to individual landlords. 
Wha tever the precise cons truction placed on this, these ques tions have 
also increased the political salience of HMOs within the LHAs. 
Finally it is worth noting that one in ten LHAs also noted personnel 
movements as a factor in changed priorities. Professionals moving from 
one LHA to another appear to transfer policy as well as their own 
professional skills. 
Problems o~ 1nspect1ng HMOs and en~orc1ng standards 
Locating HMOs is often alleged to be a major problem, especially as only 
just over a third of the sample LHAs have registration schemes and only a 
third of their estimated HMOs were registered. Indeed registration 
schemes were not associated with greater enforcement activity at all in 
either proactive or reactive LHAs. Kirby and Sopp discovered that less 
than 10 per cent of their sample use house condition surveys or census 
data. Most relied on their officers' accumulated knowledge of local 
conditions gained by casework (Kirby and Sopp, 1986; see also Clay brooke 
and Prentice, 1987). 
It is perhaps surprising to discover, therefore, that only a quarter of 
LHAs said that locating HMOs was a problem. LHAs had three approaches to 
this. First, and most popular, was the use of existing administrative and 
other records to compile lists of likely HMOs for inspection. These 
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included cases where Housing Benefit had been paid to more than one 
claimant at an address, the Electoral Register, notifications of infec-
tious diseases, following up property searches and newspaper advertise-
ments. The decentralisation of housing management and environmental 
health teams has increased local knowledge about areas and contributed to 
LHAs' capabilities of spotting HMOs. Once lists have been drawn up, 
priority for inspection is usually given to properties of three or more 
storeys, because of fire hazards, with the residue being worked through on 
the basis of annual targets. It would be wise however to refer to the 
methodology used in the 1985 physical and social survey which abandoned 
this 'records' method when a pilot survey found it unreliable (Thomas with 
Hedges, 1986). Some, though a minority, of proactive authorities had 
programmes of cyclical inspections of known HMOs, the regularity depending 
on the type of HMO. Clearly once the 'backlog' of inspecting HMOs is 
overcome, more and more LHAs will have to institute cyclical programmes to 
ensure standards are maintained. 
Less popular, but more likely to be effective within an area, is the 'area 
blitz' method. Existing information is used to identify priority areas 
with known concentrations of HMOs. The whole of each area is then 
surveyed to ensure that the many HMOs not picked up by the 'records' 
method are identified. Census indicators can also be used to locate 
priority areas. This method is often used in conjunction with the 
identification of priority area renewal zones (see Leeds City Council, 
1987 for an example). This approach is often combined with policies to 
enforce physical and management standards in all HMOs in priority areas, 
combined with dealing actively with fire precautions outside priority 
areas - as well as acting on complaints about other standards. 
Much rarer is the 'portfolio' approach where a local authority decides to 
inspect all known HMOs in the ownership of one or more landlords. In 
these cases the landlords have managed one or more HMOs so badly that the 
LHA gives priority to the rest of their portfolio. 
The next three problems were experienced by up to half LHAs, espeCially 
the proactive ones. First, gaining access to HMOs and all their rooms, 
pluS the associated problems of personal safety and unsocial hours. 
Second, the time needed to carry out inspections and prepare the intricate 
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notices necessary after working out schemes of improvement. Third the 
complexity of the statutory procedures that have to be followed - not 
least in relation to the number of notices per HMO and the method of 
service. Where LHAs have a programme of regular, cyclical inspection these 
problems are cumulative to the task of inspecting newly found HMOs. 
Then LHAs have to confront, not only the landlords, but also the tenants 
and half the LHAs experienced difficulties with them. Problems with 
unscrupulous and aggressive landlords whose major expertise was in 
confounding the LHAs' enforcement procedures were to be expected. Tracing 
landlords was difficult. So to were those landlords, especially 
mul ti-company land lords, who switched ownerships between their companies 
or removed tenants temporarily to render null and void the notices 
officers had spent so many hours painstakingly drawing up. Maintaining 
services for tenants following gas and electricity disconnections was also 
problematiC for many LHAs. Problems with tenants were less to be 
expected. However, proactive LHAs have to confront the difficulty of 
dealing with tenants who have not complained and asked for their accommo-
dation to be inspected. LHAs often found tenants were apathetiC, if not 
openlY hostile, to inspections and the consequences of enforcement, 
especially if they feared harassment and attempts by landlords to get them 
to quit. 
Two other problems were common, though less widespread - facing one in 
five LHAs. First, there is the problem of coordination. Co-ordination 
with town planning departments over enforcement is a particular problem, 
so too are conflicts about degrees of self-containment. The major problem 
is what to do about enforcing fire safety requirements in HMOs which are 
unauthorized in planning terms. In the past some LHAs have steered clear 
of enforcing standards - in particular where works are required and grant 
paid - for fear of compromising planning policy if subsequently the 
authority proceeds to enforcement under planning legislation. Given the 
unacceptable level of fire risk to which tenants are exposed if LHAs fail 
to act on unauthorised HMOs, LHAs are now more likely to act in advance of 
any resolution of planning status - at least to ensure, either that 
adequate fire precautions are installed, or a direction notice served to 
reduce numbers as interim measures. If enforcements teps are taken to 
remove the HMO in planning terms, tenants will have, in the meantime been 
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protected from fire at less cost in wasted grant, than if the LHA had 
insis ted on enforcing on the full range of standards. In many cases 
informal indications from planning colleagues in advance of formally 
agreeing planning status enable LHAs to proceed to enforce on the full or 
limited range, depending on the likely outcome of the review of the 
planning status. LHAs have gradually evolved procedures for dealing with 
this, most effectively when working in priority areas, co-ordinating local 
planning policies for development control with enforcement procedures 
under the Housing Act. Co-ordination problems also arise in relation to 
tenancy relations issues - again mainly by LHAs which have not developed a 
coordinated generic approach to HMOs. 
Second, there is the problem of workload where specialist teams face the 
constant difficulties of dealing with apathetic tenants, obstructive 
landlords and painstaking and cumbersome procedures. Painstaking work can 
so often be unproductive, if not completely abortive, when trying to get 
better standards. 
The overall impression which emerges from this survey is the sheer 
complexity of the task which faces officers on the ground. The evidence 
confirms Kirby and Sopp's observation that "'officers' work on HMOs was 
often time consuming, repetitive and even when successful easily undone by 
subsequent poor management by landlords." (Kirby and Sopp, 1986) Without 
doubt there are many dedicated and skilful professionals at work in this 
area but if, as it seems, HMOs provide sometimes unpopular and unrewarding 
casework, it is not surprising that pressures of other work can displace 
effort on HMOs. Where officers are given discretion about inspection and 
enforcement it is hardly surprising, if having spotted a possible HMO in a 
street in their district, they cross over to the other side to visit an 
applicant for an improvement grant - a more straightforward case where 
someone has applied for a grant and is likely to welcome and co-operate 
with the officer. Many LHAs accepted that this potential problem was 
exacerbated when there were generic environmental health officers working 
in district teams, with general as well as housing duties. Where they 
have discretion to organise their own workloads, demand led grant work -
and abbatoir inspections - can squeeze out HMO work. On the other hand, 
while specialist HMO teams can overcome the problem of competing 
priorities and differentially rewarding tasks, by removing discretion 
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about inspecting HMOs and enforcing standards, they do leave officers with 
heavy and often unrewarding HMO caseloads. At the same time specialist 
teams can lack the grassroots knowledge of the district officer. 
The question of discretion is, of course, a wider one and the next section 
deals with it in general. Suffice it to note now that LHAs gave officers 
less discretion about standards than about carrying out inspections. 
Proactive LHAs gave their officers less discretion in both areas, but 
nearly half the reactive LHAs left it to the discretion of their officers 
whether or not a HMO was inspected. 
Policy: effectiveness and refor. 
Given the debate, rehearsed in an earlier section, about the relative 
merits of duties and discretion, it should be noted that most LHAs 
considered their existing powers could be, and were, effective. There 
were, however, two conditions to this. First, provided they could offer 
grant aid - although some did have reservations about the need for this. 
(In addition the different time scale for enforcement action and grant 
approval could lead to complications, with landlords being required to 
undertake work before grants were approved.) Second, provided they had 
the time to follow up enforcement procedures. Thus 37 per cent of all 
LHAs, and 45 per cent of proactive LHAs, said enforcement was effective 
when linked with grant. More fundamentally, two thirds of all LHAs, and 
three quarters of proactive ones, said it was effective if they had the 
time. Few had to do work in default often, although a fifth said they had 
cause to do so at some time. Few prosecuted HMO landlords, a number 
commenting on the "paltry" level of fines. Delaying tactics by landlords 
also undermined effectiveness, especially in proactive LHAs who also 
encountered delays during court hearings. Altogether a fifth of LHAs said 
such tactics were harmful to successful enforcement. 
In view of the campaign for legislative reform, it was perhaps surprising 
that many LHAs were satisfied with the set of powers they had. They 
could be made to work when combined with adequate resources for grants 
and staff time. Nevertheless, support for mandatory legislation came 
from 52 per cent of all sampled LHAs, who between them had 60 per cent of 
furnished renting households in the whole sample. Only 38 per cent of 
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LHAS were opposed to mandatory duties, and 10 per cent were uncertain 
about it. 60 per cent of partnership and programme LHAs favoured 
mandatory duties, compared with 40 per cent of others. In both types of 
authority, it was those pursuing reactive policies who were most in favour 
of mandatory duties (59 per cent compared with 45 per cent of proactive 
LHAs). Amongst the arguments for mandatory duties are that they would 
ensure that LHAs had to continue to make HMO work a priority at times when 
other demands, like grant work, were in danger of overtaking it, or when 
grant shortages restricted enforcement because members were worried about 
mandatory grants leading to overspend on limited budgets. Indeed, it was 
pointed out how important it would be for adequate staffing and capital 
resources to accompany mandatory duties. Indeed just over a quarter of 
all LHAs wanted mandatory grants abolished, both as a necessary 
consequence of introducing mandatory enforcement in a period of constraint 
on improvement grant expenditure, and because many of them considered 
landlords had adequate resources to do the work without grant aid. Some 
fel t mandatory grants were a peverse reward to landlords for failing to 
provide adequate standardS. In sum, LHAs should have discretion to judge 
if a grant was required. This would remove disincentives to take 
enforcement action, where LHAs did not want to pay mandatory grant in 
cases where it was not needed. This view was held by equal proportions of 
LHAs in favour of, and opposed to, mandatory inspection and enforcement 
and it reflects the views the ADC and IEHO (1988, 1985a) but not of the 
AMA (1987). 
In addition the following specific reforms were identified by many LHAs to 
increase their effectiveness in removing unsatisfactory HMOs: 
(i) An increase in the repairs element of the Special grant and the 
attachment of letting conditions to mandatory grants. 
(ii) Simplification of the procedures for serving notices. In 
particular to enable the service of one notice, simultaneously 
specifying requirements in respect, say, of amenities, occupancy 
and fire safety. Also removing the notice of intention to serve 
direction orders or overcrowding notices. 
(iii) Specifying reforms to the control and management order procedures, 
in particular to allow the 1962 Regulation to apply automatically 
to all HMOs not selectively by notice. 
656 
(iv) The introduction of regular licensing of HMOs, conditional on 
standards, with associated Termination Orders when HMOs were found 
unsatisfactory. The Leicestershire Act provisions were commended 
by many LHAs (See Cooke, 1987). It was also suggested that fees 
for licensing could conceivably cover the LHAs enforcement and 
inspection costs (See also Archer and Sims, 1987). 
(v) The introduction of a national code for fire precautions. (The 
Home Office draft was issued in late 1987 after the interviews with 
LHAs had been completed.) 
Rules or discretion: other perspectives 
Before drawing any conclusions about the relative merits of discretionary 
powers and mandatory duties, it is pertinent to reflect on lessons which 
can be drawn from writings and debates about the nature of discretion. 
Much of the argument about discretion is related to normative, prescrip-
tive, issues, principally because unfettered discretion is thought to 
undermine individual rights. The lack of detailed regulation of agencies 
and staff who are given a degree of discretion in the administration of 
policy can result in a very different treatment of individuals nominally 
entitled to similar rights. In such circumstances, it is argued that 
rules will secure rights since a restriction of discretion removes any 
arbitrariness in their distribution. Against this it is argued that rules 
can be equally unacceptable if they lack a responsiveness to human need. 
Before attempting to assess the rules vs. discretion argument about HMOs 
it is important to try to draw back from an emotional, if understandable, 
concern for the plight of HMO residents and examine: first, whether there 
are any inherent limits to regulation by rules which require the continued 
exercise of discretion; second, whether the way in which the 'front line' 
professional carries out his or her case work affects the delivery of 
services; and third examine whether the politics of the task in question 
and the relationship between central and local government determine rule 
bounded or discretionary decision making. 
A number of writers point the analyst of the HMO debate in helpful 
directions. First, there are echoes from the debate about welfare rights 
in Britain and the so-called 'anti-discretion movement' which wanted 
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guarantees about benefits from clear rules which fettered the discretion 
of officials to make payments. In his analysis of this debate Bull (1980) 
argued that it was necessary to distinguish between agency and officer 
discretion and between discretion and judgement. If agency discretion was 
abolished, so too was officer discretion to depart from rules in 
exceptional circumstances, but that still meant officers had an inevitable 
need to make judgements to interpret the rules and to decide questions 
where it was inappropriate to use rules. Two issues were, in Bull's view, 
in danger of being confused: the extent to which Parliament should permit 
agencies to exercise discretion and how far the inevitability of officer 
judgement can be subject to scrutiny. So far as HMOs are concerned a 
parallel would lay with Parliament fettering the discretion of LHAs about 
inspecting HMOs and enforcing standards where they failed to match local, 
published, criteria but leaving it to the discretion of LHAs to decide on 
standards appropriate to local circumstances, to depart from them in 
exceptional circumstances, subject to procedures enabling these local 
decisions to be subject to adjudication. 
The manner by which officers cope with their HMO casework has already been 
referred to. Environmental Health Officer working on the ground can be 
categorised as equivalent to Lipsky's 'street level bureaucrats' (Lipsky, 
1980). Such officers, Lipsky argued, use their freedom to make choices at 
the point of service delivery to devise ways 
of heavy case loads and the uncertainties 
effect, far from being passive channels 
of coping with the pressures 
under which they work. In 
through which policy is 
implemented, the choices street level bureaucrats make in exercising 
discretion and judgement become the policies. In essence Lipsky's thesis 
is that, although street level bureaucrats have a strong sense of public 
service, they also have large caseloads, inadequate resources, and face 
difficult, sometimes apathetic, hostile or violent clients. They develop 
coping strategies to protect themselves and manage their tasks in ways 
which effectively displace agency objectives. They have to ration their 
time in the face of excessive demands for their services. In the face of 
these pressures they use their discretion to develop ways of working and 
of processing clients in order to ration their time which result in a 
stereotyping of those who are dependent on them. 
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Thus, to pursue the HMO case, environmental health officers working on 
district teams on a generic basis have heavy caseloads of HMOs and other 
work, like home improvement grant applications and inspections. If all 
HMO residents are characterized as apathetic, feckless and inadequate 
young singles, officers can use this stereotype to justify concentrating 
on delivering grants to, say, pensioner owner occupiers who, by virtue of 
accepted need, infirmity and a positive attitude to officialdom, have a 
more favourable image. Thus' undeserving' and 'deserving' stereotyping 
unwittingly displaces agency goals in the exercise of officer judgement. 
This stereotyping involves a simplification by caseworkers of the 
complexity of the issues they tackle and a suppression in their minds of 
the diversity of their clients and their needs as a basis for rationing. 
They involve developing defence mechanisms to justify decisions and forms 
of behaviour which act in self-fulfilling ways i.e conditions in HMOs do 
get worse and this can be ascribed to the behaviour and attitudes of the 
tenants. 
Given the low status and powerlessness of clients with negative 
stereotyping it is difficult for street level bureaucrats to be 
accountable to them - caseworkers simply require deference from their 
clients to get compUance for their decisions. Because it is always 
necessary for officers to exercise some judgement, it is difficult for 
line managers to control their behaviour. The paradox, as Lipsky 
explains, is that despite the discretion they have, street level 
bureaucrats do not think they have any power. They are merely the 
oppressed front line representatives of large organisations with 
inadequa te resources to meet increasing demands. For clients, however, 
street level bureaucrats represent the organisation, and their behaviour 
will be seen as evidence about agency attitudes and policy. Thus street 
level bureaucrats' behaviour may engender assumptions by clients about 
negative attitudes of agencies towards them, despite official policy to 
the contrary. 
An emotive response to this analysis might be to insist that all 
discretion about HMOs is eliminated and officials bound by rules. 
certainly it illustrates the crucial importance of providing adequate 
staff resources for the task in hand, consideration of the comparative 
appropriateness of all purpose district teams and specialist HMO teams, 
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the necessity to organise adequate support and training services and to 
coordinate the impact of all local agencies involved in ameliorative (e.g. 
standard enforcement) and preventative services (e.g. tenancy relations). 
to HMO residents at a local, district or team level as well as at agency 
level. 
It is far from certain, however, whether all tasks involved in HMO work 
can be neatly fitted into either rule bounded or discretionary categories 
_ with an implied assumption that there should be a serious attempt to 
increase rule bounded HMO decisions. Indeed it seems likely that there is 
a continuum on which different tasks can be placed. 
Jowell's analysis of this question is pertinent since he argues that there 
are limitations on what rules can achieve in reducing administrative 
discretion (Jowell, 1973; see also Davis, 1969; Galligan, 1986; and Harlow 
and Rawlings, 1984 for additional discussion of the issue). He shows that 
two criteria are required to decide if discretion should be controlled by 
legalisation (rules) or judicialisation (subjecting decisions to 
adjudication): first, whether legal techniques can be effective in 
achieving intended aims and second, whether the task is suited to legal 
control. 
He shows that rules, as concrete guides to implement policy have the great 
merit of affecting everyone equally, reducing arbitrary decisions by 
avoiding selective enforcement, giving notice of entitlement, helping 
administrators by guiding the allocation of resources and shielding them 
from pressure groups. Their limitations are that rigidity and legalism 
are inimical to the flexibility which might be proper in relation to 
policy goals. The advantages of adjudication lie in the involvement of 
all participants, the need to justify decisions in the light of principles 
and a case by case elaboration of the issues providing 'individualised 
jUstice'. On the other hand they do not guarantee the existence of 
substantive rights, the costs of adjudication may prevent some 
participating, case specific adjudication prevents comprehensive planning 
and does not result in comparison. 
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Jowell goes on to argue that these costs and benefits do not ex1.st in 
isolation but depend on the problem in hand, since neither rules nor 
adjudication may be appropriate. He finds that this is particularly the 
case as far as standards are concerned where there may be no consensus 
and cases are unlike and may not recur, although the specification of 
criteria may be helpful in increasing precision. It is also the case, in 
the determination of need, whereas rules are appropriate for clear cut and 
recurring 'yes/no' decisions. 
It may be less desirable, therefore, to fetter by rules the discretion 
LHAs currently have about determining standards for particular HMOs, than 
to limit the discretion they have about carrying out inspections. Perhaps 
the clearest message to emerge from Jowell's and others' analysis is that 
the advantages and disadvantages of rules and discretion do not exist in 
the abstract. At an emotive level discretion ought to be limited. Rules 
help foster fairness and reduce arbitrary decisions. They also promote 
predictability and this helps individuals affected by rules to plan their 
own affairs. There are also advantages in ensuring that decisions are 
subject to the due procedural processes of review and challenge by public 
hearings and inquiries. But there can be no absolute judgement about the 
choice between rules and discretion. It depends on the policy arena in 
question. Government it would seem needs both rules and discretion, 
provided that in exercising discretion it acts with rationality, purpose 
and morality (Galligan 1986). Nevertheless a core of guiding standards 
can enhance fairness, predictability and limit arbitrariness, whilst 
leaving a flexibility for the application of standards to particular 
cases. This would allow the parties involved to participate in the 
decisions that affect them, since evidence from other policy areas has 
shown that negotiation, consultation and bargaining may be more effective 
than rules in getting compliance with regulatory standards. Galligan who 
discusses some of this evidence puts it well: "It is necessary to be wary 
of any question which is put simply in terms of the merits of choosing 
between rules and discretion." (Galligan, 1986, p.165). 
The final perspective lies outside this discussion about the inherent 
limits of control and looks at the politics of the policy itself for the 
source of discretion. (For a general discussion see Adler and Asquith, 
1981). At first sight it is paradoxical that LHAs have been part of a 
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campaign to impose more duties or 'burdens' on themselves, reducing their 
'autonomy' • The HMO issue illustrates the important role professional 
communities can play in the national-local government system as members 
of a function-specific policy community. (See Rhodes 1980, 1986a, 1986b 
for general discussion of these issues). Although Environmental Health 
Officers work for particular au thori ties, they are also members of a 
professional institution and often advisors to local authority 
associations. They are in contact with colleagues in other authorities 
and can therefore mobilise policy communities on a single issue in just 
the way they appear to have done about HMOs, with both the IEHO, ADC and 
AMA pressing for changes. In pressing their own professional aspirations 
they have tried to impose a further 'burden' on LHAs as well as 
'nationalised' concern over, and policy approaches to HMOs, despite the 
widespread variation in local circumstances. In particular, this illus-
trates the way certain 'technocratic' professionals can draw on an 
intellectual hegemony in areas where there may be little political 
challenge to their technical competence, (for example on the health and 
safety risks in HMOs) at a time when there is a lot of scepticism about 
the role of other professionals in local government. This has enabled 
environmental health officers to play an effective role in the housing 
policy community (see Laffin, 1985 on this general theme). 
That this mobilisation of professional concern has not succeeded in 
persuading central government to act must be seen in the light of the 
poliCy issue itself. It has been argued that housing policy has become 
increasingly 'nationalised' (Murie, 1985) but the gradual accretion of 
financial and other controls into the hands of central government, which 
can be evidenced in mandatory duties over council house sales since 1980, 
seems to have been selective. It does not extend to giving private 
tenants 'rights to buy', nor to requiring LHAs to inspect HMOs and enforce 
standards. Discretion to do the latter is left to LHAs, a discretion they 
have not always been prepared to exercise. The reasons for this can be 
found within the politics of the policy itself at both central and local 
government level. First unresolved contradictions in central government's 
housing policy leave HMO policy ambiguous. Second, other competing 
priorities within local government, shaped (and constructed) in part by 
central government and 1n part by local po 11 tical pressures have pushed 
the enforcement of HMOs standards into a lower priority. 
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The discretionary nature of legislation is closely connected with the 
ambiguity of central government policy. Any reduction of discretion 
requires a reduction, if not elimination of the ambiguity. However, the 
ambiguity lies in certain contradictions in government housing policy. 
Central government is undoubtedly concerned about the plight of HMO 
residents yet, at the same time, it wants to support private rented 
housing as part of its privatisation strategy. It is alarmed lest any 
extension of LHAs' powers and duties thwarts this strategy by undermining 
landlords' profits. If enforcement were to succeed without eliminating 
supply, and without sacrificing its overall housing policy objectives, the 
government would have to create a market framework within which landlords 
could make competitive returns out of letting flats and bedsitters 
conforming to acceptable standards and at affordable prices. Until now, 
strategies to increase the supply of acceptable standard private rented 
housing have been thwarted by the government's refusal to reform housing 
finance and to provide adequate subsidies for landlords and tenants in 
this sector by comparison with those for owner occupation and social 
rented housing. The result is that the HMO sector only houses the 
marginal poor without the resources to pay for better standards. To date 
the government's relentless determination to promote owner occupation and 
as of right subsidies in this sector for ideological reasons, its 
consequent failure to create fiscal neutrality between renters and owners, 
whilst cutting public expenditure on rented housing, contradicts its 
policy to promote private rented housing. Without a redirection of 
subsidies to tenants and their landlords there cannot be any upgrading of 
HMOs. 
It is this failure to resolve these contradictions which clouds central 
government policy about HMOs. LHAs are given powers, not duties, and 
central government is able to ascribe HMO conditions to LHAs failure to 
act, not on the underlying housing market factors in relation to national 
policy choices, which are its responsibility. At the same time it fails 
to provide adequate resources to LHAs as the basis for effective action on 
HMOs and other unsatisfactory housing. Thus central government can claim 
to be doing something about the problem by providing the powers, at the 
same time as LHAs blame central government for their inabil1 ty to use 
them. Any reduction of LHAs' discretion in this field is unlikely without 
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greater clarity in private rented policy. This, it is suggested, is 
unlikelY to happen because it requires something more fundamental in 
relation to questions of housing finance and inter tenurial relationships. 
The failure of LHAs to act is not entirely the responsibility of central 
government. The empirical study of the application of HMO policy has 
shown how crucial competing priori ties have been. In particular the 
decision by many LHAs to fund and service large capital programmes of 
house and area improvement has directed resources to inner city owner 
occupiers who have had greater knowledge and articulacy in voicing their 
demands than HMO residents. Indeed many LHAs had seen a fall in statutory 
enforcement work in HMOs, as planned capital programmes absorbed more and 
more environmental health officers' time in running teams of technicians 
servicing owner occupiers' grant applications. This has been exacerbated 
by the two year 'boom' in grant applications engineered by central 
government in 1982 when the percentage paid on intermediate and repairs 
grants was increased. In so far as these applications came from well 
advised owner occupiers, staff productivity in responding to these was 
much higher than carrying out enforcement work on HMOs. 
yet many of these capital programmes and grants are also discretionary. 
LHAs could have chosen to ignore these and to resource a planned programme 
of HMO inspections instead. What appears to have happened is that the 
economically marginalised who live in HMOs have also become politically 
marginalised. They are not organised into local pressure groups and their 
precarious housing circumstances prevent them complaining. Meanwhile, 
subsidized young occupiers buy up inner city housing with the aid of 
mainstream mortgage finance channelled to inner areas as Building 
Societies come down market under the pressure of financial deregulation 
and competition from Banks. These owner occupiers have been effective in 
getting their improvement grant applications serviced whilst Building 
Societies and others have reinforced and supported LHAs' strategies to 
declare area improvement schemes because this will give their mortgage 
investments greater security. Where HMOs appear in such areas the incoming 
owner occupiers mobilise action groups to get LHAs to enforce standards in 
the interests of local residents, not the tenants'. 
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What has happened in more recent years, however, has been a retreat both 
locally and nationally by the environmental health profession from a role 
of technicians servicing the grant applications of owner occupiers to 
their more traditional role of 'sanitary policemen', emphasising their 
professional values and skills for the service of the least well housed. 
At the same time, members of voluntary bodies working locally with the 
single homeless have moved into the local political arena and into key 
positions as councillors in inner urban LHAs enabling a redirection of 
priorities. Yet their ability to do this is not independent of external 
demands on resources, and it has occurred at a time when other demands, 
crucially to service owner occupiers' improvement grants have diminished 
since the 1982 to 1984 boom faded. Many have campaigned along with the 
IEHO for legislation which would limit their freedom of action, whilst at 
the same time they have sought to circumscribe centralisation of powers in 
respect of other services. This apparent paradox can be explained when 
it is seen as part of a wider campaign to reform housing finance and thus 
to create the circumstances in which locally based enforcement action can 
be effective. More significantly many professionals see mandatory duties 
as a means of limiting the options for political choice open to their 
members about conflicting priorities at times of scarce resources. 
HMOs and the Deregulation of Private Rented Housing 
It is unlikely that the Government's current policy (in the 1988 Housing 
Act) to partially deregulate private rented housing will enable more 
effective enforcement on its own. All new lettings are to be at market 
rents with tenants having security whilst paying them. This section 
briefly considers the impact on HMOs, but a more general discussion of 
deregulation is deferred to the final chapter in Part 5 of the thesis. 
The Government believes rents will rise, drawing in additional investment 
and permitting higher standards in the eXisting stock, but the proposals 
are unlikely to succeed in meeting the needs of HMO tenants and bringing 
in new investment. It is crucial to remember that the HMO market is 
already de facto deregulated. It is hard to see how rents could rise to 
give competitive returns because of deregulation per se, given the current 
low incomes of tenants, without additional subsidies or greater hardship. 
Indeed the opposite may happen given the Government' ,etermination to 
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restrict public expenditure. Whilst removal of controls may lift any 
ceiling currently placed on de facto deregulated rents, substantially 
higher rents are unlikely and it is difficult to imagine investors 
making long term investments which will be so dependent on demand 
underwritten by Housing Benefit. There may be some marginal increase in 
investment since some risks will be lower as a result of increased 
confidence, given that landlords can legally achieve market rents and 
secure vacant possession. As a result lower returns will be required 
permitting some increase in standards. In so far as landlords look for 
capital gains it is likely that most will offer relatively insecure 
shortholds to protect the liquidity of their investments. The lack of 
political consensus will provide no stability for long-term investment. 
In all there must be serious doubts as to whether conditions in HMOs will 
improve upon deregulation. Indeed if anything they will worsen. If rents 
rise, more marginal owner occupiers with access to credit (and some 
savings) will transfer to owner occupation, thus reducing demand at rents 
which could give competitive returns on habitable HMOs. Demand for low 
quality and high density accommodation from those on low wages and limited 
benefit will increase, especially in areas of excess demand because 
subsidies will be insufficient to enable them to pay the kind of rents 
which will give landlords competitive returns on better housing. The bad 
conditions will further undermine reputation and 
investment. 
deter 'responsible' 
The fact is that central government has not resolved the contradictions 
inherent in its policy. It cannot revive private renting and improve HMO 
conditions, whilst maintaining support for owner occupation and failing to 
provide adequate support for reasonable standard rented housing. Whilst 
the BES scheme (see Chapter 20) brings significant subsidy into private 
renting for assured tenancies it is unlikely to have an impact on HMO 
standards. The Government's policy on HMOs remains ambiguous. Whilst it 
said, during the debates on the Bill, that it would review and strengthen 
LHA enforcement powers it did not say it would create duties to carry 
these out (See House of Commons, 1988 and below). More seriously it has 
not created the circumstances in which LHA use of these powers can be 
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effective, given the unfavourable market factors within which LHAs will 
have to use them, not the least the continuing insecurity and poverty of 
those dependent on HMOs for whom few, if any, alternatives exist. 
Government Proposals about HMOs 
It is the Government's intention to make the eXisting legislation work 
better (DoE 1988d). The new fitness standard (DoE, 1987b) will be 
adapted, as far as HMOs are concerned, to reflect the greater intensity of 
use and the health and safety problems inherent in HMOs, like the need for 
fire escapes. The proposed grant regime will cover all work needed to 
bring HMOs up to this fitness standard on a discretionary basis. 
The Government have made it clear that it does not intend to replace LHAs 
powers with duties, arguing that such a change would have undesirable 
consequences and that many LHAs consider their existing powers adequate. 
Recognising however that these powers are unnecessarily complex and absorb 
a lot of staff time the Government has made two sets of proposals to amend 
them. 
First, it has suggested a restriction in the definition of HMOs. It 
accepts that the wide interpretation of the current definition results in 
an uncertain and also inconsistent application by LHAs. It proposes to 
exclude self-contained flats and houses occupied by up to 6 people living 
together as one household, but not to set out different categories of 
HMOs. The restricted definition would therefore apply to situations where 
there is sharing by unrelated parties and a greater intensity of use than 
by a single family. 
Second, it proposes four modifications to enforcement procedures to 
streamline them. A common single notice procedure will be introduced for 
works to bring HMOs up to the new fitness standard. The new powers to 
enforce repairs notices introduced in 1988 would also be applied to HMOs. 
It will no longer be necessary for LHAs to make an order before the 
Management Regulations can be applied: they will apply automatically. The 
control order procedure will be amended including measures to speed up 
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procedures. Registration Schemes may be amended by placing tougher 
penalties on landlords who fail to register, and to allow LHAs to change 
registration fees. 
The proposals to amend the current improvement grants framework in England 
and Wales are also relevant and can be found in consultation papers (DoE, 
1987b, 1989b). At the time of writing it is anticipated that the propos-
als on grants will be incorporated in the Local Government and Housing 
Bill, due to be published in February 1989. The proposals on HMOs may 
have to await later legislation. 
A single unified grant (making no distinctions between repairs and 
improvements) will be available to bring houses up to the new fitness 
standard. While this will be a mandatory grant for owner occupiers it 
will only be available for landlords as a discretionary grant, provided 
they let on regulated or new style assured or shorthold tenancies. There 
will be no eligible expense limit. To ensure work is subsidised only 
where justified, detailed specification will be built into grants about 
the work needed to remedy unfitness. Discretionary grants will also be 
available for the higher target standard, subject to an eligible expense 
limit. The amount of grant (to reach either standard) will be subject to 
a test of the resources available to landlords to do the work themselves. 
The intention is to assess how much of the cost can be recovered from 
increased rental income (e.g. in supporting a loan), the balance being 
given on grant. The LHA will determine how much rent is available for 
this and assess the shortfall, consulting Rent Officers about prevailing 
rents and the extent to whoch they provide a satisfactory return or the 
investment. It is clear that the test can be related not only to the 
dwelling in question or but also to a test of the wider resources 
available to landlords in assets and other properties. Grants will be 
repaid if dwellings are sold within five years. 
Evaluat10n 
Many authorities consider their existing powers to be effective 1n 
enforcing standards. Effectiveness depends however on adequate staffing 
to undertake time consuming inspections and to pursue complex enforcement 
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procedures. Effectiveness also depends upon the adequacy of capital 
resources to support mandatory and discretionary special grants paid 
consequent upon inspection and enforcement. 
The argument for mandatory duties recognises that the rights vulnerable 
members of the community have to minimum standards of amenity and safety 
should be safeguarded by statute. Relying on complaint based systems 
alone will not achieve this. Occupants of mul ti-occupied houses are 
amongst the most vulnerable people in society. They do not choose to live 
in shared housing. A combination of transience, mobility, vulnerability 
and poverty give them no option. They are not likely to complain about 
inadequate standards to their local authorities for two reasons. First, 
inadequate knowledge about local authority powers, combined with a 
suspicion of officialdom. Second, a fear that a consequence of complaint 
will be harassment by their landlord and the knowledge that it will be 
difficult for them to find anywhere else to live. Landlords who run the 
worst HMOs probably attract the most powerless tenants. In these 
circumstances it is important to ensure that local authorities act 
independently of tenant complaints to seek out and eradicate substandard 
conditions. Until recently local authorities have not done this. Evidence 
suggest that other demands on local authority resources from less 
vulnerable members of the community can - and have - displaced inspection 
and enforcement work on mul ti-occupied houses. Insofar as au thori ties 
accepted this argument, they were echoing and endorsing the views of 
professional institutes and the local authority associations: that the 
inspection and enforcement of standards should not be a matter of local 
choice. Like the housing of homeless persons in priority categories, 
residents of multi-occupied housing should have access to minimum 
standards irrespective of where they live. That is not to say that the 
duty should extend to all houses where there is sharing nor, that there 
should be national minimum standards. The duty should be confined to 
regularly inspecting and enforcing standards in certain restricted 
categories, but local authorities should have discretion about these 
standards and the way they are applied to individual HMOs, subject to the 
minimum fitness standard proposed by DoE. The LHAs' standards should be 
published and incorporated in statutory local plans to ensure coordination 
with planning policies. Such standards would then be subject to public 
participation and to review and public local inquiries. 
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Local authorities recognize that such a duty has implications for 
resources and priorities. In part these stem from their assessment of the 
time consuming and often abortive nature of current enforcement 
procedures. Most were critical of these and put forward recommendations 
for detailed changes. Were these to be made (as the Government now 
proposes) less staff time will be wasted especially on abortive work. In 
addition the resource implications of mandatory inspection duties could be 
confined to certain categories of multi-occupied houses. Authorities are 
also concerned about the demand that mandatory grants would have on their 
capital resources. A third in the sample took the view the grants should 
be discretionary since they believe many landlords had adequate resources 
and that, in any case, they should not benefit from grant aid to upgrade 
properties that they had deliberately neglected. Local authorities' 
assessment of landlords' ability to pay for higher standards from their 
returns must be in doubt. The Department's own research suggests that many 
could not, and the author's work would indicate that many only make 
competitive returns by skimping repairs and management. However there is 
now less danger that enforcement action would force authorities to 'top 
slice' capital programmes for landlords who have adequa te resources to 
comply without grant aid, since the Government propose that all grants 
will be discretionary subject to a test of resources. (In the meantime, 
of course, the percentage of mandatory grant aid has been reduced to 20%.) 
In a number of ways, therefore, local authorities should find that doing 
inspections and carrying out enforcement requires a more efficient and 
equitable use of scarce resources than at present. To promote confidence 
for investors, grants should be mandatory to achieve the fitness standard 
not discretionary as proposed. If grants are not mandatory, LHAs should 
at least have the power to deduct grant from the cost of any work done in 
default, leaving the landlord to pay the balance together with a change 
for administration. 
In view of this, the argument for mandatory duties is a powerful one. It 
rests on the need to guarantee the housing rights of a vulnerable group in 
society, in the knowledge that other demands on local authorities' time 
and capital have displaced them in the past. This is not an 'attack' on 
local authorities because they should have discretion about standards and 
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their application. For certain categories (see below) there should be a 
duty to inspect and enforce and it should not be a matter of local 
political choice as to whether or not these inspections are done. 
Many local authorities find that definitions are a problem. Those that do 
tend to want a series of precise definitions embracing various categories 
of HMO. Others take the opposite point of view and welcome the 
flexibility whereby the current definition allows them to apply standards 
to a variety of shared housing. 
There are two related issues about definitions. First, an appropriate 
definition of a HMO must be justified in relation to the powers that 
authorities will have to control HMOs and regulate standards. Second, any 
definition should foster clarity and thus promote pred1ctability for 
landlords, who need to know, when investing in HMOs, whether or not their 
property will come within the ambit of authorities' regulatory and control 
powers. 
The above issues suggest that the degree of flexibility inherent in the 
current definition is inappropriate. It creates uncertainty for investors 
and enables authorities to intervene in types of sharing where regulation 
and control is inappropriate. 
The case for authorities enforcing standards in HMOs turns on the fact 
that separate households have to share faci11 ties, including cooking, 
washing and toilet facilities. It is evident from much of the research 
conducted on HMOs that people do not choose to live in HMOs. They have 
shared these facilities with strangers because they cannot afford separate 
self-contained accommodation. There is a strong case for regulating 
conditions, both on the grounds of the social costs of inadequate 
facilities and on equity grounds to guarantee minimum standards for HMO 
residents. 
Where, however, a group of unrelated people live together as a household 
sharing their housekeeping arrangements, there is much less of a case for 
the control of this form of sharing and the regulation of its standards by 
HMO legislation. There is also no case for using this legislation to 
regulate standards in converted flats where each household has exclusive 
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use of basic amenities. Nevertheless there is a case for securing 
adequate means of escape from fire in the latter cases but as this is 
already covered by other legislation there is no case for incorporating 
converted flats in HMO definitions merely for this purpose. 
The arguments and proposals in this section of the consultation paper 
about definitions seem acceptable therefore. The exclusion of houses 
occupied by up to 6 people living together as one household would have the 
added benefit of conformity with the 1987 amendment to the Use Classes 
Order under Town and Country Planning legislation, which incorporated such 
houses with those occupied by a single person or a family. Thus change of 
use of a house from family use (or use by a single person) to use by up to 
6 people living together as a household no longer needs planning consent. 
There is much potential for confusion where there is no congruence in 
housing and planning enforcement about the degree of sharing. That the 
current differences do not promote desirable clarity for investors is 
clear from the research. That the confusion will be reduced is to be 
welcomed, and investors should no longer be faced with enforcement 
notices under planning legislation for houses which were assumed to 
conform with HMO standards (and vice versa). The case for control rests 
on sharing by separate households. Where a house is shared by 6 or fewer 
people who live as separate households, the house should be included in 
the ambit of the definition. 
The proposals about procedures for single enforcement notices are to be 
welcomed. Many authorities find the need to serve an array of separate 
notices cumbersome and wasteful of scarce resources. The proposal to make 
the combined notice registerable as a land charge (together with the 
revised power in the Housing Act 1988 to recover default costs) is also 
to be welcomed as it will give authorities the confidence to proceed with 
enforcement in the knowledge that proceedings will not be aborted if 
landlords evade complying with notices by switching property between their 
companies. 
The proposals about management orders are also to be welcomed. Authorities 
regard the necessity to serve a notice before the Management Regulations 
can apply to a particular property as a quite unnecessary procedure, 
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believing that landlords of all HMOs should be obliged to meet, as a 
matter of course, what are very basic minimum standards. 
So, too, are the proposals about control orders. So unwieldy are the 
procedures that very few authorities in the sample made any orders and the 
Department's proposals will reduce some of the current reluctance to use 
control orders. 
Registration schemes, despite their (few) champions have fallen into 
disuse because many authorities think that only 'good' landlords will 
register properties and they take few steps to maintain the currency of 
their register. If failure to register a property as a HMO was an offence 
subject, on conviction, to a large scale fine (say Scale 4) more landlords 
would have incentives to register, provided, of course, authorities 
pursued positive information policies about registration schemes. To 
assist authorities to enforce standards, all schemes should have 'control' 
provisions. Whilst authorities should have powers to levy fees to cover 
the costs of compiling and maintaining registers (landlords should be 
obliged to re-register every two years), the fee should not cover 
authorities' costs of carrying out their other HMO powers. It would be 
inequitable if 'good' landlords had to bear the authorities' costs of 
enforcing standards against bad landlords and would give good landlords a 
disincentive to register. 
Conclusions about HMO Standards and their Entorca.ent 
Despite the Government's failure to introduce mandatory duties, many of 
their other proposals should assist LHAs. It will promote greater clarity 
about definitions for both landlords and tenants, will overcome a number 
of the criticisms LHAs had about their current enforcement powers and 
provide them with some of the modifications they want to see. 
Within the area of local discretion a number of choices have to be made 
which cannot realistically ignore supply considerations, since LHAs are 
not in a position to shape market response to their interventions. As 
Thomas, concluded, HMOs have a place in the market, however unacceptable 
they are now. Until the need for cheap ready access furnished housing can 
be met through affordable and accessible self-contained accommodation 
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shared houses have an important role to play at the bottom of the market. 
The challenge is to upgrade them and their management without reducing the 
relatively low cost of multi-occupied houses (Thomas, with Hedges, 1986). 
LHAs will therefore have to pitch local standards in relation to 
judgements about supply. Although few units of accommodation are likely 
to be lost (Thomas judged 7 per cent by enforcement action at IEHO 
recommended standards), landlords' costs will go up. 
That LHAs acknowledge the supply consequences of their decisions is clear 
from survey responses, both in respect of standards and local rules about 
payment of housing benefit on rent. On the latter the position at the 
time of the survey reflected concerns that benefit, especially 
certificated benefit, drove up rent. Some LHAs were therefore referring 
rents to Rent Officers for determination of Fair Rents - not usually in 
all cases, but in cases where rents were unreasonably high by a given 
margin above local Fair Rent levels. (See Leeds City Council, 1986; York 
City Council, 1986). LHAs accepted that this was a difficult decision to 
take. If rents fell, supply might be withdrawn or tenants harassed by 
their landlords. Many indeed commented on the need for a balance to be 
struck, somehow, between high standards with high rents (and benefits) and 
low standards with low rents, as a result of 'tough' rent and benefit 
policies. LHAs' ability to choose their policy was being increasingly 
limited however by the incentive based arrangements introduced in 1988 for 
paying DSS subsidy to LHAs. Benefit payments did not cover all the 
payments, where rents were unreasonably high in relation to local Fair 
Rent levels. Similar arrangements also apply to rent support in the 
deregulated market following on the Housing Act 1988 (e.g. see DoE, 
1987d). Rent officers will determine whether or not market rents paid by 
Housing Benefit claimants are reasonable. If not DSS subsidy on LHA 
benefit payment will be restricted to that part of the rent which is 
reasonable. If LHAs want to pay benefit on the full market rent they will 
have to fund all of the difference. (See Chapter 20 for further discus-
sion of this). 
All this goes to illustrate the importance of co-ordinated local action 
(AMA 1987) which becomes all the more important if mandatory duties are 
not imposed. HMO standards are not just a question for environmental 
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hea 1 th and fire officers. Town planning, tenancy relations, housing 
management (rehousing and managing control order HMOs), rent levels and 
benefits all have to be considered. Difficult decisions have to be taken. 
They need assessment in the light of local circumstances. 
Rules can appropriately circumscribe some of these, but room for 
discretion must be left open in relation to standards and their 
applications, provided their application is open to procedural review and 
challenge. Clear rules however can specify LHAs obligation to regularly 
inspect and register all HMOs, subject to agreed and specific exceptions, 
as suggested, and require them to draw up local standards and enforce 
them. All of this will need resources and creative decisions on how best 
to use officers in teams so that their public service aspirations are not 
frustrated by experiences as 'street level bureaucrats'. 
What remains in doubt is whether the circumstances will be favourable for 
LHAs to exercise these tougher powers. If anything, deregulation will 
worsen conditions. If rents rise, more marginal owner occupiers with 
access to credit (and some savings) will transfer to owner occupation, 
thus reducing demand at rents which could give competitive returns on 
habitable HMOs. Demand for low quality and high density accommodation 
from those on low wages and limited benefit will increase, especially in 
areas of excess demand because subsidies will be insufficient to enable 
them to pay the kind of rents which will give landlords competitive 
returns on better housing. The bad conditions will further undermine the 
already poor reputation of this part of the private rented sector and 
deter 'responsible' investors. In short, it is unlikely that the Govern-
ment has created the circumstances in which LHA use of these powers can be 
effective, given the unfavourable market factors within which LHAs will 
have to use them, not the least the continuing insecurity and poverty of 
those dependent on HMOs, for whom few, if any, alternatives exist. 
What is crucial, therefore, to successful enforcement is the nature of the 
wider economic framework, as much as the specific details of enforcement 
duties and powers. HMO tenants cannot afford the rents landlords require 
for decent housing. Subsidies are needed therefore. These can either go 
to the tenants, in the form of housing benefit to help them pay higher 
rents, or to the landlord in the form of improvement grants to reduce his 
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or her own costs of providing decent standards at levels which can be paid 
for from current rent levels. There can be a mixture of both demand and 
supply subsidies. Enforcement will increase landlords' costs and, in 
certain circumstances, the number of lettings will fall. Rents will have 
to rise sufficiently to enable landlords to get a competitive return and 
Housing Benefit will have to take the strain to enable tenants to defray 
rent increases. The extent to which the Housing Benefit system does this 
will be crucial to the success of enforcement - if it is to work in the 
interest of existing tenants. If rents do not rise - or do not rise 
sufficiently - to cover the investment required, then payment of discre-
tionary grant under the proposed system should in principle cover all the 
costs not met by rents. Whether or not it does, will turn on LHAs' 
wi llingness to pay grants and on the detailed rules used to determine 
grant, not the least the allowance made for risk, liquidity and capital 
appreciation in deciding on an appropriate rate of return to work out how 
much of the improvement and repair works can be serviced by rents. Debates 
on the enforcement of HMO standards must therefore incorporate a debate 
about the resources and rules for the Housing Benefit and improvement 
grant systems and their application at the local level. Unless these 
other financial frameworks are consistently related to the achievement of 
housing standards, LHAs' use of the propsoed tougher enforcement powers 
may well prove to be abortive. 
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PART FIVE 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
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CHAPTER 20 
INVESTMENT IN PRIVATE RENTED HOUSING IN THE 19808 AND 19908: 
HARKET RESPONSES TO REGULATION AND DEREGULATION 
Introduction 
The empirical research reported in this thesis has been done into two 
quite specific aspects of private rented housing. First, the nature and 
impact of LHA policy in respect of physical and management standards. 
Second, the extent to which there have been changes in the ownership of 
private rented houses - and the impact which new investment has had on 
physical conditions. 
The evidence about LHA policy, the ways discretionary powers are used and 
their impact on standards have been discussed in some depth 1n the 
previous three parts of the thesis. The implications of the research 
findings for the way LHAs should be able to enforce standards and pay 
grants to private landlords in the future were examined in Chapters 18 and 
19. Both chapters contained an evaluation of current Government policy in 
this respect and put forward specific alternative proposals. It is not 
intended to repeat these discussions in detail here, but to refer to them 
only as necessary in the context of the main purpose of this concluding 
chapter. 
Instead the objective of this last chapter is to summarise the evidence in 
the thesis about changes in the ownership of private rented housing, to 
look at how recent investors have responded to central and local govern-
ment policy about private renting over the last decade, and to consider 
how they might react to current policy on deregulation. 
Since 1980 the Government's intention has been to increase the private 
renting of empty property and stimulate new building, especially for those 
who are mobile and want accommodation for a relatively short period, but 
the initiatives taken by the Government in 1980 are widely agreed to have 
had little impact (see Kemp, 1981a; HCEC, 1982). Until now, policy about 
private renting has tended to ignore questions of demand and links between 
tenures, whilst concentrating on regulatory measures (see, for example, 
Doling and Davies, 1984; and Harloe, 1985). It has left untouched the 
tax and subsidy discrimination against private renting and has not 
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increased the rent-paying capacity of predominantly low income private 
tenants at a time when the middle and upper income groups who sustained 
private renting in the past now own their own homes. 
During the 1980s there has been a growing interest in reviving private 
investment in rented housing, both in Britain and abroad (see, for 
example, Maclennan, 1988 and NFHA, 1985). There are many reasons for 
this, including in Britain the ideological preference of the Government 
for privatisation. Other factors include the growing concern about the 
shortage of housing for rent, manifested, in its most acute form, in 
rising homelessness, in the face of public expenditure constraints, the 
pervasive physical decay in private rented housing in inner city 
neighbourhoods, and the acute shortage of rented housing in growing 
regions of economies, co-existing with labour surpluses in the peripheral 
regions. 
For all these reasons the Government has now gone considerably beyond its 
1980 measures and deregulated new lettings. In its 1981 White Paper it 
argued that private renting is a good option for people who need mobility 
and do not wish to be tied to the ownership of a house (DoE, 1981a). 
Controls mean landlords' returns give them no incentive to stay in the 
market and keep property repaired. Laws on security deter people from 
providing temporary let tings. The supply has shrunk below 'what is 
needed' and those who want to move cannot find new tenancies. Partial 
deregulation was proposed as a means of stimulating supply. It was 
enacted in the Housing Act, 1988. 
The objective of this chapter is to use the evidence gained from this 
research and elsewhere to evaluate the short term impact of deregulation. 
The chapter has four sections. The first looks at the investment that has 
occurred in the 1980s and how it has been shaped by policy. The second 
identifies the problems that have arisen and examines the needs of 
landlords and of tenants that should be met in a market framework. The 
third section looks at how far the new legislation on deregulation meets 
these needs. 
needed. 
The final section suggests what further improvements are 
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Investment in the 1980s 
The main effects of policies, given the economic environment of the 1980s, 
were overall dec line in the size of the sector, together with a large 
scale shift within the sector away from the provision of regulated, mainly 
unfurnished tenancies, towards let tings which for all practical purposes 
fell outside the regulatory framework. 
One third of the houses let unfurnished in inner Sheffield in 1979 became 
vacant during the period of the analysis. Over half of these were sold to 
owner-occupiers. 25 per cent were relet furnished, and only 17 per cent 
were relet unfurnished. On the other hand, in the much smaller furnished 
sector, even though nearly 30 per cent of the houses let in 1979 were sold 
to owner-occupiers, the total supply remained constant, mainly because of 
the houses transferred from unfurnished lettings. 
Investment in the Unfurnished Sector 
One of the most important findings with respect to the regulated 
unfurnished sub-sector was the level of activity among investors. 
Basically what had been happening was that older style, long term 
landlords had been selling up mainly to large company landlords, often in 
the building industry, new to landlordism. 
The objective of these new landlords or "property dealers" was not 
apparently long term investment but rather to obtain improvement grants, 
upgrade the property and ultimately sell as vacant units. The process can 
be characterised thus. Property dealers speculated by buying terraced 
properties with sitting tenants to sell when the tenants leave. In the 
meantime, the properties were improved with up to 15 per cent grants, 
making them saleable and mortgageable, and at the same time often 
providing building work for the landlords' businesses. To avoid being 
locked into long term lettings, they bought run down property (to attract 
grant), with single pensioner sitting tenants (to maximise chances of 
vacancy and avoid relatives with succession rights) and bought on a large 
scale (guaranteeing a steady rate of vacancies). If tenants quit or died 
before conditions on grants keeping the property in the rented sector 
expired, landlords relet temporarily on shorthold to avoid repaying the 
grant. This process was happening in two thirds of the 41 urban local 
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housing authorities studied, especially in partnership and programme 
authorities when grants are more readily available. In Sheffield. 45 per 
cent of the 1985 unfurnished sample had changed hands since 1970 
Buyers advertised for tenanted property in local papers, bought at auction 
and used networks of estate agents acting as brokers between new and old 
landlords. There had been particular interest in umimproved terraced 
housing in renewal areas, subject to compulsory repair and improvement 
notices, because these carried the right to mandatory grants - important 
at times of grant restrictions. Moreover, existing owners subject to 
enforcement notices often had neither the desire, nor the capital to 
improve, so they wished to sell and were generally better off financially 
selling out to property dealers than to local authorities or housing 
associations. 
Local authority policy was important to this investment strategy - through 
their area schemes, grant policy and repairs enforcement orders. This 
last both put pressure on existing landlords to sell up and carried grant 
entitlement, without continued letting as a condition of award. Some 
authorities thought buyers were deliberately running down property or 
persuading their newly acquired tenants to complain to attract enforcement 
action. Elderly tenants, on the other hand, were often unhappy when 
confronted with their new landlords' workforce. 
Investment 1n the Furn1shed Sector 
The follow-uP survey in Sheffield included only houses let to a single 
household, but as these households were often sharers, including students, 
the lettings came within definitions of houses in multiple occupation. 
This sub-sector had also undergone considerable change in ownership. Over 
a quarter of the 1985 total had changed hands since 1979. These included 
two thirds of the properties switching from unfurnished to furnished 
lettings and, significantly, three quarters of those switching were bought 
with vacant possession. Most new investors were small scale with fewer 
than six properties each. 
This trend was confirmed by the survey of the 41 authorities. Almost all 
authorities had experienced an increase in furnished accommodation. Over 
half thought the number of shared houses had increased - suggesting that 
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this was where the 'smart money' was going, especially in partnership and 
programme authorities. Generally investors were buying up terraced 
houses, 'putting in a few kitchen units' and letting to young singles. 
Such lettings were subject to fewer controls, cost less in overheads and 
offered a greater chance of capital gain than traditional beds1ts. 
It was tempting to describe these investors as "property milkers". Far 
more than in the unfurnished sub-sector, lettings are regarded as 
investments for their rent income than for capital gain alone and most are 
puchased for continued letting. Their state of repair suggests they have 
been "milked" for the maximum net rental. New landlords acquired 
furnished property in the very worst state of repair, and few put defects 
right. Furnished property was in worse repair in Sheffield than 
unfurnished in both 1979 and 1985 
Tenants, however, appeared much less likely than unfurnished tenants to 
complain. This is probably because they neither understand the system nor 
feel confident to risk complaining. The 1985 national survey of HMO's 
confirmed this: 80 per cent were below standard on at least one of three 
criteria (disrepair, occupancy and management). Tenants did not complain 
either to the local authority or to landlords, because they feared 
harassment and eviction and knew that there was a shortage of reasonable 
quality housing they could afford. Most had only a vague idea about the 
Councils' responsibilities and distrusted officialdom. 
The insecurity of furnished tenants was highlighted by the fact that most 
Sheffield lettings were not directly protected by the Rent Act - with half 
such tenants in 1985 having licence agreements, which allowed market 
rents and provided contractual security. Since then, the Street and 
Montford judgement has suggested that many licences would be legally 
regarded as 'sham' evasion. Landlords have therefore turned to shorthold 
tenancies which give only contractual security but did come within the 
Fair Rent system, until the enactment of the Housing Act, 1988. (Blakey, 
1987; Carver and Martin, 1987). 
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Rents and Investment Returns 
The main reasons usually advanced for the decline in private renting, 
particularly in the regulated sector are the low rents and rates of return 
available and the better investment opportunities elsewhere. The surveys 
provide considerable evidence on these aspects. 
First, in the unfurnished sector in Sheffield rents - net of rates, water 
and service charges - doubled in real terms between 1979 and 1985. Over 
the period the retail price index and the average earnings index of all 
employees rose by 74 and 87 per cent respectively, whereas rents rose at 
least twice as much as this. This increase was mainly the result of Rent 
Officer determination. 80 per cent were registered Fair Rents and, except 
for the presence or absence of basic amenities, variations in rents 
amongst properties were largely explained by the date of rent registration 
and, therefore, by the effect of the phasing of increases. The state of 
repair of the property made no statistical difference to the registered 
rent. In the light of this evidence, it is hardly surprising that 
landlords (especially longstanding ones) endorsed the Fair Rent system as 
an independent means of setting rents - the operators of the legal control 
system were clearly often allowing them higher rents than they would 
otherwise have achieved. 
For all these increases, rates of return on rent alone were s till low. 
Calculations of returns from unfurnished properties in 1985 based upon 
rents, the 1985 vacant possession capital valuation of the sample proper-
ties (average 12,900) and their annual management and maintenance costs 
(average £244) suggested that unfurnished properties yielded only about 5 
per cent per annum gross (3 per cent net of costs) on rent alone (i.e. 
making no allowance for capital appreciation). 
Not surprisingly only 32 per cent of unfurnished houses in Sheffield in 
1985 had landlords who were satisfied with these returns, especially as 
many made comparisons with returns from more liquid and less risky 
alternatives like building societies or government bonds. These nominal 
returns however ignored real increases in rents and capital appreciation. 
When these are incorporated, the net present value of the return gained by 
landlords who had bought unfurnished sitting tenant property 1n 1979 was 
more than the alternative of plaCing the sitting tenant price either 1n 
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Building Societies or equities over the period 1979 to 1985, provided 
capital appreciation in the sitting tenant value was included in the 
calculation. Although this does not take into account the greater risk 
and lower liquidity of property investment, property dealers had an 
investment strategy which minimised risk and maximised liquidity, as the 
research showed. 
Landlords were, nonetheless, rational to say they would sell unfurnished 
property if it became vacant "tomorrow". If they had got vacant 
possession in 1979 they would have been better off investing the sale 
proceeds in alternative investments than carrying on renting. Only if 
they could have been certain in 1979 that they would get vacant possession 
(and capital gain) in 1985 would they have been bet tel' off staying in 
property. Thus, despite the doubling of rents in real terms since 1979, 
80 per cent of properties had landlords who would sell vacancies 
"tomorrow", once the restraints of re1etting conditions on grant aided 
property were taken into account. Property dealers would be cashing in 
their speculative gains and more longstanding, often elderly, landlords 
extracting their capital and escaping the "bother and fuss" of coping with 
property. 
If landlords can expect real increases in rents and capital gain, it is 
better to compare nominal returns from renting with equities, rather than 
Building Societies or bonds. Nevertheless the 3 per cent nominal net 
return was clearly inadequate (even given the rent increases and capital 
gain on top), especially given the, then, low liquidity and high risk of 
private rental investments. Indeed the British Property Federat10n in 
evidence to the House of Commons Environment Committee argued for 6 per 
cent net, 9 per cent gross (HCEC, 1982, Vol. 2 p.276). Indeed the Small 
Landlords Association were quite emphatic about this in their evidence to 
the same Committee. They argued for 12 per cent gross, 10 per cent net. 
'Such an increase would be clearly beyond the means of many tenants. 
Equally, however, many landlords would be satisfied with a lower rate of 
return provided they were guaranteed the right of repossession on 
reasonable terms, in which case it would be reasonable to take account of 
any real capital gains'. (HCEC 1982, Vol. 2, P .179) • This implies 
doubling rents on existing stock in Sheffield - along with appropriate 
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adjustments to security to increase liquidity. Thus the level of rents 
and the extent of security are important in determining landlords' rates 
of return. 
The position in the furnished sector was, not surprisingly, very 
different. Rents for houses which were let furnished in both 1979 and 
1985 doubled, rising 25 per cent more than retail prices between 1979 and 
1985 - less rapidly than in the unfurnished sector. Of course where 
landlords changed from unfurnished to furnished letting they got very much 
bigger increases. This part of the market was essentially deregulated 
with only 7 per cent of rents being registered. Rents were closely 
related to the total number of sharers, especially students. Landlords 
liked students because they could increase occupancy levels and let to 
them on per person rentals (consistent with non-exclusive occupation 
agreements). As a result, on average they received £2,700 per annum from 
houses let to students in 1985. 
In 1985 furnished properties were valued on average at £15,900 and annual 
running costs averaged £612. Average annual nominal rates of return were 
14 per cent gross and 9 per cent net. Not surprisingly, 72 per ~ent of 
furnished houses had landlords satisfied with their rental income and 80 
per cent of furnished houses would be relet if they became vacant 
, tomorrow' • 
Private Rented Investment: Current· Problems and Implioations for Polioy 
The Unfurnished Sub-sector 
This has also been sometimes referred to as the long term sub-sector in 
this thesis - and elsewhere. The majority of its tenants are elderly, 
they typically live in terraced housing and have lived there for many 
years. Their incomes are low and their rents are registered Fair Rents. 
Property dealers ~ made money from letting such property in good 
condition to low income people, usually on registered rents, but only 
because they invested for capital gain rather than rent. Rent increases 
since 1979 were not enough to pursuade them to stay in residential 
property, mainly because the gap between sitting tenant values (the prices 
investors pay to buy the discounted stream of net rents and capital 
685 
appreciation) and vacant possession values (the prices owner-occupiers are 
willing to pay) has remained. The gap existed not only because rents were 
kept low by regulation, but also because of the low effective demand from 
poor tenants, because security puts restraints on landlords' capacity to 
realise their investment, and because vacant possession prices were 
increased by subsidies to owner-occupiers. 
Rents in this unfurnished regulated sector do not give landlords returns 
on vacant possession value commensurate with returns elsewhere, which have 
similar - or better - risk and liquidity characteristics. Existing 
landlords therefore want to sell up, but have to hang on in order to get 
the vacant possession value, unless they sell prematurely with sitting 
tenants because of age, capital requirement or a perceived risk of being 
stuck with the property, including the risk of repairs enforcement by the 
local authority. 
The value gap also explained the activities of property dealers who 
exploited it by buying at sitting tenant value to sell at vacant 
possession value, prepared to offer existing landlords a "mark up" on 
si t ting tenant prices to encourage sales. Loca 1 authorities' po licies 
(enforcement action, mandatory grants and area renewal schemes) assisted 
dealers by providing a pool of traditional landlords sell1ng up, grants 
for subsidised upgrading, and environmental improvements which encouraged 
potential home owners to buy houses in the area. 
Without substantial extra subsidies, rents in a deregulated market paid by 
low income tenants are unlikely to rise sufficiently to close this value 
gap and so prevent continued decline of the eXisting inventory, let alone 
rise to levels which would give competitive returns in relation to 
replacement costs and thus bring about new building for long term renting. 
Insofar as realising capital gain is important the investment must also be 
liquid: hence long term security, as well as low rent, stands in the way 
of encouraging investment. 
Tbe Furnisbed Sub-sector 
This has also been referred to as the "rapid turnover sub-sector", since 
most of its tenants are young singles and other transient groups. Most 
are on low incomes and they tend to stay only for a short period in a 
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letting. Investment in lettings here has been prof1table. Nominal rates 
of return have been comparable with alternative liquid investments. But 
prof1table letting to low income people was only possible by renting out 
disrepaired and badly managed properties on licence agreements at high 
occupancy rates to tenants dependent on grants and welfare payments and 
paying out very high proportions of their gross income in rent. Moreover 
access was problematic. Non-price rationing was endemic. Tenants could 
face demands for large advance rental payments or 'side money' at the 
better end of the market. The need to exploit tenants in this manner in 
order to make profits reinforces negative images of landlordism. Agents 
who are professionally qualified avoid this area of property management to 
eliminate potent1al involvement in dubious practices. 
This sub-sector was de facto deregulated by 1985 - although in principle 
the poss1bility of tenants establishing protection and getting rents 
registered, Umi ted the rents landlords charged to avoid the risk of 
tenants seeking to refer even higher rents to Rent Officers. But both 
parties faced problems. Tenants got accommodation which was insecure and 
was poor value for money. Landlords found their investment risky. Demand 
depended on the income maintenance systems available to students and to 
unemployed tenants and licencees. Councils were starting to refer 
unreasonably high rents to Rent Officers when tenants claimed Housing 
Benefit. Costs depended on the local authorities' willingness to enforce 
repair and other standards, and many authorities were becoming more active 
in this regard. Finally, landlords had to let outside the Rent Acts to 
maintain rent and the liquidity of their investment. Up until 1989, this 
was a high risk area and a risk premium was required if landlords were to 
remain in the sector. Current investors' expertise has had to be as much 
in operating outside the legal framework as it has had to be in prudent 
and responsible property management. 
Implioations for Legal and Finanoial Frameworks: Landlords' and 
Tenants' Requirements 
The pre-1989 legal and financial framework met the needs neither of 
landlords nor tenants. Unfurnished tenants paid (relatively) low rents 
for secure but poor quality properties - unless property dealers bought 
them. Furnished tenants paid high rents for insecure and poor conditions, 
whilst prospective tenants searched under conditions of excess demand. 
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Meanwhile landlords either accepted below market returns or operated 
outside the legal framework. As the Commons Select Committee on the 
Environment observed in 1982, the central dilemma is that rents would have 
to rise considerably to give landlords competitive returns on decent 
housing, but that such rents could not be paid without greater hardship or 
considerable subsidy (HCEC 1982, Vol. 1). Deregulation, per se, is no 
guarantee that market rents would give competitive returns. If these 
problems are to be resolved within a market framework, policy must address 
questions of demand as well as supply. 
Tenants in the long term sub-sector are mostly elderly. They require low 
rents, security, and improved standards. They need protecting from 
harassment if landlords seek to sell or to let in the deregulated sector. 
Landlords will ultimately sell upon vacant possession. Meanwhile they 
need incentives to improve and maintain standards, but there is no case 
for deregulating rents since most have paid a sitting tenant price and are 
getting adequate returns on this. (See Ricketts, 1986, for an alternative 
approach to this sector, involving tradeable property rights rather than 
deregulation per se). 
Tenants in the rapid turnover sector want easy access, habitable standards 
and affordable rents more than long term security. Few can pay rents 
which are both affordable and also give landlords adequate returns, 
certainly on replacement costs as well as on the cost of supplying from 
the existing inventory. Tenants' low bargaining power affords them little 
choice especially in areas of excess demand. If their bargaining power 
cannot be raised they need protection through standard contracts together 
with more opportunities to choose accommodation by the building of more 
local authority and housing association houses. Only if there is a big 
increase in supply is it likely that low income tenants, with little 
current choice or bargaining power, will benefit from deregulation. 
Landlords in the rapid turnover sector want adequate returns in relation 
to the liquidity and risk of this type of investment. This means a 
combination of rents which gives competitive returns, the ability to evict 
bad tenants with speedier procedures, and repossession when they want to 
sell. Large, long term investors emphasise rents and competitive returns. 
Small ones are concerned about modifying security. (See for example 
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evidence of British Property Federation, Chesterton's and Small Landlords' 
Association In HCEC, 1982 Vol. 2 ; see also Whitehead et ale, 1985). 
Stability in the legal framework is also needed to eliminate uncertainty 
about the reintroduction of controls. It is also important to increase 
the reputation of this class of investments so that good quality landlords 
are prepared to come into the market. If landlordism is seen as a 
repugnant form of investment, many will not enter the field, even if the 
returns are good. Capital subsidies may be important therefore, in 
ensuring both that returns are competitive and social objectives are 
achieved. 
Deregulation 
Given this picture, it is not surprising that a market oriented government 
should seek to change the regulatory framework and attempt to make private 
renting a more desirable investment. In other words, the Government has 
attempted to shift the balance in favour of investors and, in so doing, to 
give a higher priority to the needs of those seeking accommodation. One of 
the problems for legislators who want to carry through a programme of 
deregulation is how to balance the interests of existing and potential 
tenants (see for example the analysis in Whitehead et al., 1985). If 
existing tenants are to be protected, is it possible to prevent 
deregulation of new lettings 'spilling over' to the existing sector? More 
generally, it needs to be recognised that the problems of the sector and 
the interests of its residents are very diverse. A single policy is 
unlikely to meet the required range of policy objectives, ranging from the 
needs of the elderly and the condition of their houses to the needs of job 
movers and of young people leaving home for the first time. Different 
policy instruments will be required. 
The Government's policies about this and other matters are now examined in 
the light of the thesis and other evidence. 
The Relevant Provisions of the Housing Aot, 1988 
Under the provision of the Housing Act 1988, the private rented sector 1s 
again split into two - now delineated by the date at which the tenancy 
commenced. (See Smith, 1988 for a concise summary). 
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Existing tenants lose neither their security nor their right to Fair 
Rents, although rights of succession are modified to speed up 
deregulation. Laws on harassment are also strengthened. All new 
lettings, which would in the past have been Rent Act lettings (including 
relets), however, will be at market rents, but with varying security. 
There are two ways of letting. First, there is a modified form of 
assured tenancy with freely negotiated rents, in which it is lawful to 
charge a premium, and where security will be protected by fixed tenancies 
running on as statutory periodic tenancies, subject to new mandatory and 
discretionary grounds for eviction, such as, respectively, three months 
rent arrears and persistent delay in paying. If the basis for rent 
increments is not specified in the contract, Rent Assessment Committees 
may adjudicate on a market rent. The previous requirements for assured 
tenancy landlords to be approved and for qualifying lettings to be newly 
built or improved has been abolished. Second, assured shorthold tenancies 
will have no security beyond a fixed period (as little as six months) but 
tenants (during a firs t con tractua I shortho Id) may apply to the Rent 
Assessment Committee to determine a market rent, which will take account 
of the limited security, in situations where market rents are considered 
excessive and information about comparables exists. The expectation is 
that rents for assured tenancies will be higher than for assured 
shortholds because of the greater security (thus compensating landlords 
for their lower liquidity). 
Rent officers will be able to ration housing benefit if tenants occupy too 
much space or rent very expensive properties. More generally, market 
rents paid by all Housing Benefit claimants will be referred to Rent 
Officers for validation as reasonable for the purposes of the subsidy paid 
by the Department of Social Security to local authorities. These rents 
will be based on a rate of return method, allowing for capital 
appreciation, where no competitive market exists (consultants have been 
advising DoE on this). The Government will reimburse local authorities 
the cost of paying benefit on reasonable rents, but if they choose to pay 
benefit on a rent which is judged 'unreasonable' they must bear the full 
cost of the difference. (see DoE 1987d). This is an extension of existing 
practice and policy. Local authorities have been able to limit benefit to 
reasonable rents or refer unregistered rents to Rent Officers, and from 
April 1988 incentive based formulae were introduced to calculate Central 
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Government subsidy on local authorities' housing benefit payments. Subsidy 
was paid at 25 per cent (instead of the normal 97 per cent) when benefit 
was paid on rents in excess of a limit for each district, corresponding 
nationally to 180 per cent of average registered rents. The 1988 Act 
abolished local authorities' powers to refer unregistered rents to Rent 
Officers. 
As Chapters 18 and 19 have discussed, the Government also proposes to 
restructure the home improvement grant system, reducing required standards 
and making all grants to private landlords discretionary. Grant paid will 
no longer be related to a given percentage of eligible costs, but to a 
test of landlords' ability to finance the eligible work out of rental 
income. 
Two associated pieces of legislation are relevant to a consideration of 
deregulation. For the first time since 1945 they provide subsidies for 
the provision of private rented housing, enabling private landlords to 
compete on more nearly equal terms with other tenures. 
The Local Government Act, 1988, gives local authorities the power to 
provide financial assistance to private landlords (and housing 
associations) letting assured tenancies. The assistance can range from 50 
to 75 per cent of scheme cost, dependent on region. 
More significantly the Finance Act, 1988, extended the provisions of the 
Business Expansion Scheme (BES) to rented housing. This provides 
significant inducements to invest in unquoted companies letting assured 
tenancies (assured shorthold letting does not qualify) in properties which 
are fit, have all the standard amenities, and are subject to no premium. 
To qualify for the BES tax breaks up to 1993, individuals must invest a 
minimum of £500 and a maximum of £40,000 in any year, either directly or 
through a managed fund, in new property companies let ting on assured 
tenancies. This investment is eligible for income tax relief at 
investors' marginal tax rates and for full capital gains tax relief on 
disposal of shares after five years (although the company is liable for 
tax on gains it makes on property it sells). Companies can invest up to 
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£5m per tax year and properties should cost no more than £85,000 outside 
London (£125,000 in London) at acquisition or after refurbishment (See 
Greaves, 1989; Hackwood, 1989; Smith, 1988). 
Evaluation: The Continuing Regulated Sector 
The Government have been correct not to remove controls from existing 
tenants who are often elderly and have nowhere else to go. They are also 
right to tighten up the laws on harassment, particularly by giving 
displaced tenants the right to compensation related to capital gains. 
There should anyway be little risk of additional harassment as the 
incentives which previously existed before 1989 to secure vacant 
possession to sell or to let on the de facto deregulated market have 
hardly changed. 
Ultimately these properties will be sold off mainly to owner-occupiers. In 
the meantime some will be acquired by property dealers and improved. As 
Chapter 18 sugges ted, how far the grant reforms will remove property 
dealers' and long standing owners' incentives to carry out improvements 
depends in part on the test used to define the rental resources available 
to pay for improvement, whether it is property or firm related, how much 
is allowed for risk and liquidity and how much expenditure is to be 
eligible for grant aid. The removal of mandatory grant is likely to 
reduce dealers' incentives to invest. The proposed system is likely to be 
more efficient in the use of public funds (grants will not be paid on 
costs which could be supported by rents). It is less likely to be 
equitable (since the discretionary basis could mean that grants could be 
distributed in a capricious and arbitrary manner unrelated to tenants' or 
landlords' needs). It is also likely to be less effective because it 
will increase uncertainty and will be harder to understand. 
If incentives are to be reduced, failure to get property improved will be 
a cost, not only to many tenants, but also to whole neighbourhoods. The 
Government needs to tackle this problem on a much more comprehensive 
basis, including an appropriate combination of mandatory and discretionary 
grant aid together with tax allowances to encourage investment in the 
stock. In effect there is a strong case (provided that tenants' interest 
are protected) for encouraging a private sector "buyout" from older 
longstanding landlords who are uninterested in improvements. And the 
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application of fair rent formulae (which still apply to existing tenants) 
should create incentives for landlords to carry out annual and cyclical 
maintenance. Such a 'buyout' strategy could involve housing associations 
as well as private interests (see Maclennan, 1986, 1988). 
Evaluation: The Deregulated Sector 
The main emphasis of policy 1s however on the new tenancies and on 
increasing investment in easy access accommodation. The overall intention 
of the legislative changes is to increase rents, to reduce the risk of 
this class of investment and to enhance its liquidity, thereby increasing 
returns to a competitive level and drawing in new responsible investors 
who will expand the overall supply. The Government particularly want to 
increase supply for households at an early stage in their lifecycle and 
for job movers and do not intend private renting to provide for families 
or other low income households. This is correct. Either owner-occupat10n 
or social rented housing can bet tel' meet the needs of families and the 
vulnerable. Only those with economic power are likely to benefit from the 
attributes of private rented housing in relation to ready access, lower 
transaction costs, fewer obligations and flexibility in changing housing 
decisions (Whitehead and Kleinman, 1986). Indeed, as Coleman points out, 
given the existence of mortgage interest income tax relief for owner 
occupiers, 'renting at market rents but without an equivalent fiscal or 
other subsidy for tenant or landlord becomes an attractive or cheap choice 
for the consumer only under limited circumstances' (Coleman, 1989, p.46). 
He identifies the following categories where this might apply: those who 
want to live cheaply in a small quantity of housing in a city centre 
location, people who move often and incur a lot of transactions costs, 
high income households not wanting the responsibility of owning a home, 
those who need to save up for a deposit to buy, and short term residents 
like students and overseas business people. 
The market for this ready access housing was, however, de facto already 
deregulated by 1989. The question is whether de jure deregulation will 
lead to increased rents, provide competitive returns, draw in new 
investors, increase supply and give tenants bargaining power. 
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On the demand side, there must be some doubt as to how far higher rents 
can be sustained, given the low income of current and potential tenants 
unless there is increased subsidy to help them defray higher costs. Three 
factors suggests the opposite may happen. 
First, students' grants have fallen in real terms by 20 per cent since 
1980 and they have lost some of their eligibility to claim housing 
benefit, particularly to claim benefit in the summer vacation unless they 
reside at their pri va te rented residence, thus undermining landlords' 
income, many of whom rented for 52 weeks to students who 'occupied' for 
say, 38 (see Harris, 1987). The announcement that grants are to be frozen 
and topped up with loans after 1990 increases uncertainty about levels of 
demand from students. 
Second, the revised Housing Benefit system introduced in April 1988 
worsened the position for those in work, those with occupational pensions 
and savings and those under 25 (see Kemp, 1987b, for background to this 
reform). Although it covers all eligible rent and, 80 per cent of the 
rates for those below the Income Support Level, and whilst all tenants 
receiving some benefit will be protected from rent increases, significant 
numbers, including low paid workers, will receive little help towards 
total rent and those on benefit will be subject to high marginal tax rates 
if their incomes increase, because of the steep taper of 65 pence 1n every 
pound by wh1ch benefit is withdrawn when net income exceeds Income 
Support. 
Because all tenants in receipt of some housing benef1t receive, in extra 
benefit, the full amount of any rent increase, all tenants on benefit have 
marginal housing costs of zero and no financial incentive to 'haggle' with 
landlords over rents and to 'shop around' to find al terna t1 ves. As a 
result there will be a complex administrative system of referring the 
rents of claimants to Rent Officers to check if the rent is a market rent 
or a rent which reflects the operation of the Housing Benefit System. The 
problems involved in validating 'reasonable' market rents in areas where 
there have been few comparable free market lettings are very considerable. 
Using a rate of return method implies knowledge of vacant possession 
valuations, of what to allow for risk, liquidity and capital appreciat10n 
and how to assess appropriate allowances for furnishings, management and 
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maintenance. None of these will be readily assessable (see Whitehead and 
Kleinman, 1988 for a general discussion of this problem). If these rents 
are set below actual rents charged, LHA subsidy will not be paid by DSS 
on the difference. LHAs will be free to pay full benefit on the rent 
actuallY charged, rather than the rent validated by the rent officer, but 
will have to pay for the full cost of the difference. If they prefer to 
pay benefit only on the validated rent, tenants will then have to pay even 
more from their meagre resources, or landlords will increase occupancy 
rates for a lower per person rent or rents will fall, causing landlords to 
leave the market. 
Thus, whilst the formal removal of controls may lift any ceiling currently 
placed on de facto deregulated rents, there is little evidence that the 
market can sustain substantially higher rents, except in areas of housing 
pressure such as London, given the low income of tenants and the new 
Housing Benefit system. Moreover where the system pays all the eligible 
rent plus increases, claimants will have no financial incentive to shop 
around to find al ternati ves. As a consequence tenants will lack either 
financial muscle or incentive to bargain with landlords about rents as 
well as other contractual terms, the latter being particularly important 
since the Government have not legislated for standard contracts. Only if 
there is a big increase in supply is it likely that low income tenants, 
with little current choice or bargaining power, will benefit from 
deregulation and, given the enhanced powers landlords have to fix rents 
and other terms, deregulation will bear particularly harshly on low income 
tenants in areas of shortage. Most tenants will be too poor to pay the 
rents which will give landlords competitive returns, while those that can 
pay them will find it cheaper to become home owners. If rents rise it 
will give further incentives for people who are ineligible for housing 
benefit to transfer into owner occupation where they will get tax relief 
on mortgage interest as of right. There must be some doubt therefore 
whether the demand side conditions conducive to new investors have been 
created, unless additional subsidies are provided. 
That is not to say, of course,that a growth in supply of new and well 
improved houses to rent privately in desirable neighbourhoods would not, 
of itself, create a demand which does not now exist. Given that such ac-
commodation is very difficult to find now, potential demand is deflected 
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into owner occupation where such property is more readily available. 
potential demand for such rented accommodation may well be found amongst 
groupS of job movers and other well paid professional and other workers at 
an early stage of their careers who value the flexibility that renting can 
bring and who can also afford a rent giving landlords a competitive 
return. Currently many such potential tenants choose to buy and tie up 
capital, not only because subsidised home ownership is very competitive, 
compared to paying an economic rent, but because they cannot find housing 
of comparable quality in the rented sector. If they can, they will retain 
flexibility, eliminate (or substantially reduce) transactions costs and 
will not need to lock up capital in house purchase. In such situations 
renting may well become more attractive to them. 
It also has to be admitted that the new legislation is a stage in the 
direction of providing the necessary conditions for increased supply. In 
principle, the legislation enhances the reputation and increases 
confidence by lowering the risk of this class of inves tment since it 
provides a statutory framework for letting at market rents with minimal 
security and reduces the risks of being saddled with 'bad' tenants. The 
rate of return required for this lower risk should be less than under the 
current framework for, as can be seen from the Sheffield evidence, current 
de facto market rents reflect the high risk of letting on the margins of 
the law. De jure market rents need not necessarily rise, all other things 
being equal. Given market rents, contractual arrangements for rent 
reviews in line with inflation and statutory powers to remove bad payers, 
together with other possession rights enhanCing liquidity, some of the 
requirements of larger, long term investors could be met within the 
proposed framework. In principle, therefore, the legislation should 
overcome many of the problems landlords experienced under the current 
framework and meet many of the needs identified above. 
In practice, it is simply not clear that deregulation will result in rents 
that give competitive returns without significant and assured subsidy. 
The earlier assured tenancy scheme foundered after the withdrawal of 
capital allowances because investors considered returns were inadequate 
from rents at current levels of demand (Kemp, 1987a). The current BES 
scheme is an attempt to reintroduce capital subsidy for a short period, 
although it remains to be seen whether it will create only a short lived 
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'wave', rather than more enduring investments. The first signs f['om 
prospectus a['e that it will be short lived, most promoters emphasizing 
capital growth and 'exit routes' for investors to achieve tax free gains. 
As a sympathetic critic of Government policy put it, 'it allows money to 
be made by going into renting only by getting out of renting after a few 
years' (Coleman, 1989, p.48). Perhaps even more lmpo['tantly, from the 
point of view of bringing in long term responsible investors, there is 
still no political consensus and no certainty about the long term stabil-
ity of the legal framework. This is crucial if investors are deciding to 
make investments in new buildings where the return is expected to arise 
over the lifetime of several Parliaments. Reputation - which is crucial 
to institutions - could be undermined by the Goverment's determination not 
to resurrect the system of prior approval of assured tenancy landlords. 
The Government believes prior approval would have high administrative 
costs and could not guarantee netting all 'cowboys'. Instead, the 
Government prefers the approach of policing standards and, as Chapter 16 
described, has amended local housing authorities enforcement powers in the 
1988 Act. Nonetheless, the fear remains that the 'ghost of Rachman' has 
not entirely been laid (although an important step in the direotion of 
exorcising this ghost has been the way some BES schemes are linked to 
housing associations). 
One area where there is some chance of expansion is among smaller 
landlords who get the power via assured shorthold tenancies to realise 
vaoant possession values and remove bad tenants easily. Suoh landlords 
might be prepared to accept lower rents and rates of return than current 
investors, and provide better value for money and improved standards, 
especially for young single people. Certainly, it would appeal' that, if 
capital gain is crucial to most landlords' investment horizons, letting on 
assured shorthold tenancies is likely to dominate new lettings. If the 
possibility of capital gain means that landlords will acoept equity 
related returns, they may well also acoept lower rents than they would 
want in the absenoe of capital gain. This may well make it feasible to 
expect some short term investment, but it cannot be realistic to build new 
houses to let on the expectation of capital gains oontinuing. It is far 
more likely to be a short than a long run expectation. It is not a viable 
basiS for rebuilding private renting. 
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Conclusions 
Some of the framework that is necessary to ensure enduring new net 
investment in private rented housing has therefore been set in place by 
the Housing Act 1988, but problems remain, both in relation to 
sustainable rents and confidence in the sector. 
Most importantly, it is hard not to conclude that the 1988 legislation 
failS to address the underlying problems of the private rented sector 
about levels of demand and competing tax and subsidy arrangements in other 
tenures. It is, however, possible to see some way ahead. Capital 
subsidies may be the only obvious way of ensuring both that returns are 
competitive and social objectives are achieved. Given all the risks of 
providing rented housing to low income people and the uncertainties about 
the legal framework and rent allowance system, it is far more lively that 
investors will respond to capital subsidies than make investments whose 
returns are dependent on tenants' rent paying capacity being underwritten 
solely by Housing Benefits. At the same time if other tenants on higher 
incomes are to be attracted, rents need to be set at a level which makes 
renting competitive with house purchase. Again capital subsidies may be 
needed. Without the abolition, or phasing out of mortgage interest relief, 
some compensating subsidy to private renting is required and the BES 
scheme is a start in this direction. In addition, what is needed is a 
framework in which financial institutions can lend, via property bonds or 
by indexed or low start loans, to property management companies for the 
purchase and improvement of vacant inner city dwellings for young singles 
and job seekers. This should be allied with greater use by local 
authorities of revised discretionary and mandatory powers to police and 
enforce standards of houses let at market rents. It almost certainly 
requires a system of prior approval of landlords (which would increase the 
likelihood of bipartism support), and retention of approved status would 
be subject to letting at acceptable minimum standards. 
On the demand side, tenants need a greater degree of market power if the 
proposals are to work to their advantage. This requires four things. 
First, prescribed forms of contracts should be required for all new 
lettings together with the establishment of Housing Courts to arbitrate on 
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disputes (see Satsangi, 1988, for a review of these proposals). Second, 
the Housing Benefit system needs to be fundamentally remodelled. 
Consideration should be given to basing rents on standard market rents 
valued for each area. Claimants would be allowed to keep any differences 
between the standard and actual rent agreed with the landlords. At the 
risk that some tenants would lose, the gain would be that this gives the 
tenants both incentives and power with which to bargain. (See evidence 
from USA experience of the Experimental Housing Allowance Program in 
Friedman and Weinberg, 1983; Wolman, 1987; see also Whitehead et al., 
1985). Third, tapers on benefit for those whose net income exceeds income 
support levels should be less steep and allowances used to calculate 
eligibility should be more generous. In short, Housing Benefit will need 
to underwrite market rents. Fourth, the bargaining power of low income 
tenants would be greatly increased if their access to social rented 
housing was increased. All of this means both more public investment in 
the provision of adequate rented housing and more public expenditure on 
helping low income tenants afford their standards. 
Without more public investment, the House of Commons' Select Committee on 
the Environment's central dilemma will not have been resolved. Indeed, if 
anything, it is more likely that there will be an increase in the demand 
for low quality, high occupancy, housing by young people in work, posing a 
dilemma for local authorities in exercising any tougher powers they are 
given to enforce standards. Unfortunately deregulation, as currently 
implemented, conflicts with Government policy to cut public spending on 
housing and to maintain fiscal support for owner occupation which reduces 
demand for private renting. Revival of commercial private renting on any 
scale is unlikely on these terms. 
This then raises the intriguing question as to the role housing 
associations might play in the future, as an alternative to commercial 
private renting, by providing housing to people outside their traditional 
client group. The government is moving housing associations to a more 
market oriented approach. New tenancies have to be assured and housing 
associations are free to set their own rents. Housing Association Grant 
has been reduced and is fixed at the outset of a scheme rather than 
paid, as in the recent past, as a grant covering capital costs that cannot 
be funded from Fair Rents. The balance has to be borrowed, including new 
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forms of finance, like index linked loans. The intention is to transfer 
risk to housing associations and make them more efficient. It might also 
move them up market (NFHA, 1981). As the future unfolds there may well 
develop a very complex provision of subsidised independent rented 
housing, some provided through BES schemes and some by Housing 
Associat10ns, both for groups trad1tionally dependent on commercial 
landlords, while some will continue to be provided commercially, perhaps 
also involving public funds in the form of improvement grants. The 
1nteresting question then arises as to which of these forms of 
quasi-private provision provides rented housing for young singles and 
mobile households in a way that is most equ1table, efficient, and effec-
tive in its use of public funds. But to begin to answer that question 
requires yet another research project and one which is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. 
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